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Procuring Guilty Pleas for 
International Crimes: The Limited 
Influence of Sentence Discounts 
Nancy Amoury Combs 59 Vand. L. Rev. 69 (2006) 
International tribunals prosecuting those responsible for 
genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes face many of the 
same resource constraints that bedevil national criminal justice 
systems. Consequently, international tribunals have begun to utilize 
various procedural devices long used by national prosecutors to 
speed case dispositions. One such procedural device is the guilty 
plea. National prosecutors induce criminal defendants to plead 
guilty and waive their rights to trial through a process of plea 
bargaining; that is, by offering defendants sentencing concessions in 
exchange for their guilty pleas. International prosecutors who seek 
to engage in plea bargaining, however, face a host of impediments 
unknown to domestic prosecutors. Most important of these is that 
some groups of international defendants do not significantly value 
the sentencing concessions that form the heart of plea bargaining in 
national criminal justice systems. This Article explores the role of 
sentencing discounts in the guilty-plea decisions of international 
defendants, and it reveals that while sentencing discounts play the 
primary role in influencing Western defendants charged with 
domestic crimes to plead guilty, those same discounts often have 
relatively little effect on the guilty-plea decisions of various groups of 
international defendants. Indeed, whether the prospect of sentence 
leniency will motivate an international defendant to plead guilty 
depends on a number of eclectic and sometimes unexpected factors, 
including the nature of the crime, the nature of the prosecutorial 
selection process, the background of defense counsel, the status and 
education of the defendants, and the defendants' cultural views 
about crime and its appropriate punishment. The study in its 
entirety reveals that the wholesale transplantation of plea 
bargaining practices that successfully procure guilty pleas in the 
context of domestic prosecutions is likely to prove inefficient and 
ineffective in the context of many international prosecutions. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Approximately 90 percent of all American criminal cases are 
disposed of by means of guilty pleas, 1 and a large percentage of 
defendants brought before courts in England, Australia, and other 
countries that use common-law procedures likewise plead guilty.2 
Why do substantial numbers of defendants in national criminal justice 
systems choose to convict themselves when they are entitled to have 
their guilt formally adjudicated? The widely accepted primary reason 
is that they receive sentencing discounts when they choose to self-
convict. Most defendants charged with domestic crimes plead guilty 
following a process of plea bargaining between defense counsel and 
prosecutors. Although plea bargaining can take many forms, 3 at its 
1. See Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 752 n.lO (1970) (relying on estimates "that 
about 90%, and perhaps 95%, of all criminal convictions are by pleas of guilty''); WAYNE R. 
LAFAVE ET AL., CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 21-22 (3d ed. 2000) (observing that no more than 15% of 
felony charges and only 3% to 7% of misdemeanor charges are likely to be resolved by trial); 
George Fisher, Plea Bargaining's Triumph, 109 YALE L.J. 857, 1012 (2000) (noting that in 
modern American courtrooms guilty plea rates in the neighborhood of ninety or even ninety-five 
percent are common); Stephen J. Schulhofer, Plea Bargaining as Disaster, 101 YALE L.J. 1979, 
1993 (1992) ("[E]ighty to ninety percent of defendants currently plead guilty."). 
2. See KATHY MACK & SHARYN ROACH ANLEU, PLEADING GUILTY: ISSUES AND PRACTICES 4 
& n.22 (1995) (reporting that 83.5% of criminal cases in South Australia and 78% of criminal 
cases at the County Court of Melbourne were resolved by guilty plea); John Willis, New Wine in 
Old Bottles: The Sentencing Discount for Pleading Guilty, 13 LAW IN CONTEXT 39, 59 (1995) 
(observing that the majority of Australian defendants plead guilty); ANDREW SANDERS & 
RICHARD YOUNG, CRIMINAL JUSTICE 396 (2000) (reporting that 82% of British cases were 
disposed of by means of guilty plea); Penny Darbyshire, The Mischief of Plea Bargaining and 
Sentencing Rewards, 2000 CRIM. L. REV. 895, 896 (observing "that the overwhelming majority of 
[English] defendants ... plead guilty''); Gail Kellough & Scot Wortley, Bail Decisions and Plea 
Bargaining as Commensurate Decisions, BRIT. J. CRIMINOLOGY 186, 188 (2002) (reporting on 
surveys that "have revealed that over 90 per cent of all criminal cases [in Canada] are resolved 
before trial through a negotiated plea"); JOHN BALDWIN & MICHAEL MCCONVILLE, JURY TRIALS 1 
n.1 (1979) (noting that "(m]ost defendants, both in England and in the United States," plead out). 
3. See Malcolm M. Feeley, Perspectives on Plea Bargaining, 13 LAW & Soc'v REV. 199, 
199-200 (1979) (noting that plea bargaining can involve "negotiation over sentence as distinct 
from charge, over dropping all charges as distinct from reducing them, over facts as distinct from 
the purely instrumental manipulation of charges [and that each form] can be implicit or 
explicit"). Robert Weninger, for instance, states that "(t]he widest definition of plea 
bargaining . _ . includes any inducements that are offered in exchange for a defendant's 
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heart is a promise of some form of sentence leniency in exchange for 
the defendant's guilty plea.4 In the context of domestic crimes, then, 
most defendants are understood to plead guilty primarily, if not 
exclusively, in order to obtain sentence discounts,5 and the magnitude 
of the available discounts will largely determine how many guilty 
pleas will be obtained.6 As the South Australian Court of Criminal 
Appeal put it: 
If a plea of guilty, as distinct from remorse evidenced by such a plea, cannot be regarded 
as a factor in mitigation of penalty, there is no incentive, other than the demands of 
honesty, for an offender to admit his guilt, and experience indicates that the demands of 
honesty have but little influence on many of those who appear in the docks of criminal 
courts. In most cases, if the offender has nothing to gain by admitting his guilt, he will 
see no reason for doing so. 7 
When the crime in question is an international crime that is 
being prosecuted before an international tribunal, the question arises 
whether the prospect of a sentence reduction provides defendants with 
the same compelling motivation to plead guilty that it does for 
defendants accused of domestic crimes. Mter violent upheavals left 
thousands or hundreds of thousands dead in the former Yugoslavia, 
Rwanda, and East Timor, the United Nations ("UN") established 
criminal tribunals to prosecute some of the international crimes that 
were committed in those locations.8 These three tribunals-the 
concession of criminal liability." Robert A. Weninger, The Abolition of Plea Bargaining: A Case 
Study of El Paso County, Texas, 35 UCLA L. REV. 265, 289-90 (1987). 
4. E.g. , LAFAVE ET AL., supra note l, at 21 (explaining that guilty pleas arise when "the 
prosecution offers certain concessions in return for the defendant's entry of the plea"). 
5. See Steven S. Nemerson, Coercive Sentencing, 64 MINN. L. REV. 669, 675 (1980) 
(attributing American guilty pleas to the expectation of sentence discounts); R. v. Jones (2000) 
Q.C.A. 84, 2000 WL 1244498 (Austl.) (Davies JA) (asserting that in most cases a guilty plea "is 
evidence of an expectation on the part of the offender usually as a result of legal advice that a 
guilty plea will probably result in a reduced sentence"); MICHAEL ZANDER & PAUL HENDERSON, 
CROWN COURT STUDY, RCCJ RESEARCH STUDY No. 19, at 146 (1993) (reporting that the majority 
of British defendants who plead guilty are influenced by the expected sentencing discount); R. v. 
March [2002] EWCA (Crim) 551, 2002 Crim.App. R(S) 98 (Eng.) (holding that failing to give a 
defendant a sentence discount following a guilty plea would discourage guilty pleas); Willis, 
supra note 2, at 71 ("Without precise and predictable benefits for pleading guilty, it is by no 
means clear that defendants and their advisers will be sufficiently reassured to change their 
plea."); cf. MACK & ANLEU, supra note 2, at 39 (reporting on interviews with prosecutors and 
defense counsel who said that a sentence discount is an important factor motivating defendants 
to plead guilty but is not always the most important factor). 
6. Cf. Albert W. Alschuler, Plea Bargaining and Its History, 13 L. & SOC'V REV. 212, 235 
(1979) (''The high rates of guilty pleas in the 1920s left little room for dramatic increases. In 
recent years, however, prosecutors may have found it necessary to offer greater concessions 
simply to keep those rates constant."). 
7. R. v. Shannon (1979) 21 S.A. St. R. 451 (Austl.). 
8. S.C. Res. 827, U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., 3217th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/827 (May 25, 1993) 
(as amended) [hereinafter lCTY Statute]; S.C. Res. 955, U.N. SCOR, 49th Sess., 3453d mtg., U.N. 
Doc. S/RES/955 & Annex (Nov. 8, 1994) (as amended) [hereinafter ICTR Statute]; UNTAET 
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International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia ("ICTY''), 
the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda. ("ICTR"), and the 
Special Panels for Serious Crimes in East Timor ("Special Panels")-
have lately experienced considerable pressure to dispose of their cases 
more expeditiously. To that end, international prosecutors at these 
institutions have been making substantial efforts to induce defendants 
to plead guilty, and, in particular, they have offered the kinds of 
sentencing concessions that would prove attractive to most defendants 
appearing before national courts.· These offers have in many cases 
failed to induce international defendants to plead guilty, and this 
failure has in some cases necessitated a greater reliance on other, 
perhaps less desirable means of docket-clearing.9 
Informed by a series of personal interviews that I conducted 
with international defense counsel and prosecutors, 10 this Article 
analyzes efforts to obtain guilty pleas in international cases. The 
Article shows that the primary reason that those efforts fail in certain 
contexts is that sentencing discounts play only the most minor role, if 
they play any role at all, in the guilty-plea decisions of certain groups 
of international criminal defendants. Whether the prospect of 
sentence leniency will in fact motivate international defendants to 
plead guilty depends on a number of eclectic and sometimes 
unexpected factors, including the nature of the crime, the nature of 
the prosecutorial selection process, the background of defense counsel, 
Regulation No. 2000/15 on the Establishment of Panels with Exclusive Jurisdiction over Serious 
Criminal Offenses (June 6, 2000) [hereinafter Special Panels Statute]. Other international 
criminal tribunals exist as well. The Special Court for Sierra Leone was established to prosecute 
international and domestic crimes that occurred during Sierra Leone's brutal eleven-year civil 
war. See S.C. Res. 1315, U.N. SCOR, 55th Sess., 4168th mtg., at 2, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1315 (Aug. 
14, 2000) (stating that "the situation in Sierra Leone continues to constitute a threat to 
international peace and security in the region" and directing the UN Secretary-General to 
negotiate with the government of Sierra Leone regarding the Special Court); Statute of the 
Special Court for Sierra Leone, arts. 2-5, available at http://www.sc-sl.org/scsl-statute.html 
[hereinafter SCSL Statute]. The UN and Cambodia have recently agreed to establish 
Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia to prosecute Khmer Rouge leaders, but the 
Chambers have not yet begun work. See Draft Agreement Between the United Nations and the 
Royal Government of Cambodia Concerning the Prosecution under Cambodian Law of Crimes 
Committed During the Period of Democratic Kampuchea, art. 1, May 22, 2003, available at 
http://www. womenwarpeace.org/issues/justiceldocs/gares57228b.pdf. The Rome Statute 
establishing a permanent International Criminal Court (ICC) was signed in 1998. Rome Statute 
of the International Criminal Court, July 17, 1998, U.N. Doc. NConf.183/9 [hereinafter Rome 
Statute]. This Article does not discuss these institutions since they are not currently receiving 
guilty pleas. 
9. See infra notes 70-72. 
10. The footnotes identify some interviewees, but many others spoke to me on condition of 
anonymity. In the latter cases, if a documentary source is available, I cite it and omit any 
reference to the interviews. In cases in which no documentary source is available, I cite the 
interview, identifying the interviewee by pseudonymic initials. 
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the status and education of the defendants, and the defendants' 
cultural views about crime and its appropriate punishment. These 
factors can coalesce in unforeseen ways: in the context of some large-
scale crimes, virtually no sentence reduction will be sufficient to 
motivate defendants to plead guilty, while in the context of other 
atrocities, no sentence reduction is necessary to motivate defendants 
to plead guilty. 
This Article explores the role of sentencing discounts in the 
guilty-plea decisions of international defendants. The Article reveals 
that although institutions currently prosecuting international crimes 
are similarly structured and seek to fulfill similar mandates, dramatic 
differences exist regarding the way in which defendants prosecuted 
before these institutions value sentencing discounts. The views of 
lCTY defendants, for instance, most resemble those of Western 
defendants appearing before national criminal courts. In particular, 
an ICTY defendant's expected sentence reduction appears to play a 
primary role in his decision whether or not to plead guilty. By 
contrast, the prospect of sentencing reductions does not appear to 
significantly influence the decisions of ICTR defendants and Special 
Panels defendants. Most ICTR defendants are ideologically committed 
to an understanding of the Rwandan conflict that precludes their 
pleading guilty to the commission of genocide, regardless of the 
sentencing benefit they might obt;;iin by doing so. Thus, prosecutorial 
attempts to motivate ICTR defendants to plead guilty with the 
promise of sentence reductions have been largely unsuccessful. 
Special Panels defendants, by contrast, are culturally committed to a 
world view that places tremendous value on confession, apology, and 
reconciliation. Thus, promises of sentence reductions have been 
unnecessary to persuade Special Panels defendants to plead guilty 
since they are already inclined to do so. The analysis that follows 
suggests that prosecutors who seek to persuade international 
defendants to plead guilty must assess a multiplicity of factors and in 
many cases extend their inducements beyond the traditional promise 
of sentencing concessions. 
Part II provides a brief description of plea bargaining in 
national courts and examines in particular the relationship between 
different forms of negotiation and the sentencing schemes to which 
those negotiations must adapt. This examination reveals that the 
effectiveness of a given form of plea bargaining depends largely on the 
way in which the sentencing of crimes in that jurisdiction is 
conducted; the insights of this examination are then applied to the 
plea bargaining and sentencing practices prevailing at the 
international tribunals. Part II ends by detailing the conventional 
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view that most Western defendants who plead guilty to domestic 
crimes do so primarily to obtain sentencing concessions. Some 
defendants charged with international crimes likewise plead guilty 
primarily to obtain sentencing concessions; in particular, an 
examination of ICTY plea bargaining and sentencing practices, 
undertaken in Part III, indicates that the guilty-plea decisions of 
ICTY defendants, like the decisions of defendants charged with 
domestic crimes, are substantially influenced by the expectation of 
sentence reductions. Ideological commitments and race-based 
loyalties can serve to reduce the influence of sentencing concessions, 
however, as Part IV reveals through its exploration of plea bargaining 
efforts at the ICTR. Finally, through an examination of guilty-plea 
practices at the Special Panels, Part V concludes the study by 
illuminating the significant role that socio-economic and cultural 
factors can play in encouraging or discouraging international 
defendants to plead guilty. The study, in its entirety, reveals that the 
wholesale transplant of plea-bargaining practices that successfully 
procure guilty pleas in the context of domestic crimes is likely to prove 
inefficient and ineffective in the context of many international crimes. 
II. PLEA BARGAINING AND CRIMINAL SENTENCING IN NATIONAL AND 
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEMS 
Most guilty pleas in national criminal justice systems are 
secured following a process of plea bargaining. Plea bargaining can 
take a number of forms. In most cases, the bargaining is explicit; that 
is, the prosecution and defense bargain openly about the concessions 
the defendant is to receive. Such negotiations typically concern either 
the sentence that will be imposed on the defendant (sentence 
bargaining) or the charges to which the defendant will plead guilty 
(charge bargaining). When engaged in sentence bargaining, the 
prosecutor usually agrees to recommend that the court impose a 
specific sentence or a narrow range of sentences. In jurisdictions 
where sentence bargaining is practiced, courts typically sentence in 
accordance with prosecutorial recommendations;11 indeed, unless a 
11. American judges, for instance, virtually always follow sentence recommendations. See 
LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 1, at 956 (explaining that a prosecutor may "promise a certain 
sentence upon a guilty plea" and that the possibility is slight that the trial judge will not follow 
his recommendations); Albert W. Alschuler, The Trial Judge's Role in Plea Bargaining, Part I, 76 
COLUM. L. REV. 1059, 1065 (1976) ("Students of the criminal courts of many American 
jurisdictions have noted that judges almost automatically ratify prosecutorial charge reductions 
and sentence recommendations."); Donald G. Gifford, Meaningful Reform of Plea Bargaining: 
The Control of Prosecutorial Discretion, 1983 U. ILL. L. REV. 37, 38 ("[R]egardless of the 
articulated standard, courts rarely intervene in plea agreements."). Australian judges, by 
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court follows the prosecutor's recommendations in most cases, the 
prosecutor will be unable to sentence bargain because the prosecutor's 
recommendations are valuable only to the extent that the court 
adheres to them. When engaged in charge bargaining, the prosecutor 
typically agrees to dismiss certain charges-usually the most 
serious-with the expectation that the defendant will receive a lower 
sentence as a result. 12 Some jurisdictions additionally or alternatively 
practice implicit plea bargaining, which refers to a judicial practice of 
imposing lower sentences after a guilty plea than after a trial. In 
those jurisdictions, no bargaining needs to take place between the 
defense and prosecution; rather, defendants plead guilty on the 
expectation that the court will sentence them more leniently.l3 
The sort of plea bargaining that is practiced in a given 
jurisdiction depends on a number of considerations, the most important 
of which is the legislative scheme that governs the court's sentencing. 
As discussed in more detail below, it is generally understood that 
defendants accused of domestic crimes plead guilty primarily to obtain 
sentencing discounts; thus, to induce such a defendant to plead guilty, 
a prosecutor must be able to offer the defendant a fairly certain 
sentence reduction in exchange for his guilty plea. In many 
jurisdictions, the prosecutor's charging decisions enable the prosecutor 
to provide defendants this certainty. In particular, charge bargaining 
is apt to be effective when the criminal code (1) classifies criminal 
activity into carefully delineated, distinct crimes; and (2) constrains 
judicial sentencing discretion by setting forth presumptive sentencing 
ranges for particular crimes. California, for example, divides criminal 
homicide into murder14 and manslaughter.l5 Murder is further 
contrast, are not so inclined to sentence in accordance with prosecutorial recommendations; 
consequently, sentence bargaining between prosecution and defense is less common in Australia. 
MACK & ANLEU, supra note 2, at 4, 26-27. 
12. E.g., LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 1, at 956 (explaining that an "on-the-nose" guilty plea to 
one charge may be exchanged for the prosecutor's agreement to drop other charges). In many 
cases, the dismissed charges carry mandatory sentences higher than the range of sentences 
available for the remaining charges, so the dismissal of the more serious charges necessarily 
results in a reduced sentence. See id. ; Michael Bohlander, Plea Bargaining Before the ICTY, in 
ESSAYS ON lCTY PROCEDURE AND EVIDENCE IN HONOUR OF GABRIELLE KIRK MCDONALD 151, 151 
(Richard May et al. eds ., 2001) (explaining the effect of dismissal on the overall sentence). 
13. See Alschuler, supra note 11, at 1076 (describing implicit plea bargaining in the federal 
courts); Lawrence M. Friedman, Plea Bargaining in Historical Perspective, 13 LAW & SOC'Y REV. 
247, 253 (1979) (discussing the unspoken understanding between defendants and judges that 
results in defendants being better off following a guilty plea). As a British court bluntly observed: 
lt is "trite to say that a plea of guilty would generally attract a lighter sentence . Every defendant 
should know that." R. v. Cain, [1976] Crim. L.R. 464 (Eng.). See also R. v. Boyd, (1980) 2 Cr.App. 
R(S) 234 (Eng.). 
14. Murder is defined as "the unlawful killing of a human being, or a fetus, with malice 
aforethought." CAL. PENAL CODE § 187 (West 2006). 
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subdivided into first-degree murder16 and second-degree murder, 17 
while manslaughter is subdivided into voluntary,ts involuntary,19 
vehicular,20 and gross. vehicular while intoxicated.21 Each of these 
crimes is punishable by a reasonably narrow range of sentences. 
Defendants convicted of voluntary manslaughter, for instance, must 
be sentenced to three, six, or eleven years' imprisonment,22 while 
defendants convicted of involuntary manslaughter must be sentenced 
to two, three, or four years' imprisonment. 23 Thus, charge bargaining 
is effective in California because defendants are guaranteed a certain 
degree of certainty about their potential sentences when deciding to 
plead guilty. 
Charge bargaining is not as effective when it comes to 
international crimes, however, because those crimes are broadly 
defined and encompass a wide range of behavior. Genocide, crimes 
against humanity, and war crimes constitute the core offenses over 
which the ICTY, ICTR, Special Panels, and other international 
criminal bodies have jurisdiction,24 and each of these crimes can be 
15. Manslaughter is defined as "the unlawful killing of a human being without malice." Id. 
§ 192. 
16. California defines first-degree murder as including "murder which is perpetrated by 
means of a destructive device or explosive, a weapon of mass destruction, knowing use of 
ammunition designed primarily to penetrate metal or armor, poison, lying in wait, torture, or by 
any other kind of willful, deliberate, and premeditated killing, or which is committed in the 
perpetration of, or attempt to perpetrate, arson, rape, carjacking, robbery, burglary, mayhem, 
kidnapping, train wrecking, or [other acts] or any murder which is perpetrated by means of 
discharging a firearm from a motor vehicle, intentionally at another person outside of the vehicle 
with the intent to inflict death." Id. § 189. 
17. Second-degree murder is any murder that is not first-degree murder. Id. 
18. Voluntary manslaughter is an unlawful killing without malice that occurs "upon a 
sudden quarrel or heat of passion." I d. § 192(a). 
19. Involuntary manslaughter is an unlawful killing without malice that occurs during "the 
commission of an unlawful act, not amounting to felony; or in the commission of a lawful act 
which might produce death, in an unlawful manner, or without due caution and circumspection," 
with the exception of acts committed while driving a vehicle. I d. § 192(b). 
20. Vehicular manslaughter encompasses a number of acts involving a vehicle, including 
"driving a vehicle in the commission of an unlawful act, not amounting to felony, and with gross 
negligence" and "driving a vehicle in the commission of a lawful act which might produce death, 
in an unlawful manner, and with gross negligence." Id. § 192(c)(1). 
21. Gross vehicular manslaughter while intoxicated is the "unlawful killing of a human 
being without malice aforethought, in the driving of a vehicle, where the driving was in violation 
of Section 23140, 23152, or 23153 of the Vehicle Code, and the killing was either the proximate 
result of the commission of an unlawful act, not amounting to a felony, and witb gross 
negligence, or the proximate result of the commission of a lawful act which might produce death, 
in an unlawful manner, and with gross negligence." Id. § 191.5(a). 
22. Id. § 193(a). 
23. Id. § 193(b). 
24. ICTY Statute, supra note 8, arts. 2-5; ICTR Statute, supra note 8, arts. 2-5; Special 
Panels Statute, supra note 8, § 1.3 (providing additionally for jurisdiction over the domestic 
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committed in a multitude of ways. Persecution as a crime against 
humanity, for instance, can be perpetrated by means of murder, 
extermination, or torture. 25 Persecution also encompasses arguably 
less serious discriminatory acts involving political, social, and 
economic rights, 26 including those targeting property alone. 27 
Consequently, two defendants convicted of persecution may have 
engaged in vastly different criminal behavior. General Blaskic, for 
instance, was a military commander convicted by the ICTY of 
persecution for having ordered "attacks on towns and villages; murder 
and serious bodily injury; the destruction and plunder of property ... ; 
inhuman and cruel treatment of civilians and, in particular, their 
being taken hostage and used as human shields; [and] the forcible 
transfer of civilians."28 By contrast, Dragan Kolundzija, who was also 
convicted by the lCTY of persecution, was a comparatively lowly shift 
commander in a prison camp who had only a limited ability to prevent 
the mistreatment of prisoners or to improve the conditions in which 
prisoners were held. 29 Kolundzija did not himself mistreat anyone;30 
rather, his conviction of persecution stemmed from his continuing to act 
as a shift commander despite the abuse that others perpetrated on 
prisoners and the appalling conditions prevailing at the camp. 
Similarly, disparate acts or omissions can form the basis of other 
international crimes. A defendant convicted of genocide, for instance, 
might be responsible for a handful of murders or tens of thousands of 
murders. 
Perhaps because they must impose appropriate sentences for 
crimes encompassing vastly differing levels of culpability, international 
judges are given almost limitless discretion in sentencing. The statutes 
offenses of murder, sexual offenses and torture); Rome Statute, supra note 8, art. 5 (bestowing on 
the ICC jurisctiction over war crimes, crimes against humanity, and genocide and, if certain 
conditions are met, over aggression); SCSL Statute, supra note 8, arts. 2-5 (authorizing the 
Special Court for Sierra Leone to exercise jurisdiction over crimes against humanity, war crimes 
and certain violations of Sierra Leonean law) . 
25. Prosecutor v. Semanza, Case No. lCTR-97-20-T, Judgment, 'If 349 (May 15, 2003). 
26. Prosecutor v. Kupreskic et al. , Case No. lT-95-16-T, Judgment, 'If 615 (Jan. 14, 2000) 
[hereinafter Kupreskic Judgment]. 
27. Prosecutor v. Blaskic, Case No. IT-94-14-T, Judgment, 'If 233 (Mar. 3, 2000) [hereinafter 
Blaskic Judgment]. The ICTY has been careful to instruct, however, that "not every denial of a 
human right" can constitute persecution as a crime against humanity. Kupreskic Judgment, 
supra note 26, 'If 618. It has defined persecution as "the gross or blatant denial, on discriminatory 
grounds, of a fundamental right, laid down in international customary or treaty law, reaching 
the same level of gravity as the other acts prohibited in Article 5 [of the ICTY Statute] ," which 
addresses crimes against humanity. Id. 'If 621. 
28. Blaskic Judgment, supra note 27, at Disposition. 
29. Prosecutor v. Sikirica et al., Case No. IT-95-8-T, Sentencing Judgment, 'If 210 (Nov. 13, 
2001) [hereinafter Sikirica Sentencing Judgment] . 
30. Id. 'lf'lf 202, 204, 229. 
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and procedural rules of the ICTY and the ICTR, for instance, instruct 
judges to take into account various factors when sentencing, including 
the gravity of the offense and the individual circumstances of the 
defendant, 3l the general practice regarding prison sentences in the 
courts of the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda, as well as any 
aggravating or mitigating circumstances.32 But that is the extent of 
the guidance provided to----<>r the constraints imposed upon-the Trial 
Chambers. The statutes and the rules do not provide any instruction 
as to the relative "gravity'' of the various offenses within the 
Tribunals' jurisdictions,33 nor do they indicate which "individual 
circumstances" might be relevant to sentencing or how they might be 
relevant. Further, although the statutes and rules require the Trial 
Chambers to consider aggravating and mitigating circumstances, they 
fail to delineate any aggravating circumstances, and they make 
mention of only one mitigating circumstance: "substantial cooperation 
with the Prosecutor by the convicted person before or after 
conviction."34 Judges at other international tribunals possess 
similarly broad discretion in sentencing.35 
31. ICTY Statute, supra note 8, art. 24(2); ICTR Statute, supra note 8, art. 23(2). 
32. ICTY R.P. & Evm. R. lOl(B)(i)·(iii) (2004); ICTR R.P. & Evm. R. lOl(B)(i)-(iii) (2004). 
For a critical analysis of that provision, see William A. Schabas, Sentencing By International 
Tribunals: A Human Rights Approach, 7 DUKE J . COMP. & lNT'L L. 461, 480 (1997). The ICTY 
and ICTR have not held themselves bound by the sentencing practices of the former Yugoslavia 
or Rwanda. See Prosecutor v. Delalic, Case No. IT-96-21-A, Judgment, 'I] 813 (Feb. 20, 2001); 
Prosecutor v. Serushago, Case No. ICTR-98-39-A, Reasons for Judgment, 'I] 30 (Apr. 6, 2000) 
(observing that the Trial Chamber is obliged only to take account of the sentencing practices in 
Rwanda). 
33. For a discussion of the ICTY's and ICTR's views on the relative gravity of various 
offenses, see Andrea Carcano, Sentencing and the Gravity of the Offence in International 
Criminal Law, 51 lNT'L & COMP. L. Q. 583 (2002) (examining whether the same act should be 
punished more severely when charged as a crime against humanity rather than as a war crime); 
see also Allison Marston Danner, Constructing a Hierarchy of Crimes in International Criminal 
Law Sentencing, 87 VA. L. REV. 415, 420 (arguing that "contrary to the current practice of the 
ICTY, judges sentencing defendants convicted of violations of international law should consider 
the elements of the chapeau in evaluating the harm caused by the defendants' acts"). 
34. ICTY R.P. & Evm. R. lOl(B)(ii); ICTR R.P. & Evm. R. 101(B)(ii). 
35. Judges of the Special Panels, for instance, are likewise instructed to consider in 
sentencing "such factors as the gravity of the offence and the individual circumstances of the 
convicted person." Special Panels Statute, supra note 8, § 10.2. Judges of the Special Court for 
Sierra Leone are also directed to consider the gravity of the offense and the defendant's 
individual circumstances, and they are instructed in addition to "have recourse to the practice 
regarding prison sentences in the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda and the national 
courts of Sierra Leone." SCSL Statute, supra note 8, arts. 19(1) & (2). Special Court for Sierra 
Leone judges must also consider aggravating and mitigating circumstances; like the Statutes of 
the ICTY and ICTR, the Special Court Statute identifies no aggravating circumstances and only 
one mitigating circumstance: substantial cooperation with the prosecution. SCSL Statute, supra 
note 8, art. 6( 4). 
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Whether broadly defined crimes coupled with wide sentencing 
discretion result in equitable punishment is open to debate. What is 
not debatable, however, is that broadly defined crimes coupled with 
wide sentencing discretion impede a prosecutor's ability to promise the 
defendant a certain benefit with an offer to withdraw charges. In other 
words, because international judges have such wide sentencing 
discretion, and the crimes within the Tribunals' jurisdiction are so 
broadly defined and so grave, a prosecutorial promise to withdraw a few 
charges here and there often will fail to provide a defendant adequate 
certainty that he is getting appropriate consideration-or any 
consideration at all-for his guilty plea. So long as the remaining 
charges are sufficiently serious, a Trial Chamber may well sentence a 
defendant to the same term of imprisonment to which he would have 
been sentenced had he not pled guilty. So, while a California defendant 
can plead guilty to involuntary manslaughter instead of voluntary 
manslaughter and be assured of a sentence reduction, a Tribunal 
defendant who admits to murder as a crime against humanity instead 
of the more serious extermination as a crime against humanity can be 
assured of nothing. 
Charge bargaining can be effective in the international realm, 
then, only if the prosecution is willing to withdraw charges in a way 
that would fundamentally alter either the legal or the factual 
description of the criminal conduct. That sort of bargaining has 
virtually never occurred at the international tribunals.36 By and large, 
international prosecutors seeking to secure guilty pleas have focused 
their efforts not on charge bargaining but on sentence bargaining and 
implicit bargaining, as will be discussed in the following Parts. 
Whatever forms of plea bargaining are practiced in a particular 
jurisdiction, the end goal of each is the same: to provide the defendant 
a sentencing discount as a means of convincing him to enter a guilty 
plea. Plea bargaining in national criminal justice systems, then, is 
premised on the assumption that defendants consider the offer of a 
sentencing discount to be a compelling inducement. The very fact that 
such high percentages of defendants charged with domestic crimes do 
choose to plead guilty upon the offer of sentencing discounts seems to 
prove the point. As Frank Easterbrook put it: "Defendants 
presumably prefer the lower sentences to the exercise of their trial 
rights or they would not strike the deals."37 Indeed, American 
academics have constructed sophisticated economic models to predict 
36. For a comprehensive treatment of ICTY charge bargaining, see NANCY AMOURY COMBS, 
GUILTY PLEAS IN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW (forthcoming 2006). 
37. Frank H. Easterbrook, Criminal Procedure as a Market System, 12 J. LEGAL STUDIES 
299, 309 (1983). 
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whether an acceptable plea bargain will exist in certain situations, 
and these models are predicated on the assumption that defendants 
seek to minimize their incarceration time.38 Richard Adelstein 
asserts, for instance, that "the defendant will agree to a guilty plea if 
he perceives the cost of the sentence received upon the plea as less 
than the expected disutility of the trial prospect and its associated 
sentence."39 
Whether or not most American defendants engage in precise 
calculations of conviction likelihood and sentencing possibilities, 
empirical evidence suggests that they do plead guilty largely because 
they expect to receive a sentence discount for doing so. Only a few 
American jurisdictions have made any attempt to prohibit prosecutors 
from offering sentencing concessions to defendants, 40 but those that 
did so have experienced a sharp decline in their percentage of cases 
disposed of by means of guilty pleas. In 1975, for instance, Alaska's 
Attorney General prohibited his prosecutors from offering defendants 
charging or sentencing concessions.41 Defendants convicted at trial 
continued to receive longer sentences than defendants who pled 
guilty, 42 so implicit plea bargaining persisted. Although the 
prohibition on charging and sentencing concessions did not cause as 
dramatic an increase in trial rates as many had expected, probably 
because implicit plea bargaining continued, 43 it did cause a 
substantial increase. In Anchorage, for instance, trials increased by 
about 97 percent following the plea-bargaining ban.44 At about the 
same time that Alaska instituted its ban, the District Attorney in El 
Paso County, Texas likewise banned both charging and sentencing 
38. See, e.g., William M. Landes, An Economic Analysis of the Courts, 14 J. L. & ECON. 61 
(1971) (describing the basic behavior assumptions of the prosecutor and accused in Landes's 
theoretical model); Edward A. Ruttenberg, Plea Bargaining Analytically-The Nash Solution to 
the Landes Model, 7 AM. J. CRIM. L. 323, 330, 334 (1979) (examining the assumptions required to 
construct a "synthesized model of plea bargaining''). 
39. Richard P. Adelstein, The Negotiated Guilty Plea: A Framework for Analysis, 53 N.Y.U. 
L. Rev. 783, 809 (1978). 
40. See Robert L. Misner, Recasting Prosecutorial Discretion, 86 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 
717, 752 (1996) ("Calls for the abolition of plea bargaining have been heard and ignored for more 
than twenty-five years."). 
41. Michael L. Rubenstein & Teresa J. White, Alaska's Ban on Plea Bargaining, 13 LAw & 
Soc'V REV. 367, 367 (1979). 
42. Teresa White Carns & John A. Kruse, Alaska's Ban on Plea Bargaining Reevaluated, 75 
JUDICATURE 310, 311-12 (1992). 
43. See Rubenstein & White, supra note 41, at 380 & n.18 (describing the concern of defense 
counsel that, if they took a hopeless case to trial, the "convicted client would have to pay the bill 
in the end, perhaps in the form of a longer sentence"). 
44. Jd.at374. 
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negotiations in felony cases.45 As in Alaska, implicit bargaining 
continued because guilty-plea defendants received shorter sentences 
than jury-trial defendants.46 The implicit bargaining was not 
sufficient to maintain the guilty-plea rates that existed prior to the 
plea bargaining ban; rather, the proportion of cases disposed of by 
trial almost doubled, and in three years' time, the criminal case docket 
had increased by 250 percent, causing delays and straining 
resources. 47 As these examples suggest, sentencing discounts matter 
to American defendants. Without them, most American defendants 
will proceed to trial. 
Empirical studies likewise indicate that a substantial 
proportion of defendants in the United Kingdom also plead guilty so as 
to obtain sentencing concessions.48 To encourage guilty pleas English 
laws not only require judges to consider a defendant's guilty plea in 
sentencing,49 but also require judges to announce when they have 
discounted the defendant's sentence.50 Similarly, some Australian 
judges were disturbed because a substantial proportion of defendants 
declined to tender early guilty pleas or declined to plead guilty at all 
because they were uncertain as to what, if any, sentencing discount 
they would receive. In response, the judges began establishing 
guidelines for sentence reductions in guilty-plea cases and have begun 
informing defendants as to what discount they have in fact received.51 
To the same end, the Royal Commission on Criminal Justice in the 
United Kingdom recommended providing defendants with a reliable 
early indication of the maximum sentence they will receive after 
pleading guilty as a means of encouraging early guilty pleas. 52 The 
45. Weninger, supra note 3, at 275-76. See generally Sam W. Callan, An Experience in 
Justice Without Plea Negotiation, 13 LAW & Soc'V REV. 327 (1979). 
46. Weninger, supra note 3, at 295. A 1975 study of the attempt to eliminate plea 
bargaining in Black Hawk County, Iowa, also found that implicit plea bargaining remained 
following attempts to eliminate plea bargaining. Note, The Elimination of Plea Bargaining in 
Black Hawk County: A Case Study, 60 IOWA L. REV. 1053, 1064 n.llO (1975). 
47. Weninger, supra note 3, at 277-78. 
48. C. Hedderman & D. Moxon, Magistrates' Court or Crown Court? Mode of Trial Decisions 
and Sentencing, in 125 HOME OFFICE RESEARCH STUDY 32 (1992) (U.K.); see also SANDERS & 
YOUNG, supra note 2, at 414. 
49. Criminal Justice Act, 2003, art. 144(1) (Eng.). 
50. I d. art. 17 4(2)(d). Few judges inform the defendant of the sentence he would have 
received had he gone to trial, however. RALPH HENHAM, SENTENCE DISCOUNTS AND THE 
CRIMINAL PROCESS 18-20 (2001). 
51. SeeR. v. Thomson & Houlton (2000) 49 N.S.W.L.R. 383, ~~ 21-22, 109, 135, 148-152 
(Austl.) (holding that New South Wales courts should follow the practice of other courts and 
announce the sentencing discount bestowed on the defendant as a result of his guilty plea, and 
setting the discount at between 10 and 25%). 
52. REPORT OF THE ROYAL COMMISSION ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE 112-13 (1993) (Runciman 
Commission). But see SANDERS & YOUNG, supra note 2, at 422 (opining that "[a) statement that 
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Scottish High Court of Justiciary concurred in this approach, 
observing that a Scottish statute that requires a judge to take account 
of a guilty plea in sentencing "is not likely to give encouragement to 
pleas of guilty unless accused persons and their legal representatives 
have some assurance as to the allowance which the court is likely to 
make."53 The sentencing judgments of appellate courts in the United 
Kingdom are similarly premised on the assumption that defendants 
plead guilty in order to obtain sentencing concessions. So as not to 
discourage subsequent defendants from pleading guilty, appellate 
courts routinely reduce sentences when they determine that the trial 
court gave the defendant insufficient credit for pleading guilty. 54 
Indeed, one Court of Appeal went so far as to state that the law 
required the sentencing judge to give the defendant some sentencing 
reduction for a guilty plea no matter how strong the prosecution's case 
may be. 55 
The offer of sentencing concessions, then, is routine in nations 
that use guilty pleas56 because it is effective in inducing a substantial 
portion of criminal defendants in those nations to plead guilty. Its 
effectiveness stems largely from the fact that the criminal defendants 
in question value the sentencing concessions they expect to receive 
more than they value the trial rights that a guilty plea requires them 
to forego. How tempting an inducement a sentencing discount will be 
depends of course on the magnitude of the discount and the likelihood 
of conviction following a trial. But the premise underlying the practice 
of plea bargaining-that sentencing concessions substantially 
influence defendants' guilty-plea decisions-appears to be sound in 
the context of national prosecutions. It is also sound in the context of 
some international prosecutions. The following Part will explore the 
guilty-plea decisions of defendants charged with international crimes 
on a plea of guilty [the judge) would impose one sentence but that on a conviction following a 
plea of not guilty he would impose a severer sentence is one which should never be made"). 
53. Du Plooy v. H.M. Advocate, High Court of Justiciary, [2003) S.L.T. 1237, 2003 WL 
22257793 (Scot.). 
54. See, e.g., R. v. Marsh, [2004) EWCA (Crim) 465, 2004 Crim.App. R(S) 80 (Eng.) 
(reducing sentence from ten years' imprisonment to eight years' imprisonment); R. v. McKeown, 
[2004) EWCA (Crim) 461 (Eng.) (reducing sentence from two·and·one·half years' imprisonment 
to two years' imprisonment); R. v. Buffrey, [1992) 14 Cr.App. R(S) 511 (Eng.) (reducing sentence 
from five years' imprisonment to four years' imprisonment); R. v. Skilton & Blackham, (1982) 4 
Cr.App. R(S) 339 (Eng.) (reducing robbery sentence from five years' imprisonment to three-and-
one-half years' imprisonment); R. v. Boyd, [1980) 2 Cr.App. R(S) 234 (Eng.) (reducing burglary 
sentence from three years' imprisonment to two years' imprisonment). 
55. SeeR. v. Fearon, (1996) 2 Cr.App. R(S) 25 (Eng.). 
56. Guilty pleas are most commonly available in the criminal justice systems of Anglo-
American countries that utilize adversarial criminal procedures. Nancy Amoury Combs, Copping 
a Plea to Genocide: The Plea Bargaining of International Crimes, 151 PENN. L. REV. 1, 4 (2002). 
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in the former Yugoslavia and will reveal that these defendants, like 
defendants charged with domestic crimes, find sentencing discounts to 
be a compelling enticement. 
Ill. THE SUBSTANTIAL INFLUENCE OF SENTENCING DISCOUNTS IN 
INTERNATIONAL CASES: GUILTY PLEAS AT THE ICTY 
War broke out in the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia 
in 1991, when many of its constituent republics sought 
independence.57 While the secessions of Croatia and Slovenia were 
followed by only short-lived armed conflicts, the fighting between the 
Serbs, Croats, and Muslims in Bosnia-Herzegovina was fierce and 
protracted.58 The war in Bosnia resulted in approximately 200,000 
deaths,59 approximately 20,000 rapes,60 the forced relocation of more 
than two million people,61 and the "reappearance of concentration 
camps on European soil."62 In 1993, the UN Security Council 
determined that the situation constituted a "threat to international 
peace and security" and established the ICTY to prosecute those 
accused of committing genocide, crimes against humanity, and 
violations of the laws and customs of war in the territory of the former 
Yugoslavia after January 1, 1991.63 
Plea bargaining was not practiced during the early years of the 
ICTY and indeed was considered by many to be a distasteful and 
unnecessary procedural device. The practice was considered 
unnecessary because so few defendants were in the dock during the 
57. Prosecutor v. Krstic, Case No. IT-98-33, Judgment, ~~ 9-10 (Aug. 2, 2001) [hereinafter 
Krstic Judgment]. See generally M. CHERIF BASSIOUNI & PETER MAN!.KAS, THE LAW OF THE 
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA 2fr63 (1996); STEVEN L. BURG 
& PAULS. SHOUP, THE WAR IN BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA: ETHNIC CONFLICT AND INTERNATIONAL 
INTERVENTION 3-127 (1999). 
58. See Krstic Judgment, supra note 57, ~~ 7-10 (explaining the history of the region, its 
ethnic composition, and the ensuing conflict). 
59. Rosemary E. Libera, Divide, Conquer, and Pay: Civil Compensation for Wartime 
Damages, 24 B.C. INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 291, 293 (2001). 
60. MICHAEL P. SCHARF, BALKAN JUSTICE 52 (1997); Makau Matua, Savages, Victims, and 
Saviors: The Metaphor of Human Rights, 42 HARV. INT'L L.J. 201, 223 (2001). 
61. 1 VIRGINIA MORRIS & MICHAEL P. SCHARF, AN INSIDER'S GUIDE TO THE INTERNATIONAL 
CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA xiii (1995); cf. Lynn Hastings, 
Implementation of the Property Legislation in Bosnia-Herzegovina, 37 STAN. J. INT'L L. 221, 221 
(2001) (stating that ethnic cleansing during the war "deprived millions of Bosnian citizens of 
their homes"). 
62. Developments in the Law-Introduction, 114 HARV. L. REV. 1943, 1953 (2001); see also 
SCHARF, supra note 60, at 31-32 (describing reports of ethnic cleansing received by the United 
States, Britain, and France in 1991). 
63. ICTY Statute, supra note 8, art. 1. 
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Tribunal's early years64 that prosecutors had little need to expedite 
proceedings. The practice was considered distasteful for two reasons: 
first, because many ICTY prosecutors hailed from civil-law countries 
where plea bargaining is not widely practiced, and second, because the 
very magnitude of the international crimes at issue made the sort of 
back-room negotiations that characterize the plea bargaining of less 
serious domestic crimes seem entirely inappropriate. During the 
ICTY's procedural rulemaking process, for instance, the United States 
proposed granting defendants full or partial testimonial immunity in 
exchange for their cooperation. The proposal was rejected,65 with 
then-ICTY President Cassese stating: "The persons appearing before us 
will be charged with genocide, torture, murder, sexual assault, wanton 
destruction, persecution and other inhuman acts. Mter due reflection, 
we have decided that no one should be immune from prosecution for 
crimes such as these, no matter how useful their testimony may 
otherwise be." 66 
The landscape has changed markedly since those early days. 
Now, at the same time that a record number ofiCTY defendants await 
trial,67 the UN Security Council, unhappy with the ever-increasing 
64. During its first two years of existence, the ICTY had no defendants in custody. Dusko 
Tadic was not transferred to the ICTY until 1995, and another year passed before any other 
indictees were transferred. Kelly Dawn Askin, The ICTY: An Introduction to its Origins, Rules and 
Jurisprudence, in ESSAYS ON ICTY PROCEDURE AND EVIDENCE IN HONOUR OF GABRIELLE KIRK 
MCDONALD 13, 15-16 (Richard May et al. eds., 2001). The NATO peace·keeping force stationed in 
Bosnia initially was not instructed to arrest Tribunal indictees. See THEODOR MERON, WAR 
CRIMES LAW COMES OF AGE 281 (1998); Payam Akhavan, Justice in The Hague, Peace in the 
Former Yugoslavia? A Commentary on the United Nations War Crimes Tribunal, 20 HUM. RTS. 
Q. 737, 795-96 (1998) (discussing the international community's "unwilling[ness] to make the 
sacrifices necessary to arrest indicted persons"); Gabrielle Kirk McDonald, Reflections on the 
Contributions of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, 24 HASTINGS 
INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 155, 160 (2001). It was not until mid-1997 that the UN force in Croatia 
and then NATO in Bosnia began detaining indictees. Id. at 161. 
65. See Prosecuting and Defending Violations of Genocide and Humanitarian Law: The 
International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, 88 PROC. AM. Soc. INT'L L. 239, 248 (1994) 
(remarks of Steven J. Lepper) ("Among the suggestions rejected by the Tribunal was our thought 
that some sort of immunity or plea·bargaining mechanism should be instituted."). 
66. SCHARF, supra note 60, at 67. 
67. The UN Detention Center is "almost at full capacity," now holding more than sixty 
defendants, a record number. See Record Number of Detainees in The Hague, SENSE NEWS 
AGENCY, Apr. 6, 2004. Even today, however, the ICTY frequently fails to receive adequate 
cooperation from the States of the former Yugoslavia. See ICTY Office of the Prosecutor Press 
Release, Address by Carla Del Ponte, Prosecutor of the International Criminal Tribunal for the 
former Yugoslavia to the United Nations Security Council, U.N. Doc. CDP/P.I.S./917 -e, (Nov. 23, 
2004) ("The first obstacle is the lack of co·operation of States, mainly in the arrest and transfer of 
persons indicted by the ICTY."). Nevertheless, an increasing number of defendants began to be 
transferred to the UN Detention Center after the United States and European governments 
exerted substantial economic and political pressure to achieve that result. See Human Rights 
Watch, Real Progress in The Hague, Mar. 29, 2005, available at http://hrw.org/englishldocs 
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budgets of the ICTY and ICTR,68 is pressuring both Tribunals to 
complete their trials within the next few years.69 To comply with 
these demands, both the ICTY and the ICTR have drastically reduced 
the number of investigations they planned to conduct, 70 and the 
Tribunals have made plans to transfer some of their cases to national 
/2005/03/29/serbia10386.htm. Indeed, Serbia agreed to transfer Slobodan Milosevic to the ICTY 
for trial only after the United States threatened to withhold approximately $500,000 in aid. Jack 
Goldsmith, The Self-Defeating International Criminal Court, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 89, 93 (2003). 
68. In 2004, the ICTY's two-year budget totaled nearly $273 million. The ICTY at a Glance, 
http://www.un.org/icty/glance/index.htm (last visited Jan. 31, 2006). The ICTR's 2004-2005 
budget totaled more than $227 million. ICTR General Information, http://www.ictr.org 
/default.htm (last visited Jan. 31, 2006). 
69. See S.C. Res. 1503, U.N. SCOR, 4817th mtg., at 3, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1503 (Aug. 28, 
2003) (requesting that the Tribunals take all possible measures to complete investigations by 
2004); S.C. Res. 1534, U.N. SCOR, 4935th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/1534 (Mar. 26, 2004) (calling on 
the Tribunals to "complete all work in 2010"); see also ICTY Press Release, Judge Claude Jorda, 
President of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, Reports on the 
Continued Non-Cooperation by the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia to the Security Council, U.N. 
Doc. JDH/P.I.S./706-e, Oct. 23, 2002, available at http://www.un.org/icty/pressreal/p706-e.htm 
(then-ICTY President Jorda noting that the Security Council "expressly mandated us to 
cons-:entrate our work on the trial of the main civilian, military, and paramilitary leaders, in 
particular, so as to be able to complete our trial activities by around 2008"); ICTY Press Release, 
Address by the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Tribunals for the Former Yugoslavia 
and Rwanda, Mrs. Carla Del Ponte, to the United Nations Security Council, U.N. Doc. 
JJJ/P.I.S/709-e, Oct. 30, 2002, available at http://www.un.org/icty/pressreallp709-e.htm 
(referring to "the completion strategy targets and the deadlines expected of us") [hereinafter Del 
Ponte 2002 Address]. 
70. See Del Ponte 2002 Address, supra note 69 ("I have drastically prioritised our 
investigative objectives, for both Tribunals, and further focused our efforts on 'the main eivilian, 
military and paramilitary leaders' so that we can now reasonably expect to fulfil the essence of 
our prosecution missions for both Tribunals by the end of 2004."); Report af the International 
Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of International 
Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia since 1991, Summary~ 
6, U.N. Doc. N57/150 (Aug. 4, 2002) [hereinafter ICTY 2002 Annual Report] (noting the ICTY's 
efforts to further "focus ... [its] mission on trying those crimes which most seriously violate 
international public order"). For a discussion of the ICTR's reduction in investigations, see Letter 
dated 30 April 2004 from the President of the International Criminal Tribunal for the 
Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Genocide and Other Serious Violations of International 
Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of Rwanda and Rwandan Citizens Responsible 
for Genocide and Other Such Violations Committed in the Territory of Neighbouring States 
between 1 January and 31 December 1994 addressed to the President of the Security Council, 
U.N. Doc. S/2004/341, ~~ 6, 30 (May 3, 2004) (detailing the revised completion strategy of the 
ICTR); Completion Strategy of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, U.N. Doc. 
S/2003/946, Enclosure, September 29, 2003 (reducing the overall number of investigations for the 
ICTR); Report of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible 
for Genocide and Other Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the 
Territory of Rwanda and Rwandan Citizens Responsible for Genocide and Other Such Violations 
Committed in the Territory of Neighbouring States between 1 January and 31 December 1994, 
U.N. Doc. N57/163-S/20021733, ~ 9 (July 2, 2002) (''The Prosecutor has revised her future 
investigation programme from the originally estimated number of 136 new suspects and will now 
only conduct investigations against 14 new individuals together with 10 ongoing 
investigations."); ICTR Press Release, ICTR President Calls for Compensation for Victims, 
ICTR/INF0-9-2-326.EN (Oct. 31, 2002) (same). 
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courts in the Balkans71 and Rwanda. 72 In addition, Tribunal 
prosecutors began to make a concerted effort to dispose of their cases 
by means of guilty pleas. Initially, at the ICTY, these efforts proved 
remarkably successful: eight of the record fifteen defendants convicted 
at the ICTY in 2003 convicted themselves. 73 Only one ICTY defendant 
71. Both Tribunals added a provision to their procedural rules, permitting them to transfer 
their cases to national courts for prosecution. See ICTR Press Briefing, ICTRJINF0·9·13-22.EN 
(July 8, 2002), available at http://www.ictr/org/wwwroot/ENGLISH/pressbrief/2002/brief9-13-
22.btm (describing new Rule 11 bis); ICTY Press Release, Extraordinary Plenary Session of 30 
September 2002, U.N. Doc. JDH/PIS/696e (Oct. 1, 2002), available at http://www.un.org/icty/ 
pressrellp696-e.htm (same); ICTY 2002 Annual Report, supra note 70, "if 42; ICTY Press Release, 
Address by his Excellency, Judge Claude Jorda, President of the International Criminal Tribunal 
for the Former Yugoslavia, to tbe United Nations Security Council, U.N. Doc. JDH/P.I.S./690-e 
(July 26, 2002), available at http://www.un.org/icty/pressreallp690-e.htm; see also Mark A. 
Drumbl, Looking Up, Down and Across: The ICTY's Place in the International Legal Order, 37 
NEW ENGLAND L. REV. 701 (2003) (describing the plan to transfer defendants to Bosnian courts). 
The ICTY prosecution has recently sought permission from the Trial Chambers to transfer some 
cases to the courts of Bosnia, Croatia, and Serhia. See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Stankovic, Case No. IT-
96-23/2-PT, Decision on Referral of Case Under Rule 11 bis (May 17, 2005); Prosecutor v. 
Jankovic, Case No. IT-96-23/2-PT, Decision on Referral of Case Under Rule 11 bis (July 22, 
2005); Prosecutor v. Kovacevic, Case No. IT-01-42/2-1, Order on the Prosecutor's Request for 
Referral to National Authorities Under Rule 11 bis (Jan. 20, 2005); Prosecutor v. Ademi & Norac, 
Case No. IT-04-78-PT, Order for Further Information in the Context of the Prosecutor's Request 
under Rule 11 bis (Jan. 20, 2005). 
72. The ICTR has already transferred the twenty-five case files to Rwanda. See Rwanda: 
UN Tribunal Hands More Cases to National Authorities, IRINNEWS.ORG, July 27, 2005, 
http://www.irinnews.org/report.asp?ReportiD=48321&SelectRegion=Great_Lakes&SelectCountr 
y=RWANDA (last visited Jan. 31, 2006); see also Letter dated 30 April 2004 from the President 
of tbe International Criminal Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Genocide 
and Other Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of 
Rwanda and Rwandan Citizens Responsible for Genocide and Other Such Violations Committed 
in the Territory of Neighbouring States between 1 January and 31 December 1994 addressed to 
the President of the Security Council, U.N. Doc. S/2004/341, "il"il 36-38 (May 3, 2004) (reporting 
that the ICTR prosecutor intends to transfer forty-one cases in total); International Bar 
Association, Rwanda: Government to Take Over More War Crimes Prosecutions, LEGAL BRIEF 
AFRICA, Mar. 14, 2005; Completion Strategy of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, 
U.N. Doc. S/2003/946, Enclosure at "if 23 (Sept. 29, 2003); ICTR NEWSLE'ITER, June 2004, at 5 
("The Prosecutor has identified 41 cases which he intends to transfer to Rwanda and other 
national jurisdictions for adjudication."); UN War Crimes Court Close to Deal with Rwanda on 
Transferring Cases, AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE, Aug. 13, 2004. 
73. The four trials that the ICTY did conduct led to the conviction of seven defendants. See 
Prosecutor v. Simic et al., Case No. IT-95-9-T, Judgment (Oct. 17, 2003) (Blagoje Simic, Miroslav 
Tadic, and Simo Zaric); Prosecutor v. Stakic, Case No. IT-97-24-T, Judgment (July 31, 2003) 
(Milomir Stakic); Prosecutor v. Naletilic & Martinovic, Case No. IT-98-34-T, Judgment (Mar. 31, 
2003) (Mladen Naletilic and Vinko Martinovic); Prosecutor v. Galic, Case No. IT-98-29-T, 
Judgment (Dec. 5, 2003) (Stanislav Galic). In addition, guilty pleas were tendered by eight 
others: Predrag Banovic, Prosecutor v. Meakic et al., Case No. IT-02-65-PT, Joint Motion for the 
Consideration of a Plea Agreement Between Predrag Banovic and the Office of the Prosecutor, 
Annex 1 (June 18, 2003) [hereinafter Banovic Plea Agreement]; Momir Nikolic, Prosecutor v. 
Momir Nikolic, Case No. IT-02-60-PT, Joint Motion for Consideration of Plea Agreement 
Between Momir Nikolic and the Office of the Prosecutor, Annex A, Amended Plea Agreement 
(May 7, 2003) [hereinafter Momir Nikolic Plea Agreement]; Dragan Obrenovic, Prosecutor v. 
Dragan Obrenovic, Case No. IT-02-60-PT, Joint Motion for Consideration of Plea Agreement 
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has pled guilty since January 2004, 74 however, and the proliferation of 
guilty pleas in 2003 and their abrupt drop-off in 2004 appear directly 
related to the sentencing practices of the lCTY Trial Chambers in 
guilty-plea cases. More particularly, ICTY defendants were willing to 
plead guilty when they were able to bargain for and receive relatively 
lenient sentences in exchange for their guilty pleas. But they stopped 
pleading guilty when they lost confidence that they would be 
sentenced in accordance with the bargains that they had negotiated. 
In most guilty-plea cases, the ICTY prosecution and defense 
agree on a sentence or a narrow range of sentences to recommend to 
the Trial Chamber. As the following Sections will reveal, before 
December 2003, this method of plea bargaining proved an effective 
means of inducing defendants to plead guilty because the Trial 
Chambers had never imposed a sentence longer than that which the 
prosecution recommended. Sentencing in accordance with 
prosecutorial recommendations proved uncontroversial because, in the 
early days of ICTY sentence bargaining, prosecutors offered only 
modest concessions to defendants pleading guilty; they were so modest 
in fact that, in some cases, it was not clear that there existed any 
sentencing differential between a conviction after trial and a conviction 
after a guilty plea. In contrast, the sentence recommendations 
negotiated more recently have been far more lenient. They have been 
so lenient, in fact, that some Trial Chambers have refused to sentence 
in accordance with them. The following Sections will detail the ICTY's 
early guilty pleas, the evolution that has taken place both in the 
prosecution's efforts to obtain guilty pleas and the Trial Chambers' 
response to those efforts, and the chilling effect of the Trial Chambers' 
sentencing on the willingness of ICTY defendants to plead guilty. 
A. The ICTY's Early Guilty Pleas: Limited Benefits for Defendants 
The first two ICTY defendants to enter guilty pleas did so 
without engaging in plea bargaining. The first defendant to plead 
Between Dragan Obrenovic and the Office of the Prosecutor, Annex A, Plea Agreement (May 20, 
2003) [hereinafter Obrenovic Plea Agreement]; Dragan Nikolic, Prosecutor v. Dragan Nikolic, 
Case No. IT-94-2-S, Sentencing Judgment, ~ 35 (Dec. 18, 2003) [hereinafter Dragan Nikolic 
Sentencing Judgment]; Darko Mrda, Prosecutor v. Mrda, Case No. IT-02-59-S, Sentencing 
Judgment, ~ 4 (Mar. 31, 2004) [hereinafter Mrda Sentencing Judgment], Miodrag Jokic, 
Prosecutor v. Jokic, Case No. IT-01-42/1-S, Sentencing Judgment, ~~ 7-11 (Mar. 18, 2004) 
[hereinafter Jokic Sentencing Judgment]; Miroslav Deronjic, Prosecutor v. Deronjic, Case No. IT-
02-61-PT, Plea Agreement (Sept. 29, 2003) [hereinafter Deronjic Plea Agreement] ; and Ranko 
Cesic, Prosecutor v. Cesic, Case No. 95-10/1 -PT, Plea Agreement (Oct. 8, 2003) [hereinafter Cesic 
Plea Agreement] . 
74. Miroslav Bralo pled guilty in July 2005. Prosecutor v. Bralo, Case No. IT-95-17-PT, Plea 
Agreement, ~ 9 (July 18, 2005). 
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guilty, Drazen Erdemovic, was a foot soldier in the Bosnian Serb army 
who participated in the Bosnian Serbs' July 1995 massacre of 
approximately 7,000 Bosnian Muslims at Srebrenica. Erdemovic 
brought himself and his crimes to the attention of the ICTY in 1996 and 
immediately pled guilty to crimes against humanity without any offer of 
leniency.75 Goran Jelisic, the next ICTY defendant to plead guilty, 
proffered his guilty plea over the objections of his lawyers and received 
no concessions therefor. 76 Stevan Todorovic pled guilty in December 
2000, and his case was seemingly the first to feature sentence 
bargaining. As a consequence of this bargaining, Todorovic did obtain 
what seemed at the time to be substantial sentencing concessions, but 
the bestowal of these concessions can be explained, at least in part, by 
the unusual circumstances surrounding his arrest. Todorovic was 
appointed Police Chief of Bosanski Samac during the Bosnian conflict, 
and as such, he participated in the take-over of the municipality and in 
the deportation and detention of the non-Serb population. 77 After he 
was indicted, Todorovic was allegedly arrested by means of kidnapping 
and delivered to NATO forces in Bosnia-Herzegovina ("SFOR"). 78 He 
consequently challenged the legality of his arrest, and, in doing so, 
obtained an order from the Trial Chamber requiring SFOR and the 
States participating in SFOR to provide Todorovic with wide-ranging 
and potentially embarrassing information about his arrest.79 NATO 
and the United States, among other States, vehemently objected to the 
order; thus, it did not come as a particular surprise when the 
prosecution offered Todorovic a generous sentencing recommendation to 
75. Prosecutor v. Erdemovic, Case No. IT-96-22-T, Sentencing Judgment,~~ 3, 6, 10 (Nov. 29, 
1996) [hereinafter Erdemovic Sentencing Judgment] . For a thorough discussion of the Erdemovic 
case, see Combs, supra note 56, at 109--14. 
76. See Combs, supra note 56, at 117. For a thorough discussion of the Jelisic case, see id. at 
115-17. 
77. Prosecutor v. Todorovic, Case No. IT-95-9/1 , Sentencing Judgment,~~ 35, 42, 45 (July 
31, 2001) [hereinafter Todorovic Sentencing Judgment]. 
78. See Major Christopher M. Supernor, International Bounty Hunters for War Criminals: 
Privatizing the Enforcement of Justice, 50 A.F.L. REV. 215, 217 n.ll (2001); Marlise Simmons, 
War Crimes Court Takes It Easy on a Cooperative Bosnian Serb, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 1, 2001, at A4 
(reporting that the method of TodoroviC's arrest set his case apart from others and was a difficult 
issue for the court to handle). A regional court in Serbia subsequently convicted nine people of 
"kidnapping for money." 9 Convicted of Kidnap of War-Crimes Suspect, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 12, 
2000, at A15; see also Prosecutor v. Todorovic, Case No. IT-95-9/1, Transcript at 786 (Dec. 13, 
2000) (detailing the defense counsel's discussion of TodoroviC's capture and his captors' 
subsequent prosecution) . 
79. Sean D. Murphy, Contemporary Practice of the United States Relating To International 
Law, 95 AM. J . INT'L L. 387, 401 (2001). 
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secure both his guilty plea and the withdrawal of his troublesome 
challenge to his arrest. so 
The prosecution's recommended sentences for the next four 
defendants to plead guilty, by contrast, did not seem significantly lower 
than the sentences which likely would have been imposed after trials. 
In the Sikirica case, for instance, the defendants were Dusko Sikirica, 
Commander of Security at the infamous Keraterm prison camp, and 
Damir Dosen and Dragen Kolundzija, two of Keraterm's shift 
commanders.81 Keraterm detainees were kept in appalling conditions 
and were regularly beaten and killed by guards and by outsiders given 
entry by guards.82 After the trial was mostly completed, all three 
defendants pled guilty to persecution as a crime against humanity, 
admitting to varying levels of culpability. The persecution count 
alleged persecution by five methods: (a) murder; (b) torture and beating; 
(c) sexual assault and rape; (d) harassment, humiliation, and 
psychological abuse; and (e) confinement in inhumane conditions. 83 
Sikirica acknowledged participating in all of those methods and 
admitted to personally killing one detainee;84 Dosen admitted to 
participating in (b), (d), and (e);85 and Kolundzija admitted only to (e).86 
Pursuant to the plea agreement, the prosecution recommended 
sentences of between ten and seventeen years' imprisonment for 
80. Todorovic pled guilty to one count of persecution as a crime against humanity for 
murdering one person, beating twelve others, ordering and participating in the unlawful 
detention of non-Serb civilians, ordering subordinates to torture and interrogate detainees, and 
ordering six men to perform fellatio on one another on three different occasions. Todorovic 
Sentencing Judgment, supra note 77, ~ 9. In TodoroviC's plea agreement, the prosecution and 
defense each agreed to recommend sentences of between five and twelve years' imprisonment. Id. 
~ 11. The prosecution recommended a twelve year sentence, and the Trial Chamber sentenced 
him to ten years' imprisonment. Id. ~ 115. At TodoroviC's sentencing hearing, the prosecution 
opined that, had Todorovic been convicted at trial, he probably would have been sentenced to a 
term of imprisonment ranging from fifteen to twenty-five years or more. Prosecutor v. Todorovic, 
Case No. lT-95-9/1, Transcript at 55 (May 4, 2001) (on file with author). 
81. Prosecutor v. Sikirica et al., Case No. lT-95·8-T, Sentencing Judgment,~~ 118, 153, 200 
(Nov. 13, 2001) [hereinafter Sikirica Sentencing Judgment]. 
82. See id. ~~ 56-57, 62-65, 66-83 (describing conditions in the Keraterm camp); 
Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94·1-T, Opinion and Judgment,~ 159 (May 7, 1997); Prosecutor 
v. Banovic, Case No. IT-02-65-1-S, Sentencing Judgment, ~ 27 (Oct. 28, 2003) [hereinafter 
Banovic Sentencing Judgment] ("Keraterm authorities, as well as 'visitors', regularly subjected 
the detainees to severe beatings and cruel and humiliating treatment, and many were killed."). 
83. Sikirica Sentencing Judgment, supra note 81, ~ 18. 
84. !d. ~~ 18, 21. 
85. !d.~ 26. 
86. Id. ~ 32. 
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Sikirica, between five and seven years' imprisonment for Dosen, and 
between three and five years' imprisonment for Kolundzija.87 
Since the Sikirica guilty pleas did not occur until the trial was 
nearly completed, the prosecution did not save much time or resources 
through the guilty pleas, and one can presume that the prosecution 
consequently was not willing to offer as generous concessions to the 
Sikirica defendants as it would have to defendants who pled guilty 
before the trial began. That said, the Sikirica bargain is nonetheless 
notable in how little it seemed to provide the defendants. Although 
some of the relevant circumstances were different,88 the ICTY had 
earlier sentenced Zlatko Aleksovski, a Croatian pnson camp 
commander, to a mere two-and-one-half-year prison sentence after 
trial,89 which the Appeals Chamber subsequently increased to seven 
years' imprisonment.90 As another example, Hazim Delic, Deputy 
Commander of the Celebici prison camp, was convicted of brutally 
murdering two detainees, raping and torturing two more, and torturing 
numerous others, some by means of an electric shock device. 91 Delic 
received a sentence of twenty years' imprisonment after trial, 92 which 
was reduced after appeal to eighteen years' imprisonment;93 that is, 
after a full-blown trial, Delic received a sentence only slightly higher 
than the prosecution's maximum recommendation for Sikirica, for 
crimes apparently involving greater harm. Similarly, Dragoljub Prcac 
was an administrative aide at the notorious Omarska camp. 94 Prcac, 
like Kolundzija, held a position of authority in a brutal detention center 
but was not convicted of inflicting any direct harm. 95 Without pleading 
guilty, Prcac was sentenced to five years' imprisonment;96 that is, Prcac 
received a sentence at the upper end of the prosecution's sentencing 
recommendation for Kolundzija. 
87. ld. ~~ 25, 31, 37. The prosecution recommended the maximum sentence for each 
defendant. ld. ~ 42; Prosecutor v. Sikirica, Case No. IT-95-8-T, Transcript at 5687 (Oct. 8, 2001) 
(on file with author). 
88. Among other things, the conditions prevailing in the Keraterm camp seemed to be 
worse than those at the Kaonik prison, at which Aleksovski was a commander. See generally 
Prosecutor v. Aleksovski, Case No. IT-95-14/1-A, Judgment (Mar. 24, 2000). 
89. ld. ~ 244. 
90. ld. ~ 191. 
91. Prosecutor v. Delalic, Case No. IT-96-21-A, Judgment,~ 1253 (Feb. 20, 2001). 
92. ld. ~ 3. 
93. Prosecutor v. Mucic, Case No. IT-96-21-Tbis-R117, Sentencing Judgment, ~ 44 (Oct. 9, 
2001). 
94. Prosecutor v. Kvocka, Case No. IT-98-30/1-T, Judgment,~ 439 (Nov. 2, 2001). 
95. The prosecution accused Prcac of personal involvement in certain brutalities but failed to 
prove its allegations.Jd. ~~ 451-463. 
96. ld. ~ 726. 
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The next guilty plea to be entered at the ICTY was tendered in 
May 2002 by Milan Simic. Simic pled guilty to two counts of torture as 
a crime against humanity for encouraging and participating in the 
beatings of five men.97 Simic had been indicted with four co-defendants, 
one of whom was Stevan Todorovic.98 Mter Todorovic pled guilty, a 
trial commenced against the remaining four co-defendants, and Simic 
pled guilty eight months after the trial began. In exchange for SimiC's 
guilty plea, the prosecution agreed to recommend a sentence of no 
longer than five years' imprisonment. More importantly, it also agreed 
to withdraw several counts, including the most serious-persecution as 
a crime against humanity relating to SimiC's mayor-like role in the 
town of Bosanski Samac.99 While functioning in that capacity, Simic 
had been accused of implementing orders and regulations that 
unlawfully detained non-Serb civilians in inhumane conditions. 100 
Although prosecutors believed that substantial evidence supported that 
charge, its continued prosecution was undesirable because Simic, a 
paraplegic, had grave health issues which had considerably slowed the 
trial.l01 The prosecution withdrew the count, then, largely due to its 
desire to speed up the trial by removing the illness-prone Simic. In 
accordance with the prosecution's recommendation, the Trial Chamber 
sentenced Simic to five years' imprisonment. 102 The sentence did not 
seem particularly discounted given that the crimes to which Simic pled 
guilty-crimes which involved the beating of five men-involved less 
harm than is the norm for ICTY crimes. Yet such a sentence would 
97. Prosecutor v. Milan Simic, Case No. IT-95-9/2-S, Sentencing Judgment, ~~ 9-11, (Oct. 
17, 2002) [hereinafter Simic Sentencing Judgment]. 
98. Prosecution v. Blagoje Simic et al., Case No. IT-95-9, Second Amended Indictment (Dec. 
11, 1998). 
99. Simic Sentencing Judgment, supra note 97, ~~ 10, 13, 22. 
100. See Prosecutor v. Simic et al., Case No. IT-95-9, Fourth Amended Indictment, ~ 16 (Jan. 
9, 2002) (setting forth the persecution charge). 
101. Interview with BH in Sarajevo, Bosnia-Herzegovina (Dec. 5, 2003). SimiC's medical 
condition complicated the conduct of the trial from the outset. In an assassination attempt, Simic 
had lost the use of both legs, most of the use of one arm, and a kidney, which left him prone to a 
variety of infections. Simic cannot move a wheelchair without assistance and, because he cannot 
move the upper part of his body while in bed, he suffers continually from bed sores. Telephone 
Interview with Slobodan Zecevic, ICTY Defense Counsel (Dec. 17, 2002). At first, the Trial 
Chamber held sessions only in the mornings to accommodate SimiC's medical needs; later, the 
Tribunal provided him with a suitable bed on which to rest during breaks and a nurse to assist 
him, allowing the Trial Chamber to sit for an additional hour in the afternoon. Finally, in 
February 2002, the Tribunal installed a video-link and a two-way telephone link between the 
ICTY's Detention Unit and the courtroom, so that Simic could remain in the Detention Unit 
while still monitoring the trial and communicating with his counsel. Simic Sentencing 
Judgment, supra note 97, ~~ 7-8. 
102. Simic Sentencing Judgment, supra note 97, ~ 122. 
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have been unthinkable had the factual basis for SimiC's conviction 
encompassed all the conduct for which he was initially charged. 
During the first nine years of the ICTY's existence, then, only 
seven defendants pled guilty. Two of those defendants-Erdemovic 
and Jelisic---did not negotiate with the prosecution for a reduced 
sentence. The remaining five did, but only two of them-Todorovic 
and Simic-appeared to receive considerable sentencing benefits in 
exchange for their guilty pleas. Prosecutors appeared willing to 
bestow these benefits on Todorovic and Simic, however, primarily 
because unusual features of their cases made prosecutors particularly 
keen to dispose of them summarily. Prosecutors were not inclined to 
offer generous sentencing discounts to run-of-the-mill defendants, and, 
as a consequence, those defendants were not inclined to enter guilty 
pleas. By October 2002, when the next ICTY defendant to plead guilty 
did so, however, the Security Council's pressure on the Tribunal to 
complete its work had made the expeditious disposition of cases a 
necessity. In addition, evidentiary weaknesses in the cases against 
certain high-ranking defendants had made the information possessed 
by lower-ranking defendants particularly valuable. Consequently, in 
2002 and 2003, the prosecution engaged in vigorous efforts to induce 
defendants both to plead guilty and to provide the prosecution with 
information useful in other cases. Initially, these efforts were 
extremely successful. The following Section will discuss the spate of 
ICTY guilty pleas that were tendered in 2002 and 2003 and the 
sentencing backlash to which those cases gave rise. 
B. The Second Phase in ICTY Plea Bargaining: Generous Concessions, 
Substantial Cooperation, and Judicial Displeasure 
Biljana Plavsic had been co-President of the Serbian Republic 
of Bosnia and Herzegovina and was instrumental in promoting and 
implementing the Bosnian Serbs' ethnic-cleansing campaign, which 
resulted in the expulsion and death of hundreds of thousands of 
Bosnian Muslims and Croats. 103 In October 2002, Plavsic pled guilty 
to persecution as a crime against humanity, and the prosecution 
103. Approximately 850 Muslim and Croat-occupied villages were destroyed entirely, and in 
many municipalities, virtually all non-Serbs were killed or forced to flee. Prosecutor v. Plavsic, 
Case No. IT-00-39 & 40/1, Sentencing Judgment, ~ 32 (Feb. 27, 2003) [hereinafter Plavsic 
Sentencing Judgment]. ln the thirty-seven municipalities described in PlavsiC's indictment, the 
evidence showed that Serbian forces killed approximately 50,000 non-Serbs, destroyed more than 
100 mosques and Catholic churches, and established more than. 400 detention facilities, which 
confined nearly 100,000 people. Id. ~~ 41, 44, 45-48; Prosecutor v. Plavsic, Case No. IT-00-39 & 
40/1-S, Transcript of Sentencing Hearing, at 416 (Dec. 16, 2002). 
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withdrew genocide charges that had been brought against her.1°4 The 
prosecution recommended a sentence of between fifteen and twenty-
five years' imprisonment for Plavsic, 105 and the Trial Chamber 
sentenced her to a mere eleven years in prison.106 
Nine guilty pleas followed PlavsiC's in quick succession, 107 and 
many featured lenient-some would argue, unseemly-sentence 
recommendations, particularly in comparison to previous ICTY cases, 
104. Plavsic Sentencing Judgment, supra note 103, ~ 5. 
105. Prosecutor v. Plavsic, Case No. IT-00-39 & 40/1-S, Transcript of Sentencing Hearing at 
638 (Dec. 18, 2002). The prosecution lauded PiavsiC's guilty plea as "an unprecedented 
contribution to the establishment of truth and a significant effort toward the advancement of 
reconciliation." Prosecution v. Plavsic, Case No. IT-00-39 & 40/1-S, Prosecution's Brief on the 
Sentencing, ~ 25 (Nov. 25, 2002) (on file with author). At PlavsiC's sentencing hearing, the 
prosecution presented the testimony of a number of witnesses, including former United States 
Secretary of State Madeleine Albright and Deputy Chairperson of the South African Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission, Dr. Alex Boraine, who praised PlavsiC's guilty plea for the 
contribution it made to reconciliation in Bosnia. Prosecutor v. Plavsic, Case No. IT-00-39 & 40/1· 
S, Transcript of Sentencing Hearing, at 520-22, 592-96 (Dec. 17, 2002); see also Prosecutor v. 
Plavsic, Case No. IT-00-39 & 40/1-S, Transcript of Sentencing Hearing, at 408 (Dec. 16, 2002) 
(Witness Mirsad Tokaca described PlavsiC's guilty plea as "an extremely courageous, brave, and 
important gesture," saying, "[I]t represents support to what is the ultimate aim of all of us ... 
[that] normal conditions of life should be resumed in Bosnia-Herzegovina, not only in Bosnia-
Herzegovina but in the entire region as well."); id. at 458-59 (Elie Wiesel praising Plavsic as "the 
only accused to have freely and wholly assumed her role in the wrongdoings and crimes set out 
in the indictment, even though she once moved in the highest circles of power in her country."). 
106. Plavsic Sentencing Judgment, supra note 103, ~ 134. The sentence horrified Bosnian 
Muslims. Mujesira Memisevic, whose husband and children were killed during a Bosnian Serb 
ethnic-cleansing campaign, described the sentence as "outrageously low" and stated, "I am 
speechless. I cannot talk at all. I am shivering. I am completely shaken." Daria Sito-Sucic, 
Muslim Victims Outraged, Say Plavsic Sentence Low, REUTERS, Feb. 27, 2003. The Bosnian 
president of the federal committee for the missing, Amor Masovic, observed that Plavsic will 
spend just two and a half minutes in prison for every one of her 200,000 Bosniak and Croat 
victims. Amra Kebo, Regional Report: Plavsic Sentence Divides Bosnia, IWPR's TRIBUNAL 
UPDATE, No. 302, Feb. 24-28, 2003. And the ICTY's President enraged victims further by 
sending Plavsic to serve her sentence in Sweden, where she is housed in a minimum-security 
prison that apparently features sauna, solarium, massage room, horse-riding paddock, and other 
amenities. Patrick McLoughlin, Serb War Criminal Plavsic Goes to Swedish Jail, REUTERS, June 
27, 2003; see also Patrick McLoughlin, War Criminal's Conditions Rile Guards, REUTERS, Aug. 1, 
2003 (Swedish prison guards objecting when Plavsic was granted special privileges including 
private accommodation with a toilet and extended recreation time, and when she was presented 
a birthday cake on her birthday). By contrast, Plavsic has claimed that, in an effort to coerce her 
to testify against Slobodan Milosevic, ''bad air from a nearby factory is being pumped into her 
cell, causing her lungs to bleed." Serb Leader Alleges Prison Conspiracy, THE INDEPENDENT 
(London), Oct. 18, 2003; Former Bosnian Serb President Complains about Prison Conditions in 
Sweden, AGENCE FRANCE·PRESSE, Oct. 17, 2003. 
107. See Banovic Plea Agreement, supra note 73; Momir Nikolic Plea Agreement, supra note 
73; Obrenovic Plea Agreement, supra note 73; Dragan Nikolic Sentencing Judgment, supra note 
73, ~ 35; Mrda Sentencing Judgment, supra note 73, ~ 4; Jokic Sentencing Judgment, supra note 
73, ~~ 7-11; Deronjic Plea Agreement, supra note 73; Cesic Plea Agreement, supra note 73; 
Prosecutor v. Babic, Case No. IT-03-72-I, Annex A to the Joint Motion for Consideration of Plea 
Agreement between Milan Babic and the Office of the Prosecutor Plea Agreement (Jan. 22, 
2004). 
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even previous cases involving guilty pleas. Ranko Cesic, for instance, 
was a member of the Bosnian Serb Police Reserve Unit at the Brcko 
Police Station and was tasked with, among other things, arresting 
specified non-Serbs and bringing them to the Brcko Police Station or 
to the Luka Prison Camp.l08 The Luka Prison Camp was the camp at 
which Goran Jelisic-the second ICTY defendant to plead guilty-
acted as de facto commander. Cesic admitted to killing ten people and 
to forcing two brothers to perform fellatio on one another;109 that is, he 
admitted to crimes roughly comparable to the thirteen murders that 
Jelisic admitted when he pled guilty. Both men pled guilty, but 
JelisiC's plea, coming before the rush to close the Tribunal, gained him 
nothing. The prosecution recommended a life sentence for Jelisic, 110 
and the Trial Chamber imposed a near equivalent, sentencing him to 
forty years in prison.l11 By contrast, in the plea agreement it 
concluded with Cesic, the prosecution promised to recommend a 
sentence of between thirteen and eighteen years' imprisonment, 112 and 
the Trial Chamber sentenced him to an eighteen year term. 113 Cesic 
held a less senior position than Jelisic, and, unlike Jelisic, Cesic did 
agree to provide information to the prosecution, 114 but the prosecution 
gave no indication that it found CesiC's information particularly 
useful. 115 Even if it had, it is doubtful that CesiC's provision of that 
108. Prosecutor v. Cesic, Case No. IT-95-10/1-S, Sentencing Judgment, 'II 7 (Mar. 11, 2004) 
[hereinafter Cesic Sentencing Judgment]. 
109. Id. '\I'll 9-17. 
110. Prosecutor v. Jelisic, Case No. IT-95-10-T, Judgment, '\[119 (Dec. 14, 1999) [hereinafter 
Jelisic Judgment]; Prosecution v. Jelisic, Case No. IT-95-10-T, Transcript at 3070, 3132 (Nov. 25, 
1999). The prosecution's harsh sentencing recommendation likely stemmed in part from the fact 
that JelisiC's guilty plea did not save the Tribunal time and resources because Jelisic pled guilty 
only to the crimes against humanity and war crimes charges, but not to a genocide count. So, 
despite JelisiC's guilty plea, a trial had to be held on that count. Mter hearing the prosecution's 
evidence, the Trial Chamber acquitted Jelisic of genocide, holding that the prosecution had not 
proved beyond a reasonable doubt that "genocide was committed in Brcko during the period 
covered in the indictment." It held in addition that although Jelisic "obviously singled out 
Muslims, he killed arbitrarily rather than with the clear intention to destroy a group." Jelisic 
Judgment, supra, 'If 108. 
111. Jelisic Judgment, supra note 110, '\[139. 
112. Cesic Plea Agreement, supra note 73, '\[11. 
113. Cesic Sentencing Judgment, supra note 108, 'II 111. 
114. Cesic Plea Agreement, supra note 73, 'II 10. 
115. In many guilty-plea cases at the ICTY, the prosecution highlights to the Trial Chamber 
the substantial value of the defendant's cooperation. ln Erdemovic, for instance, the prosecution 
described the defendant's cooperation as "substantial, full and comprehensive" and in particular 
noted that Erdemovic had provided the prosecution with facts of which they had previously been 
unaware, enabling them to initiate on-site investigations that confirmed ErdemoviC's statements. 
Prosecutor v. Erdemovic, Case No. IT-96-22-T, Sentencing Judgment, 'II 16(iv) (Mar. 5, 1998). 
Similarly, in Babic, the prosecution's sentencing brief went on for pages describing the 
usefulness of BabiC's information and testimony. Prosecution v. Babic, Case No. IT-03-72-S, 
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information and his subordinate position to Jelisic would justify the 
vast difference between the two men's sentences. 
Other examples of sentencing disparities abound. Predrag 
Banovic, a guard at the same Keraterm Camp where Sikirica, Dosen, 
and Kolundzija committed their crimes, pled guilty in June 2003 to 
helping beat five prisoners to death and participating in twenty-seven 
other beatings and shootings.l16 Even after Sikirica pled guilty, the 
prosecution recommended that he receive a seventeen year sentence 
for committing only one murder, while it recommended that Dosen 
receive a seven year sentence when he was not personally implicated 
in any serious violence. 117 Concededly, Sikirica and Dosen held 
positions of greater responsibility than did Banovic, but BanoviC's 
crimes were vastly more numerous and brutal; thus, one might have 
expected prosecutors to recommend for Banovic a sentence far greater 
than Dosen's and perhaps equal to Sikirica's, particularly since Dosen 
and Sikirica also pled guilty. Instead, in exchange for BanoviC's guilty 
plea, the prosecution and defense agreed to recommend a mere eight 
year term of imprisonment, which the Trial Chamber duly imposed.118 
Again, BanoviC's plea agreement required him to cooperate with the 
prosecution,119 an obligation not imposed on the Sikirica defendants. 
But this factor cannot explain the sentencing differential between the 
two cases because the Banovic prosecutor told the Trial Chamber that 
BanoviC's cooperation had not been sufficient to treat it as a 
mitigating factor.1 20 The relative leniency of BanoviC's eight year 
sentence is further highlighted when it is compared to the twenty year 
sentence that the lCTY contemporaneously imposed after a trial on 
Prosecution's Sentencing Brief, ~~ 37-46 (Mar. 22, 2004). The prosecution's sentencing brief in 
Cesic, by contrast, states only that Cesic had engaged in an interview with the prosecution 
during which he shared his knowledge of the international crimes that took place in and around 
Brcko during the armed conflict in Bosnia and that he had agreed to testify in future proceedings 
if asked to do so. Prosecutor v. Ceiiic, Case No. 95·10/1-S, Prosecution's Sentencing Brief, ~ 57 
(No:. 12, 2003). 
116. Banovic Sentencing Judgment, supra note 82, at 29-30; Prosecutor v. Banovic, Case No. 
IT-02-65/1-S, Transcript of Sentencing Hearing, ~ 104 (Sept. 3, 2003); see also Bosnian Serb 
Camp Suspect Pleads Guilty at Hague, REUTERS, June 26, 2003 (discussing the beatings and 
guilty plea). 
117. Sikirica Sentencing Judgment, supra note 29, ~~ 25, 31, 42. 
118. Banovic Sentencing Judgment, supra note 82, ~ 96. 
119. Prosecutor v. Banovic, Case No. IT-02-65-PT, Annex 2 to Plea Agreement (June 2, 
2003). 
120. Prosecutor v. Banovic, Case No. IT-02-65/1-S, Transcript of Sentencing Hearing at 116 
(Sept. 3, 2003). 
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Mitar Vasiljevic, who, like Banovic, participated in the killing of five 
people. 121 
Prosecutorial sentence recommendations became so lenient in 
2003 that they began to lose their influence over the Trial Chambers. 
ICTY Trial Chambers imposed sentences at or below prosecutorial 
recommendations for the first nine defendants who pled guilty, 122 but 
in December 2003, the Trial Chamber rejected the prosecution's 
recommendation of a fifteen-to-twenty year sentence in the Momir 
Nikolic case and instead sentenced Nikolic to a twenty-seven year 
term. 123 In sentencing outside the prosecution's recommended range, 
the Trial Chamber emphasized that Nikolic was evasive when 
testifying in the trial of his co-defendants. 124 Eight days later, the 
same Trial Chamber sentenced Momir NikoliC's co-defendant, Dragan 
121. Prosecutor v. Vasiljevic, Case No. IT-98-32-T, Judgment, ~~ 96-111 (Nov. 29, 2002). 
Vasiljevic participated in the so-called Drina River incident in which Serbian paramilitaries, 
among others, brought seven Bosnian Muslim men to the bank of the Drina river and shot them 
at close range, killing five of them. !d. ~ 97. 
122. In the first round of sentencing in Erdemovic, the prosecution recommended a sentence 
not exceeding ten years. Erdemovic Sentencing Judgment, supra note 75. The Trial Chamber 
sentenced Erdemovic to ten years' imprisonment. Id. In the second round of sentencing,. the 
parties agreed in a plea agreement "that seven years' imprisonment would be an appropriate 
sentence." Prosecutor v. Erdemovic, Case No. IT-96-22-T bis, Sentencing Judgment, ~ 18(d) 
(Mar. 5, 1998). But the Trial Chamber sentenced Erdemovic to five years' imprisonment. Id. ~ 
23. In Jelisic, the prosecution asked for a sentence of life imprisonment. Jelisic Judgment, supra 
note 110, ~ 119. The Trial Chamber sentenced Jelisic to forty years' imprisonment. Id. ~ 139. In 
Todorovic, the parties entered into a plea agreement prohibiting the prosecution from 
recommending a sentence in excess of twelve years' imprisonment. Todorovic Sentencing 
Judgment, supra note 77, ~ 11. The prosecution recommended a sentence of twelve years' 
imprisonment, id. ~ 22, and the Trial Chamber sentenced Todorovic to ten years' imprisonment, 
id. ~ 115. In Sikirica, as discussed above, the parties entered into plea agreements in which the 
prosecution agreed not to recommend sentences exceeding seventeen years', seven years', and 
five years' imprisonment for Sikirica, Dosen, and Kolundzija, respectively. Sikirica Sentencing 
Judgment, supra note 29, ~~ 25, 31, 37. The prosecution recommended the maximum sentences 
for each defendant, id. ~ 42, and the Trial Chamber sentenced Sikirica, Dosen, and Kolundzija to 
fifteen years', five years', and three years' imprisonment, respectively, id. ~ 245. In Milan Simic, 
the parties entered into a plea agreement in which they each agreed to recommend a sentence of 
imprisonment of not less than three years and not more than five years. Simic Sentencing 
Judgment, supra note 97, ~ 13. The prosecution recommended a five year sentence, id. ~ 30, and 
the Trial Chamber imposed a five year sentence, id. ~ 122. In Plavsic, the prosecution 
recommended a sentence of between fifteen and twenty-five years' imprisonment. Prosecutor v. 
Plavsic, Case No. IT-00-39 & 40/1-S, Prosecution's Brief on the Sentencing of Biljana Plavsic, ~ 43 
(Nov. 25, 2002). The Trial Chamber imposed an eleven year sentence. Plavsic Sentencing 
Judgment, supra note 103. Finally, in Banovic, the prosecutor and defense both agreed to 
recommend an eight year sentence for Banovic. Banovic Sentencing Judgment, supra note 82, ~ 
11. The Trial Chamber obliged. I d. ~ 96. 
123. Prosecutor v. Momir Nikolic, Case No. IT-02-60/1-S, Sentencing Judgment, ~~ 19, 183 
(Dec. 2, 2003). 
124. Id. ~ 156. 
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Obrenovic, to seventeen years' imprisonment after his guilty plea, l25 a 
sentence which was well within the prosecution's fifteen-to-twenty 
year recommendation. Thus, Momir NikoliC's sentence appeared to be 
an aberration resulting from NikoliC's perceived lack of candor. 
After another eight days, however, a different ICTY Trial 
Chamber spurned the prosecution's sentence recommendation, this 
time in the case of Dragan Nikolic (no relation to Momir). In addition . 
to serving as Commander of the brutal Susica prison camp, where 
murders, beatings, and rapes occurred daily, Dragan Nikolic, admitted 
to personally beating nine men to death, torturing five more, and 
facilitating countless rapes. 126 After months of intense negotiations, 
the prosecution and defense entered into a plea agreement in which 
the prosecution agreed to recommend a fifteen year sentence for 
Nikolic. However, the Trial Chamber sentenced Nikolic to twenty-
three years' imprisonment, holding that the ''brutality, the number of 
crimes committed and the underlying intention to humiliate and 
degrade would render a sentence such as [the prosecution] 
recommended unjust."127 The Trial Chamber tried to prevent this 
harsher-than-recommended sentence from dealing a death blow to the 
prosecution's attempts to obtain subsequent guilty pleas by expressly 
stating that Nikolic would have received a life sentence had he not 
pled guilty.l28 As will be discussed below, however, it is by no means 
clear that the Trial Chamber's efforts succeeded. 
As part of Milan BabiC's January 2004 plea agreement, the 
prosecution recommended an eleven year sentence for Babic,129 but the 
Trial Chamber sentenced him to thirteen years' imprisonment, 
holding that a term of no more than eleven years "would not do 
justice."13° A couple of months earlier, the Deronjic Trial Chamber did 
sentence in accordance with the prosecution's recommendations in 
that case, imposing on Deronjic the ten year prison sentence that the 
prosecution recommended, but it did so over the vehement dissent of 
the presiding judge, Wolfgang Schomburg. Judge Schomburg 
concluded that Deronjic deserved a sentence of no less than twenty 
years' imprisonment131 because even on the facts presented by the 
125. Prosecutor v. Obrenovic, Case No. IT-02-60/2-S, Sentencing Judgment, ~ 156 (Dec. 10, 
2003). 
126. Dragan Nikolic Sentencing Judgment, supra note 73, ~~ 56-60, 66-104. 
127. Id. ~ 281. 
128. Id. ~ 214. 
129. Prosecutor v. Babic, Case No. IT-03-72-S, Sentencing Judgment,~ 42 (June 29, 2004). 
130. Id. ~~ 101-102. 
131. Prosecutor v. Deronjic, Case No. IT-02-61-S, Dissenting Opinion of Judge Schomburg, ~ 
2 (Mar. 30, 2004). 
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prosecution-which Judge Schomburg believed were abridged as a 
result of a charge bargain 132-Deronjic was shown to be a high-
ranking perpetrator who had committed "heinous and long planned 
crimes."133 
Milan BabiC's guilty plea was tendered in January 2004-
approximately one month after the Momir Nikolic and Dragan Nikolic 
Trial Chambers imposed their longer-than-recommended sentences. 
Given these sentences, Babic might have decided not to plead guilty 
but for the fact that he had been cooperating with the prosecution for 
two years before he was indicted and, as his defense counsel put it, 
"[i]t was a fait accompli that he would be indicted and plead guilty."134 
Eighteen months elapsed, however, before the Tribunal received its 
next guilty plea in the Miroslau Bralo case. Miroslav Bralo's plea 
agreement is unusual in that it does not contain any provisions 
relating to sentence recommendations and indeed states that "no 
promises or inducements have been made by the Prosecutor to induce 
Miroslav Bralo to enter this Agreement."135 Bralo, however, was a 
low-level offender whose case almost certainly would have been 
transferred to the Special War Crimes Court in Sarajevo had he not 
pled guilty. Many ICTY defendants have vehemently opposed the 
transfer of their cases to Bosnia, 136 and the desire to avoid that fate 
likely motivated Bralo's plea. 
Guilty pleas at the ICTY have thus dropped off markedly since 
their height in 2003. One factor contributing to the substantially 
decreased interest in guilty pleas is the highly critical publicity 
engendered by the guilty pleas of 2003 and their concomitant sentence 
discounts. Victims' groups and legal commentators have harshly 
condemned the lenient sentences imposed on, among others, Plavsic, 
Banovic, and Darko Mrda, the latter of whom pled guilty to 
participating in the executions of more than 200 Bosnian Muslims.137 
132. Id. ~ 9. 
133. Id. ~ 5. 
134. Prosecutor v. Babic, Case No. IT-03-72-A, Transcript of Appeals Proceedings at 34 (Apr. 
25, 2005). 
135. Prosecutor v. Bralo, Case No. IT-95-17-PT, Plea Agreement,~ 9 (July 18, 2005). 
136. E.g., Prosecutor v. Jankovic, Case No. IT-96-23/2-PT, Decision on Referral of Case under 
Rule 11 bis, ~ 16 (July 22, 2005). 
137. Mrda Sentencing Judgment, supra note 73, ~~ 1, 4. For a sampling of the critical 
commentary concerning lenient sentences, see Sito-Sucic, supra note 106; Kebo, supra note 106; 
Emir Suljagic & Amra Kebo, Mrda Guilty Plea Sparks Anger, IWPR's TRIBUNAL UPDATE, No. 
322, Aug. 1, 2003 (Mrda's guilty plea "sparked a row among survivors and missing persons 
organisations who believe the proposed sentence is too lenient for the crimes committed - and are 
outraged that, to date, the remains of many of those murdered have not been recovered."); 
Bosnian Women's Association Calls Serb Camp Guard Sentence "Insult," BBC WORLDWIDE 
MONITORING, Oct. 29, 2003 (reporting the view of Bosnian victims that Predrag BanoviC's eight 
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The diminished interest in guilty pleas can also be traced in part to 
the March 2004 departure of the Tribunal's American Chief of 
Prosecutions, Michael Johnson, who was a strong supporter of plea 
bargaining and who facilitated many of the 2003 plea agreements. 
Some front-line ICTY prosecutors, by contrast, are rumored to be less-
than-favorably disposed to plea bargaining; indeed, counsel for Dragan 
Nikolic accused prosecutors of essentially reneging on NikoliC's plea 
agreement by submitting a sentencing brief that was not in keeping 
with the spirit of the agreement138 and by failing to seek a reduction of 
NikoliC's sentence on appeaP39 NikoliC's counsel pointedly observed 
that such practices "will be noted by those whose duty it is to advise on 
the issue of making a Plea Agreement with the Prosecutor."140 
While these factors have played some role, the primary reason 
that the ICTY is no longer obtaining many guilty pleas is that, as a 
result of the sentences imposed on Momir Nikolic, Dragan Nikolic, and 
Milan Babic, ICTY defendants no longer have the requisite certainty 
that they will receive the sentencing discounts for which they 
bargained. Numerous interviews with defense counsel and prosecutors 
confirm that ICTY defendants share with defendants accused of 
domestic crimes in Western countries similar views about the 
undesirability of incarceration. Thus, when assessing their options, 
most ICTY defendants seek first and foremost to reduce the amount of 
time they must spend behind bars. For this reason, the ICTY 
defendants who have pled guilty recently did so only after their counsel 
had engaged in intense and protracted negotiations over the 
prosecution's sentence recommendation. That is, they pled guilty only 
because they felt confident that they would receive a substantial 
sentencing discount in exchange for their guilty plea. Based on the 
year sentence constituted "shamefully small punishment"); Bosnian Muslims Protest "Shameful" 
War Crimes Sentence, AGENCE FRANCE·PRESSE, Oct. 29, 2003 (reporting on victims' outrage 
following the Banovic sentence); Nerma Jelacic & Chris Stephen, Anger at Short Sentence for 
Prison Killer, lWPR's TRIBUNAL UPDATE, No. 331, Nov. 1, 2003 (reporting victim outrage about 
BanoviC's sentence); see also Pleading Repentance, BALKAN RECONSTRUCTION REPORT, Feb. 2, 
2004 (reporting on a right-wing Croatian politician who decried Milan BabiC's plea bargain, 
saying "[w]here is the justice in the fact that a person who is believed to have been one of the 
most notorious figures in the bloody events of the 1990s in this region can expect only 11 years of 
punishment?"); Milanka Saponja-Hadzic, Hague Deals Reduce Impact, lWPR's TRIBUNAL 
UPDATE, No. 321, July 24, 2003. 
138. See Prosecutor v. Dragan Nikolic, Case No. lT-94-2-A, Transcript of Sentencing 
Proceedings on Appeal at 23 (Nov. 29, 2004) (NikoliC's counsel asserted that the prosecution's 
sentencing brief was not one "that actually matched the nature of the spirit and agreement 
which I thought we had gone into the matter, and I was left with a sense of unease and profound 
disappointment."). 
139. Prosecutor v. Dragan Nikolic, Case No. IT-94-2-A, Appellant's Brief in Reply to the 
Prosecution Respondent's Brief, ~ 5 (Aug. 24, 2004). 
140. Id. 
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Trial Chambers' past practice, the defendants counted on the 
prosecution's recommendation to define the outer limit of their 
incarceration exposure. Now that the recommendations no longer 
provide that certainty, ICTY defendants apparently prefer to take their 
chances on a trial. Miroslav Bralo was not likely to have the 
opportunity to take his chance on an ICTY trial since his case seemed 
destined for trial in Bosnia. Thus, Bralo saw fit to plead guilty despite 
the Trial Chambers' recent repudiation of prosecutorial sentencing 
recommendations. That his plea agreement does not even contain a 
promise of a prosecutorial sentence recommendation may well reflect 
Bralo's awareness of their limited influence. 
While some Tribunal insiders maintain that prosecutors 
continue to pursue plea negotiations in some cases, all agree that the 
Trial Chambers' failure to sentence in accordance with prosecutorial 
recommendations has had a chilling effect on the bargaining. 141 Milan 
BabiC's defense counsel observed, for instance, that when he advised 
Babic to enter into the plea agreement, he ''believed that a plea 
agreement meant something, that the Court would be guided by a plea 
agreement, that they would follow the recommendation." He learned 
subsequently, he said, that the effect of a plea agreement "is 
nothing."142 As the following Part will reveal, ICTR prosecutors are also 
experiencing difficulty obtaining guilty pleas, but there the difficulty 
bears little relationship to the sentencing recommendations the 
prosecution is willing to make, or the sentences the Trial Chambers 
actually impose. 
IV. THE ROLE OF IDEOLOGY IN PLEA BARGAINING: GUILTY PLEAS AT 
THEICTR 
In April 1994, brutal ethnic violence erupted in Rwanda, a 
small country in the Great Lakes Region of Mrica, whose population 
has historically been divided into two predominant groups, the Hutu 
and the Tutsi.l43 The Tutsi minority had ruled Rwanda for 
141. Telephone Interview with HN (Feb. 17, 2005); Interview with ME in The Hague, Netb. 
(Nov. 18, 2004); Telephone Interview with Howard Morrison, ICTY Defense Counsel (Dec. 2, 
2004); Telephone Interview with OF (Oct. 20, 2004). 
142. Prosecutor v. Babic, Case No. IT-03-72-A, Transcript of Appeals Proceedings, at 34 (Apr. 
25, 2005). 
143. GERARD PRUNIER, THE RWANDA CRISIS: HISTORY OF A GENOCIDE 5 (1996); 1 VIRGINIA 
MORRIS & MICHAEL P. SCHARF, THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR RWANDA 49-50 
(1998). Rwanda's third group, the Twa, accounts for one percent or less of the population. 
PRUNIER, supra, at 5. 
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centuries, 144 but the Hutu gained control of the country at 
independence in 1962145 and thereafter perpetrated a series of 
massacres that drove nearly 100,000 Tutsi into exile in neighboring 
countries.l46 The exiled Tutsi formed an army, the Rwandan Patriotic 
Front ("RPF'), and engaged in military clashes with the Rwandan 
government147 before the two sides entered into the Arusha Peace 
Accords in 1993.148 In April 1994, an airplane carrying the country's 
Hutu president was shot down and, immediately thereafter, extremist 
Hutu began killing large numbers of Tutsi and moderate Hutu, 
massacring between 500,000 and one million people in one hundred 
days.l49 The violence came to an end in July 1994 when the RPF 
defeated the Rwandan army.l50 Heeding calls for an international 
tribunal similar to the ICTY, 151 the Security Council established the 
ICTR. 
144. PAUL J. MAGNARELLA, JUSTICE IN AFRICA: RWANDA'S GENOCIDE, ITS COURTS, AND THE 
UN CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL 3 (2000) (reporting that between the eleventh and fifteenth centuries, 
the Tutsi conquered central Rwanda and, in the mid-to-late nineteenth century, "the Tutsi 
conquered and firmly estahlished central control over much, hut not all, of Rwanda, despite the 
fact that they represented only about 10 per cent to 14 per cent of a population that was over 80 
per cent Hutu"). 
145. PRUNIER, supra note 143, at 41-54; MAGNARELLA, supra note 144, at 12-13. 
146. PRUNIER, supra note 143, at 56, 61 (reporting that there existed 120,000 refugees by 
early 1962); see also MAGNARELLA, supra note 144, at 13 (noting that hy 1963 Hutu attacks had 
"resulted in thousands of Tutsi deaths and the flight of about 130,000 Tutsi to neighboring 
countries"); PHILIP GOUREVITCH, WE WISH TO INFORM YOU THAT TOMORROW WE WILL BE KILLED 
WITH OUR FAMILIES: STORIES FROM RWANDA 63-69 (1998) (reporting a Tutsi's experiences during 
periods of violence against the Tutsi); MORRIS & SCHARF, supra note 143, at 47, 50 ("During the 
next few years [after 1959] over 100,000 Tutsis fled to neighhoring countries in the face of waves 
of mass killings."); HOWARD BALL, PROSECUTING WAR CRIMES AND GENOCIDE: THE TwENTIETH-
CENTURY EXPERIENCE 15~0 (1999) (placing the 1962 Tutsi refugee total at 200,000); William A. 
Schahas, Justice, Democracy, and Impunity in Post Genocide Rwanda: Searching for Solutions to 
Impossible Problems, 1996 CRIM. L. F. 523, 523-24 (1996). 
147. PRUNIER, supra note 143, at 93-120; MORRIS & SCHARF, supra note 143, at 50; Christina 
M. Carroll, An Assessment of the Role and Effectiveness of the International Criminal Tribunal 
for Rwanda and the Rwandan National Justice System in Dealing with the Mass Atrocities of 
1994, 18 B.U. lNT'L L.J. 163, 168 (2000). 
148. BALL, supra note 146, at 162; MAGNARELLA, supra note 144, at 16-17; MORRIS & 
SCHARF, supra note 143, at 50-51; see also PRUNIER, supra note 143, at 159-91 (providing an in-
depth account of the process and outcome of forming the Arusha Peace Accords). 
149. MORRIS & SCHARF, supra note 143, at 53, 58; Madeline H. Morris, The Trials of 
Concurrent Jurisdiction: The Case of Rwanda, 7 DUKE J. COMP. & INT'L L. 349, 351 (1997). For 
comprehensive descriptions of the massacres and the events leading up to the violence, see 
HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, LEAVE NONE TO TELL THE STORY (1999) [hereinafter LEAVE NONE TO 
TELL THE STORY]; PRUNIER, supra note 143. 
150. LEAVE NONE TO TELL THE STORY, supra note 149, at 301-02; see also MORRIS & SCHARF, 
supra note 143, at 58 (descrihing the final battles). 
151. On June 28, 1994, the Commission on Human Rights of the United Nations reported on 
the gravity of the Rwandan situation. Report on the Situation of Human Rights in Rwanda, U.N. 
ESCOR, 51st Sess. ~~ 18-28, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/199517 (June 28, 1994). Three days later, the 
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At the time of this writing, the ICTR has disposed of only 
nineteen cases involving twenty-five defendants, and, like the ICTY, it 
currently labors under Security Council pressure to close its doors 
within the next few years. However, despite its similar need to 
dispose of its cases expeditiously, the ICTR's experience with guilty 
pleas has been dramatically different from that of the ICTY. By 
December 2004, only three ICTR defendants had pled guilty during 
the nine years of the Tribunal's existence, and it had been four-and-
one-half years since the ICTR had received its last guilty plea. In 
December 2004, Vincent Rutaganira gave the Tribunal its fourth 
guilty plea, 152 but the circumstances of that case provide little reason 
to believe that many future guilty pleas will be forthcoming. Section A 
will examine those four guilty pleas, and that examination will show 
that, although the ICTR blundered in the sentencing of its first guilty-
plea case, the Trial Chambers and the prosecution learned from that 
mistake. Indeed, sentencing in the next two guilty-plea cases 
appeared to set the stage for a host of subsequent guilty pleas. Those 
pleas did not materialize, however, demonstrating that appropriate 
sentencing practices, while a necessary condition, are not a sufficient 
condition for the procurement of guilty pleas in the context of 
international crimes. Indeed, the ICTR prosecution's failure to induce 
defendants to plead guilty, despite considerable efforts, highlights the 
complex nature of international plea bargaining and the substantial 
influence of factors that would play little or no role in the context of 
domestic crimes. These factors will be examined in Section B, and 
they will place Section A's discussion of the ICTR's four guilty-plea 
cases in an entirely new light. 
Security Council adopted Resolution 935 requesting the establishment of an impartial 
Commission of Experts to examine and analyze further evidence of grave violations of 
humanitarian law in Rwanda. S.C. Res. 935, U.N. SCOR, 49th Sess., 3400th mtg., U.N. Doc. 
S/RES/935 (July 1, 1994). The Commission recommended either the creation of a new 
international criminal tribunal or the expansion of the ICTY's jurisdiction to cover crimes in 
Rwanda. Commission of Experts on Rwanda, Preliminary Report of the Independent Commission 
of Experts Established in Accordance with Security Council Resolution 935, ~~ 150-152, Annex 
to Letter from the Secretary-General to the President of the Security Council, U.N. Doc. 
S/1994/1125 (Oct. 1, 1994). 
152. Prosecutor v. Rutaganira, Case No. ICTR-95-1C-I, Minutes of Proceedings (Dec. 8, 
2004). 
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A. The ICTR's Guilty-Plea Cases 
1. Kambanda 
Jean Kambanda was the Prime Minister of the interim 
government that presided over Rwanda during the 1994 genocide. 
Although apparently not one of the genocide's planners, 153 Kambanda 
admitted to actively implementing the genocide by, among other 
things, distributing arms and ammunition, setting up roadblocks to 
capture Tutsi, and using media broadcasts to incite and encourage the 
massacres.l54 Kambanda was arrested in Kenya in July 1997_155 
Before a lawyer had been appointed for him, Kambanda engaged in 
interviews with the prosecution, 156 and he reportedly left these 
interviews with the belief that he would be sentenced to no more than 
three years' imprisonment if he pled guilty. 157 In April 1998, then, 
Kambanda entered into a plea agreement with the prosecution and pled 
guilty to genocide and crimes against humanity. 158 None of the 
sentencing promises that Kambanda believed he had received made 
their way into his plea agreement. Rather, the agreement expressly 
provided that the parties had made "no agreements, understandings or 
promises" with respect to Kambanda's sentence.159 
Whether or not promises were made to Kambanda, it is 
customary for prosecutors to recommend a discounted sentence 
following a guilty plea. Kambanda's guilty plea might have been 
expected to carry particular mitigating weight in sentencing due to his 
high-level position. The ICTY in Plavsic, for instance, emphasized 
that PlavsiC's former position as President of the Republika Srpska 
153. Kambanda maintains that the role of Prime Minister was foisted on him. Prosecutor v. 
Kambanda, Case No. ICTR-97-23-I, Transcript at 20-21 (Sept. 3, 1998); LINDA MELVERN, 
CONSPIRACY TO MURDER: THE RWANDAN GENOCIDE 170-71 (2004). 
154. Prosecutor v. Kambanda, Case No. ICTR-97-23-1, Plea Agreement Between Jean 
Kambanda and the Office of the Prosecutor, "il"il 23-40 (Apr. 29, 1998) (on file with author) 
[hereinafter Kambanda Plea Agreement]; Prosecutor v. Kambanda, Case No. ICTR-97-23-S, 
Judgment and Sentence, "il 39 (Sept. 4, 1998) [hereinafter Kambanda Judgment]. 
155. Kambanda Judgment, supra note 154, "il 1. 
156. Jean Kambanda v. The Prosecutor, Case No. ICTR 97-23-A, Provisional Appellant's 
Brief and Motions for Extension of the Time-Limits and for Admission of New Evidence on 
Appeal Pursuant to Rules 115 and 116 of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence, "il"il 3-6 (Mar. 29, 
2000) (on file with author) [hereinafter Karribanda's Appeals Brief!. 
157. Telephone Interview with SK (Dec. 1, 2004); Telephone Interview with Howard 
Morrison, ICTR Defense Counsel for Justin Mugenzi (Dec. 2, 2004); Interview with BM in The 
Hague, Neth. (Nov. 8, 2004). 
158. See generally Kambanda Plea Agreement, supra note 154. 
159. Kambanda Judgment, supra note 154, "iJ 48; Prosecutor v. Kambanda, Case No. ICTR-
97-23-I, Transcript at 6 (Sept. 3, 1998). 
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enhanced the reconciliatory and truth-telling value of her guilty 
plea. 160 Further, Kambanda had tendered his guilty plea before the 
completion of any ICTR trials; thus, his guilty plea, coming so early in 
the life of the ICTR, had the potential to set a powerful example for 
subsequent defendants to follow. Finally, Kambanda provided 
prosecutors with a wealth of information relevant to their 
investigations. Kambanda provided ninety hours of recorded 
testimony for use in subsequent trials of senior political and military 
leaders, 161 information which the prosecution described as 
"invaluable,"162 and he promised to testify for the prosecution in those 
trials. 163 Such cooperation is also ordinarily rewarded with a sentence 
reduction. 
Despite these considerations, the prosecution recommended that 
Kambanda receive a life sentence164-the harshest sentence the ICTR 
can impose165-and one can surmise why it felt compelled to make such 
a recommendation. Indeed, the very same factors that might be 
thought to justify a significantly reduced sentence recommendation for 
Kambanda likely convinced prosecutors to recommend a term of life 
imprisonment. Kambanda was the second highest-ranking political 
authority in Rwanda during the genocide and was substantially 
involved in the implementation of the genocide. Thus, the prosecutors 
likely reasoned that if anyone deserved a life sentence, it was 
160. Plavsic Sentencing Judgment, supra note 103, ~ 80. 
161. Prosecutor v. Kambanda, Case No. ICTR-97-23-1, Prosecutor's Pre-Sentencing Brief at 
22-23 (Aug. 31, 1998) (on file with author) [hereinafter Kambanda Prosecutor's Pre-Sentencing 
Brief]. 
162. Id. at 22-23; Prosecutor v. Kambanda, Case No. lCTR-97-23-1, Transcript at 12 (Sept. 3, 
1998) (on file with author). The prosecution described Kambanda's cooperation as follows: 
The accused has assisted the Prosecutor in interpreting the horrific events that 
occured [sic] in Rwanda between 7 April and 7 July 1994, as well as direct evidence 
involving other accused and suspects. Without disclosing the substance of his audio 
recorded statement, his testimony has enabled the Prosecutor to have first hand 
information, and tvidence of such key facts as the meeting between the Council of 
Ministers and Prefets held on 11 April 1994, where the topic of massacres committed 
against the civilian population was raised; the contents of deliberations and decisions 
agreed upon by consensus in the numerous closed sessions of the Cabinet; the 
involvement of Ministers, senior Military officers and Prefets in the commission of 
offences within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal. 
Kambanda Prosecutor's Pre-Sentencing Brief, supra note 161, at 23. 
163. Kambanda Plea Agreement, supra note 154, ~ 42; see also Lawyer for the Former 
Rwandan Prime Minister Argues for Light Sentence, INTERNEWS (Sept. 4, 1998), available at 
http://www.internews.org/activities/ICTR_reports/ICTRNewsSep98.html (reporting prosecutor's 
comments that Kambanda would testify in the genocide trials of other government and military 
leaders) . 
164. Kambanda Judgment, supra note 154, ~ 60. 
165. lCTR Statute, supra note 8, art. 23(1). 
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Kambanda.166 That perception carried all the more significance 
because Kambanda was convicted at the very outset of the ICTR, so the 
disposition of his case garnered particularly intense publicity. The 
prosecution did try to ameliorate the effect of its harsh sentencing 
recommendation on future plea negotiations by suggesting that any 
future application for pardon or commutation of sentence made by 
Kambanda "be considered favorably on the basis of past, current and 
future significant cooperation extended to the prosecution,"167 but 
beyond that it was not willing to go. The Trial Chamber apparently 
agreed with the prosecution's assessment of the case because it 
sentenced Kambanda to life imprisonment. 168 Although the Trial 
Chamber recognized Kambanda's guilty plea as a mitigating factor, it 
held that the aggravating circumstances surrounding Kambanda's 
crimes "negate[ d) the mitigating circumstances."169 
The sentence infuriated Kambanda, and he immediately 
appealed, seeking to quash his guilty plea and proceed to trial.170 He 
argued, among other things, that he had not been provided competent 
legal advice and that he had been inappropriately detained in 
isolation in a safe-house 500 kilometers from the detention facility 
where the other ICTR defendants are held.171 Kambanda also 
immediately ceased cooperating with the prosecution.l72 After the 
Appeals Chamber rejected his appeal, 173 the prospects for subsequent 
guilty pleas appeared dim: because Kambanda had received absolutely 
nothing for his guilty plea, it seemed unlikely that future defendants 
would choose to waive their right to trial. 
2. Serushago 
Omar Serushago did waive his right to trial, pleading guilty to 
genocide and crimes against humanity in December 1998--three 
months after Kambanda received his life sentence-but Serushago's 
166. The prosecution had previously recommended a life sentence for Jean Paul Akayesu, a 
sentence which the Trial Chamber imposed, and Akayesu was only a mayor of the Taba commune. 
Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T, Judgment, ~ 54 (Sept. 2, 1998) [hereinafter 
Akayesu Judgment] ; Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T, Transcript of Sentencing 
Hearing (Oct. 2, 1998). 
167. Kambanda Prosecutor's Pre-Sentencing Brief, supra note 161, at 2. 
168. Kambanda Judgment, supra note 154, at Verdict. 
169. Id. ~ 62. 
170. Kambanda v. Prosecutor, Case No. ICTR-97-23-A, Judgment, ~ 3 (Oct. 19, 2000) 
[hereinafter Kambanda Appeals Judgment]. 
171. Kambanda 's Appeals Brief, supra note 156, ~~ 2-10. 
172. Letter from Carla Del Ponte to Agwu Okali, ICTR Registrar (Apr. 25, 2000) (on file with 
author) . 
173. Kambanda Appeals Judgment, supra note 170, ~ 126. 
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decision to plead guilty was made long before the decision in 
Kambanda was handed down. Serushago was a low-level leader of a 
small group of militiamen. He supervised a roadblock at which Tutsi 
were detained and killed, and he admitted to killing four people 
himselfP4 Residing in Nairobi following the Rwandan massacres, 
Serushago approached ICTR prosecutors in April 1997 and provided 
them information175 that led, among other things, to the arrest of 
several high-ranking ICTR defendants including Kambanda and 
Georges Ruggiu, 176 whose case will be discussed next. In July 1998, 
Serushago voluntarily surrendered to the ICTR even though he had 
not been indicted by the Tribunal, 177 and, soon after the indictment 
was prepared, he pled guilty to it.l78 Serushago's motives for bringing 
himself before the ICTR may never be known. Some believe that he 
underwent a religious conversion that made clear to him his wrongful 
conduct while others note that he received approximately $5,000 from 
the ICTR prosecution. Serushago maintained that the money was 
used "to pay for taxis and assist the Prosecution in arrests,"179 but not 
all are convinced that the money was intended only for those 
purposes. Whatever his motivation, Serushago may have experienced 
some misgivings when he learned of Kambanda's life sentence, but his 
substantial cooperation and voluntary surrender likely gave him little 
choice at that point but to adhere to his plan to plead guilty. 
As in Kambanda, the prosecution made Serushago no written 
promises regarding its sentence recommendation; indeed, Serushago's 
plea agreement provides that sentencing "is at the entire discretion of 
the Trial Chamber ."180 When the time came to recommend a sentence, 
however, the prosecution did provide Serushago some consideration 
for his plea. Because Serushago was a low-level defendant whose case 
had not generated significant publicity, prosecutors - as well as the 
174. Prosecutor v. Serushago, Case No. lCTR-98-39-S, Sentence, ~ 25 (Feb. 5, 1999) 
[hereinafter Serushago Sentence]. 
175. Prosecutor v. Serusbago, Case No. lCTR-98-39, Transcript at 15-16 (Jan. 19, 1999) 
[hereinafter Serusbago Transcript] (on file with author). 
176. Serushago Sentence, supra note 174, ~ 32; Serushago Transcript, supra note 175, at 11; 
see also Press Release, lCTR, Rwanda: First Non-Rwandese Suspect Arrested, lCTRJINF0-9-2-
062 (July 23, 1997) (reporting the arrest of Georges Ruggiu); Press Release, lCTR, Rwanda: Top 
Figures of Former Regime Arrested, lCTRJINF0-9-2-61 (July 18, 1997) (reporting Kambanda's 
arrest). 
177. Serushago Sentence, supra note 174, ~~ 1, 34. 
178. ld. ~~ 2, 4; Prosecutor v. Serushago, Case No. lCTR-98-37, Plea Agreement Between 
Omar Serushago and the Office of the Prosecutor (Dec. 4, 1998) [hereinafter Serushago Plea 
Agreement] (on file with author). 
179. Prosecutor v. Nahimana et a!., Case No. lCTR-99-52-T, Judgment and Sentence, ~ 824 
(Dec. 3, 2003) [hereinafter Nahimana Judgment]. 
180. Serushago Plea Agreement, supra note 178, ~ 40. 
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Trial Chamber for that matter-likely felt more able than in 
Kambanda to discount Serushago's sentence without giving rise to 
ruinous publicity. The prosecution accordingly lauded Serushago's 
substantial cooperation 181 and put forth a sentence recommendation of 
not less than twenty-five years' imprisonment.182 At the time the 
prosecution made that recommendation, it had recommended 
sentences of life imprisonment in every previous case in which it made 
a recommendation. 183 And the Trial Chambers had imposed life 
sentences in each of those cases. 184 In every subsequent case that has 
gone to trial, the prosecution has likewise recommended a life 
sentence.l85 Thus, the twenty-five-year sentence that the prosecution 
recommended for Serushago can be understood to reflect a discount for 
his guilty plea and cooperation, as does the fifteen year sentence that 
the Trial Chamber in fact imposed.l86 Indeed, only three other ICTR 
defendants have received more lenient sentences than Serushago, and 
two of them were the remaining two defendants who pled guilty.187 
181. The prosecution maintained that Serushago had cooperated in four distinct ways: by 
assisting in the arrest of other defendants; by providing information in other cases and agreeing 
to testify in those cases; by providing a detailed account of his own criminal conduct; and by 
voluntarily surrendering. Serushago Transcript, supra note 175, at 10-12. 
182. Id. at 15. 
183. Kambanda Judgment, supra note 154, ~ 60; Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-
4-T, Sentence (Oct. 2, 1998) [hereinafter Akayesu Sentence]; Prosecutor v. Kayishema & 
Ruzindana, Case No. ICTR 95-1-T, Judgment, Sentence ~ 25 (May 21, 1999) [hereinafter 
Kayishema & Ruzindana Judgment]. 
184. Kambanda Judgment, supra note 154, at Verdict; Akayesu Sentence, supra note 183; 
Kayishema & Ruzindana Judgment, supra note 183, ~~ 27-28. 
185. Prosecutor v. Ndindabahizi, Case No. ICTR-2001-71-1, Judgment and Sentence, -,] 503 
(July 15, 2004); Prosecutor v. Gacumbitsi, Case No. ICTR-2001-64-T, Judgment,-,] 338 (June 17, 
2004); Prosecutor v. Ntagerura et al., Case No. ICTR-99-46-T, Judgment and Sentence, ~ 815 
(Feb. 25, 2004); Prosecutor v. Nahimana et al., Case No. ICTR-99-52-T, Judgment and Sentence, 
~ 1097 (Dec. 3, 2003) [hereinafter Nahimana Judgment]; Prosecutor v. Kajelijeli, Case No. ICTR-
98-44A-T, Judgment and Sentence, ~ 956 (Dec. 1, 2003); Prosecutor v. Niyitegeka, Case No. 
ICTR-96-14-T, Judgment and Sentence,~ 489 (May 16, 2003); Prosecutor v. Semanza, Case No. 
ICTR-97-20-T, Judgment, ~ 558 (May 15, 2003); Prosecutor v. Elizaphan and Gerard 
Ntakirutimana, Case Nos. ICTR-96-10 & ICTR-96-17-T, Judgment and Sentence,~ 890 (Feb. 21, 
2003) [hereinafter Ntakirutimana Judgment]; Prosecutor v. Musema, Case No. ICTR-96-13-A, 
Judgment and Sentence, ~ 994 (Jan. 27, 2000); Prosecutor v. Rutaganda, Case No. ICTR-96-3, 
Judgment and Sentence, ~ 464 (Dec. 6, 1999). The Trial Chamber did not report the prosecution's 
sentence recommendation in the Kamuhanda case. Prosecutor v. Kamuhanda, Case No. ICTR-
95-54A-T, Judgment, ~~ 753-760 (Jan. 22, 2004). However, the fact that the Trial Chamber 
sentenced Kamuhanda to life imprisonment strongly indicates that the prosecution 
recommended a life sentence in that case as well. !d. ~ 770. 
186. Prosecutor v. Serushago, Case No. ICTR-98-39-S, Sentence, Verdict (Feb. 5, 1999). 
187. The only defendant to receive a more lenient sentence after trial was Elizaphan 
Ntakirutimana, who was sentenced to ten years' imprisonment. Ntakirutimana Judgment, supra 
note 185, ~ 921. Ntakirutimana's advanced age and poor health contributed to the leniency of his 
sentence. See id. ~ 989. 
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3. Ruggiu 
Georges Ruggiu, a Belgian, became interested in Rwandan 
politics in the early 1990s after befriending some Rwandan students 
who were his neighbors in Belgium.188 Ruggiu met with Rwandan 
President Habyarimana on a number of occasions, and he participated 
in political debates in Belgium regarding Rwanda.189 Ruggiu, believed 
by some to be a passionate idealist190 and by others to be mentally 
unbalanced, 191 became radically opposed to the RPF, which had been 
engaged in an armed conflict with the Hutu-led Rwandan government. 
ln late 1993, Ruggiu moved to Rwanda apparently to marry192 and to 
work as a journalist and broadcaster for the Radio Television Libre des 
Mille Collines ("RTLM'). During the spring of 1994, RTLM broadcasts, 
including those by Ruggiu, incited the population to kill Tutsi.193 
A year after the atrocities, Ruggiu authored a book proclaiming 
his innocence and maintaining that the RTLM broadcasts were 
intended to mobilize Rwandans against the RPF, not against Tutsi 
188. Prosecutor v. Ruggiu, Case No. ICTR-97-32-I, Judgment and Sentence, 'II 38 (June 1, 
2000) [hereinafter Ruggiu Judgment]. At Ruggiu's pre-sentencing hearing, his lawyer 
maintained that Ruggiu "had come to know Rwanda through highly partisan friends who gave 
him a biased idea of the political situation in the country." How Belgian Journalist Became 
Involved in Hate Media, INTERNEWS, May 15, 2000, available at http://www.internews.org/ 
activities/ICTR_Reports/ICTRNewsMayOO.html#may15c; see also Prosecution v. Ruggiu, Case 
No. ICTR-97-32-I, Transcript at 109-12 (May 15, 2000) [hereinafter Ruggiu Transcript] (on file 
with author). 
189. Ruggiu Judgment, supra note 188, 'II 41. 
190. Ruggiu Transcript, supra note 188, at 115, 146, 149. 
191. See Convicted Ex-Radio Presenter has Mental Problems, Defence Suggests, HIRONDELLE 
NEWS AGENCY, Mar. 2, 2002, available at http://www.hirondelle.org/hirondelle.nsf/O 
/c319ac23033fce1ac1256721007ae237 (reporting Ruggiu's counsel's claims that the defendant 
suffered from "emotional problems") [hereinafter Convicted Ex-Radio Presenter]; Telephone 
Interview with MI (Dec. 2, 2004); Telephone Interview with PK (Nov. 23, 2004). 
192. Ruggiu Transcript, supra note 188, at 113. At his sentencing hearing, one of Ruggiu's 
former colleagues testified that Ruggiu found in his Rwandan friends a warm and accepting 
adopted family. Id. at 149-50. 
193. Ruggiu Judgment, supra note 188, 'IJ'Il 42, 44(iv)-(v), 50; see also PRUNIER, supra note 
143, at 200 (reporting that the radio station RTLM "poured out a torrent of propaganda, mixing 
constant harping on the old themes of 'majority democracy,' fears of 'Tutsi feudalist enslavement' 
and ambiguous 'calls to action."'); Schabas, supra note 146, at 524 ("They set up a private radio 
station, Radio-Television Libre Mille-Collines, which battered Rwanda with hate propaganda 
over the following months."). See generally Nahimana Judgment, supra note 185 (convicting 
radio and newspaper officials of genocide and direct and public incitement to commit genocide); 
Mark A. Drumbl, Rule of Law Amid Lawlessness: Counseling the Accused in Rwanda's Domestic 
Genocide Trials, 29 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 545, 559 (1998) ("During this time period, the 
Hutu government began to develop a propaganda machine calculated to instill in the Hutu 
citizenry a fear of the Tutsi."). For a comprehensive treatment of Hutu hate propaganda, see 
LEAVE NONE TO TELL THE STORY, supra note 149, at 65-95. 
HeinOnline -- 59 Vand. L. Rev.  109 2006
2006] GUILTY PLEAS FOR INTERNATIONAL CRIMES 109 
civilians. 194 Not surprisingly, then, after he was arrested, Ruggiu pled 
not guilty. He later contended that he remained convinced of his 
innocence until one of his co-defendants made a speech to the other 
ICTR detainees, informing them that the Rwandan violence had in fact 
been a planned genocide. 195 Ruggiu reported that this news caused him 
great distress and led him to engage in interviews with the 
prosecution. 196 He reported that after serious reflection, he recognized 
his moral responsibility to tell the truth and to plead guilty to direct 
and public incitement to commit genocide. 197 
During this time, Ruggiu's lawyers made efforts to obtain 
firmer sentencing guarantees than prosecutors had provided 
Kambanda. 198 On the surface, these efforts failed: Ruggiu's plea 
agreement, like Kambanda's and Serushago's, contains no promises 
regarding the prosecution's sentencing recommendation.l99 But at the 
same time, the prosecution clearly recommended a reduced sentence for 
Ruggiu as a result of the guilty plea. The Prosecutor recommended a 
twenty year prison sentence for Ruggiu, 200 the shortest sentence ICTR 
prosecutors had theretofore ever recommended. In addition, and 
presumably to encourage future guilty pleas, the Prosecutor expressly 
stated that she would have recommended a life sentence had Ruggiu 
proceeded to trial. 2o1 
The Trial Chamber likewise seemed intent on encouraging 
future guilty pleas. As noted above, the Kambanda Trial Chamber, by 
194. I Lied in My Book to Protect RTLM, Says Convicted Radio Presenter, HIRONDELLE NEWS 
AGENCY, Feb. 28, 2002, available at http://www.hirondelle.org/hirondelle.nsf/caefd9edd 
48f5826c 12564cf004f793dlc319ac23033fce lac 1256721007 ae23 7. 
195. Ruggiu Transcript, supra note 188, at 47. 
196. I d. at 47-56. It was later revealed that Ruggiu lied to prosecutors in some of these early 
interviews. Convicted Ex-Radio Presenter has Mental Problems, Defense Suggests, supra note 
191. 
197. Ruggiu Transcript, supra note 188, at 56-59; Plea Agreement Between Georges Ruggiu 
and the Office of the Prosecutor, '11'11 2, 4, Prosecutor v. Ruggiu, Case No. ICTR-97-32-DP (May 
12, 2000) [hereinafter Ruggiu Plea Agreement]. 
198. Hate Radio Presenter Set to Plead Guilty to Genocide Charges, HIRONDELLE NEWS 
AGENCY, May 9, 2000, http://www.hirondelle.org/hirondelle.nsf/caefd9edd48f5826cl2564cf004f 
793dlc319ac23033fce lac 1256721007 ae23 7. 
199. Ruggiu Plea Agreement, supra note 197, 'II 220. Prosecutors emphasized this point, both 
in the press, see, e.g., Portrait of Georges Ruggiu, Journalist who Incited Genocide, HIRONDELLE 
NEWS AGENCY, May 14, 2000, http://www.hirondelle.org/hirondelle.nsf/caefd9edd48f5826cl2564 
cf004f793dlc319ac23033fcelacl256721007ae237 ("Since Ruggiu started confessing, his lawyers 
say they have reached an agreement with prosecutors that will govern the legal and factual 
framework of the case. They stress, however, that this accord contains no 'parallel promises[.]"'), 
and to the Trial Chamber, see, e.g., Ruggiu Transcript, supra note 188, at 66 (detailing 
Prosecutor Carla Del Ponte's vehement assertion that no promises had been made to Ruggiu). 
200. Ruggiu Transcript, supra note 188, at 190. 
201. Id. at 188. 
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sentencing Kambanda to the harshest sentence available to it, did 
nothing to motivate subsequent ICTR defendants to plead guilty. The 
Serushago Trial Chamber did appear to treat Serushago more 
leniently as a result of his guilty plea, but the Trial Chamber did not 
discuss in any detail the mitigating role that Serushago's guilty plea 
played in his sentence. The Ruggiu Trial Chamber, by contrast, 
explicitly praised guilty pleas.202 It lauded Ruggiu's guilty plea for 
"sparing the Tribunal a lengthy investigation and trial"203 and for 
reflecting Ruggiu's "acknowledgement of his mistakes" which, 
according to the Trial Chamber, constituted "a healthy application of 
reason and sentiment."204 Most importantly, the Trial Chamber 
announced to other defendants that "some form of consideration" 
would be shown to defendants who plead guilty "in order to encourage 
other suspects and perpetrators of crimes to come forward."205 The 
Trial Chamber then sentenced Ruggiu to twelve years' imprisonment, 
a sentence that was subsequently blessed by the prosecution. 
Although the government of Rwanda sharply criticized Ruggiu's 
sentence, the ICTR's Chief of Prosecutions described it as "a good 
gesture for other accused who would wish to plead guilty and accept 
responsibility for their crimes."206 
If ICTR defendants considered sentencing discounts to be an 
influential incentive to plead guilty, then by June 2000 the ICTR 
should have been poised to receive a substantial number of guilty 
pleas. Although, until Ruggiu, the prosecution had made no express 
promises regarding its sentencing recommendations, a comparison of 
its recommendations following trials-all of which stood at life 
imprisonment-and its recommendations in Serushago and Ruggiu 
showed a prosecutorial practice of recommending discounted 
sentences for defendants who pled guilty. And even if defendants 
202. Some believe that the differing treatment given to guilty pleas in ICTR cases relates 
less to an overall evolution in the Tribunal's assessment of guilty pleas and more to the 
backgrounds of the particular judges involved in the cases. Telephone Interview with WM (Oct. 
19, 2005). Judge Kama, for instance, who presided over the Kambanda and Serushago cases, 
hailed from Senegal, a civil-law country, while Judge Pillay hailed from South Mrica, a common-
law country. As a general matter, ICTY and ICTR judges originating in civil-law countries 
appear less comfortable with plea bargaining than judges from common-law countries, 
presumably because bargaining is not so prevalent in civil-law countries. For a description of 
bargaining and bargaining analogues in Continental civil-law countries, see Combs, supra note 
56, at 37-46. 
203. Ruggiu Judgment, supra note 188, ~ 53. 
204. Id. ~ 55. 
205. Id. 
206. Rwanda Unhappy with Ruggiu Sentence, HIRONDELLE NEWS AGENCY, June 1, 2000, 
available at http://www.hirondelle.org/hirondelle.nsf/caefd9edd48f5826c12564cf004f793dlc319ac2 
3033fce1ac1256721007ae237. 
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remained uneasy about the prosecution's sentencing 
recommendations, the Ruggiu Trial Chamber's clear announcement 
that Trial Chambers would compensate guilty pleas with sentencing 
concessions might have been expected to reassure them. No ICTR 
defendant tendered a guilty plea for four-and-one-half years, however, 
until Vincent Rutaganira pled guilty in December 2004. 
4. Rutaganira 
Vincent Rutaganira served as conseiller of the Mubuga sector, 
Gishyita Commune, Kibuye Prefecture207 from 1980 to 1994.208 The 
Prosecutor's charges against Rutaganira centered on a massacre of 
Tutsi that took place at the church in Mubuga. Between 4,000 and 
5,000 Tutsi had sought refuge in the church, and all but a few were 
killed during a three-day massacre in April 1994.209 The indictment 
charged that Rutaganira and two others had ordered the attack on the 
church and had personally participated in the killings. 210 On the basis 
of these allegations, the indictment charged Rutaganira with six counts: 
genocide, extermination as a crime against humanity, murder as a 
crime against humanity, inhumane acts as a crime against humanity, a 
violation of Article Three common to the Geneva Conventions, and a 
violation of Additional Protocol II to the 1949 Geneva Conventions.211 
Rutaganira had fled Rwanda after the massacres and was still 
at large at the time the Prosecutor issued the indictment against him in 
1996. In February 2002, Rutaganira voluntarily surrendered to the 
Tribunal,212 and by the time he pled guilty, eight-and-one-half years 
after his indictment, the prosecution was prepared to take a very 
different view of the crimes he had committed. In particular, in his plea 
agreement, Rutaganira admitted only to omissions; that is, he denied 
both ordering the attack on the church and participating in the attack, 
the charges that had formed the basis for his original indictment. 
Rather, he admitted only that he was aware that Tutsi civilians had 
gathered in the church, that he was aware that assailants were 
gathering near the church before the attack took place, and that 
207. Rwanda is divided into eleven prefectures, and each of these prefectures is further divided 
into communes, which are themselves divided into sectors. 
208. Prosecutor v. Kayishema et al., Case No. ICTR-95-1-1, First Amended Indictment 'll 28 
(Apr. 29, 1996) [hereinafter Rutaganira Indictment]. 
209. Prosecutor v. Kayishema & Ruzindana, Case No. ICTR 95-1-T, Judgment, '1!'11 392, 404 
(May 21, 1999). 
210. Rutaganira Indictment, supra note 208, '1! 51. 
211. Id. 'II 60. 
212. Prosecutor v. Rutaganira, Case No. ICTR-95-1C-T, Transcript at 7 (Jan. 17, 2005) (on 
file with author) [hereinafter Rutaganira Transcript]. 
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"despite the fact that he was conseiller of Mubuga secteur he failed to 
protect the Tutsi who had sought refuge" in the church.213 
As part of the plea agreement, Rutaganira pled guilty to only 
one count: aiding and abetting extermination as a crime against 
humanity on the basis of his omissions.. Pursuant to the plea 
agreement, the prosecution did not seek merely to withdraw the 
remaining counts of genocide, crimes against humanity, and war 
crimes, but rather asked the Court to acquit Rutaganira of those counts 
because, the prosecution maintained, there did not exist sufficient 
evidence to convict him.214 As for the sentence to impose on 
Rutaganira, the prosecution agreed to recommend a sentence of 
between six and eight years' imprisonment, and it further agreed to 
recommend that Rutaganira serve his sentence either in a European 
country or in the Kingdom of Swaziland.215 Finally, the plea agreement 
makes clear that Rutaganira would not cooperate with the 
prosecution.216 The Trial Chamber acceded to the prosecution's request 
and acquitted Rutaganira of the charges to which he did not plead 
guilty. The Trial Chamber sentenced Rutaganira to six years' 
imprisonment,217 the shortest sentence ever imposed by the lCTR. 
Rutaganira represents the first case of overt sentence 
bargaining at the ICTR as it is the first case in which the prosecution 
was willing to commit to recommending a specific range of sentences in 
exchange for the defendant's guilty plea. Rutaganira also represents 
the first ICTR charge bargain, 218 but it is not the typical sort of charge 
bargain prevalent in national criminal justice systems. In the typical 
charge bargain, prosecutors agree to withdraw provable counts in 
exchange for the defendant's guilty plea. Rutaganira's plea agreement 
appears to reflect a typical charge bargain because Rutaganira 
admitted to facts substantially less serious than the facts that formed 
the basis of his indictment, but it differs in that the prosecution 
apparently was willing to accept Rutaganira's meager admissions 
213. ld. at 10-11. 
214. Id. at 2-3. 
215. ld. at 8. As noted infra, most ICTR convicts have been sent to serve their sentences in 
Mali. 
216. Id. at 29. 
217. Prosecutor v. Rutaganira, Case No. ICTR-95-1C-T, Judgment and Sentence (Mar. 14, 
2005). 
218. A charge bargain appeared to take place in Serushago but likely did not. Serushago's 
initial indictment charged him with five counts: genocide, and murder, extermination, torture, 
and rape as crimes against humanity. Prosecutor v. Serushago, Case No. ICTR-98-39-I, Modified 
Indictment at 20-24 (Oct. 14, 1998). Serushago pled guilty to four of the counts, and the 
prosecution dropped the count of rape as a crime against humanity. Prosecutor v. Serushago, 
Case No. ICTR 98-39-S, Sentence, '1!'1! 2-4. According to prosecutors, the rape charge was 
withdrawn for lack of evidence to prove the charge. 
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because it truly did not have the evidence to prove the original charges 
at trial. The prosecution said as much during Rutaganira's sentencing 
hearing, admitting that its "chances of success in proving all the 
charges against him was ... extremely low"219 because the Prosecutor 
was "not in possession of any evidence ... which indicates that Mr. 
Rutaganira himself was implicated in the planning of the said 
attack, ... nor does [the Prosecutor] possess any evidence ... indicating 
that Mr. Rutaganira's role in the said attack at Mubuga church was 
premeditated."220 
The evidence and testimony at Rutaganira's sentencing hearing 
supported the prosecution's representations. Witnesses testified, for 
instance, that Rutaganira and his wife had hidden two Tutsi girls and a 
Tutsi woman in their home during the massacres, despite the fact that 
the Rutaganiras themselves would have been killed had their 
assistance to the three Tutsi been revealed.221 Another Tutsi witness 
testified that Rutaganira had saved her life by telling assailants that 
she was a Hutu,222 while others testified that Rutaganira had been on 
very good terms with Tutsi before the killings, acting as a godfather to a 
number of Tutsi children and asking Tutsi to be godparents to some of 
his children.223 Finally, after the 1994 violence, Mrs. Rutaganira 
returned to the same town in Rwanda in which the Mubuga church 
massacres took place, and she was appointed Deputy Mayor for 
Women's Development. That she holds a political position in Rwanda's 
current Tutsi-led government reinforces the prosecution's assertions 
that no compelling evidence exists to link Rutaganira with the planning 
or implementation of the killings at Mubuga church. 
Thus, the dramatic difference between the factual basis of 
Rutaganira's indictment and the factual basis of his guilty plea appear 
to have resulted from evidentiary insufficiencies rather than from 
charge bargaining. Rutaganira's plea deal should nonetheless be 
considered a charge bargain because the prosecution asked the Trial 
Chamber to acquit Rutaganira of the remaining charges of crimes 
against humanity and war cnmes for lack of evidence. 224 
219. Rutaganira Transcript, supra note 212, at 8. 
220. Id. 
221. !d. at 20, 24-25, 31. 
222. Id. at 15--16. 
223. Id. at 20, 24. 
224. The prosecution also asked the Trial Chamber to acquit Rutaganira of genocide, but 
that request is in keeping with the factual basis of Rutaganira's guilty plea. One cannot commit 
genocide without having the specific intent to commit genocide. See Prosecutor v. Kayishema & 
Ruzindana, Case No. ICTR 95-1-T, Judgment, ~ 91 (May 21, 1999) ("A distinguishing aspect of 
the crime of genocide is the specific intent (dolus specialis) to destroy a group in whole or in 
part .... It is this specific intent that distinguishes the crime of genocide from the ordinary crime 
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Extermination as a crime against humanity-the crime to which 
Rutaganira pled guilty-is a more serious crime than murder as a 
crime against humanity because extermination requires proof of "an 
element of mass destruction which is not required for murder."225 
Therefore, if the prosecution possessed sufficient evidence to convict 
Rutaganira of aiding and abetting extermination as a crime against 
humanity, that evidence must have been sufficient to convict him of 
aiding and abetting in murder and inhumane acts as crimes against 
humanity. It is not surprising that the prosecution would desire to 
eliminate those charges once Rutaganira pled guilty to extermination: 
all of the counts related to the same conduct that formed the basis for 
the extermination charge. In such cases, prosecutors commonly 
withdraw counts that are less serious than the counts to which the 
defendant pleads guilty. The distinctive feature of Rutaganira, 
however, is that the prosecution did not seek merely to withdraw the 
less serious counts but rather to have the Trial Chamber acquit 
Rutaganira of those counts on the basis of insufficient evidence. That 
request is implausible on its face, given Rutaganira's guilty plea to the 
more serious crime of extermination, and one can only assume that 
prosecutors agreed to advance this improbable position on the 
insistence of Rutaganira himself. As the following discussion will 
reveal, that insistence indeed reflects the mind-set of most ICTR 
defendants and sheds light on the difficulties facing ICTR prosecutors 
who seek to procure guilty pleas. 
B. The Dearth of ICTR Guilty Pleas: The Insignificant Influence of 
Sentence Discounts 
Although ICTR prosecutors failed to obtain any guilty pleas 
during the four-and-one-half years between the guilty pleas in Ruggiu 
and Rutaganira, it was not for their lack of effort. Prosecutors initiated 
plea discussions in a number of cases and not only offered generous 
sentencing concessions,226 but also indicated a willingness to negotiate 
over other issues of potential interest to defendants. Both the 
Rutaganira plea agreement and my interviews suggest that ICTR 
prosecutors are now routinely willing to commit to recommending a 
of murder."). Thus, because Rutaganira admitted only to failing to protect the Tutsi, the 
prosecution did in fact lack sufficient evidence to convict him of genocide. 
225. Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Case No. ICTR·96·4-T, Judgment, ~ 591 (Sept. 2, 1998) 
[hereinafter Akayesu Judgment]. 
226. Telephone Interview with TH (Nov. 24, 2004); Telephone Interview with MI (Dec. 2, 
2004); Telephone Interview with MK (Dec. 1, 2004); Telephone Interview with RQ (Dec. 1, 2004). 
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sentence within a narrow range of sentences.227 Although defendants 
still have no guarantee that a Trial Chamber will sentence within the 
prosecution's recommended range, the fact that ICTR Trial Chambers 
most commonly sentence defendants to life imprisonment after trials228 
means that even defendants who do not obtain the precise sentence 
that they bargained for are likely to garner some benefit from a guilty 
plea. Further, unlike prosecutors in national criminal justice systems 
who have the ability to bargain only over the duration of the sentence, 
ICTR prosecutors can offer defendants additional benefits in exchange 
for their guilty pleas. As the following discussion will show, the location 
at which the defendant will serve his sentence had for years been a 
potentially fertile field for negotiation before it became an express term 
in the Rutaganira plea agreement. And in more recent times, the 
prosecution has made plans to transfer some cases to Rwanda for trial; 
that threat of transfer could likewise constitute a compelling bargaining 
chip. 
Turning first to the location of a defendant's detention, the ICTR 
Statute provides that convicted persons must serve their sentences in 
Rwanda or in any State that has indicated its willingness to accept 
convicted defendants.229 Until lately, the only countries that had 
agreed to accept ICTR convicts were Mali, the Republic of Benin, and 
the Kingdom of Swaziland,230 and virtually all ICTR defendants 
convicted thus far have been sent to serve their sentences in a prison in 
Bamako, Mali.231 Recently, however, three European countries-
227. Telephone Interview with MI (Dec. 2, 2004); Telephone Interview with MK (Dec. 1, 
2004); Telephone Interview with PK (Nov. 23, 2004); Telephone Interview with RQ (Dec. 1, 
2004). 
228. Ten of the seventeen ICTR defendants who proceeded to trial received life sentences. 
Akayesu Judgment, supra note 225, at Sentence; Prosecutor v. Kayishema & Ruzindana, Case 
No. ICTR-95-1-T, Judgment, Sentence ~ 32 (May 21, 1999); Prosecutor v. Musema, Case No. 
ICTR-96-13-A, Judgment and Sentence, ~ 1008 (Jan. 27, 2000); Prosecutor v. Niyitegeka, Case 
No. ICTR-96-14-T, Judgment and Sentence, ~ 502 (May 16, 2003); Prosecutor v. Rutaganda, 
Case No. ICTR-96-3, Judgment and Sentence,~ 473 (Dec. 6, 1999); Nahimana Judgment, supra 
note 185, at ~~ 1105, 1108 (Dec. 3, 2003) (sentencing Nahimana and Ngeze to life sentences); 
Prosecutor v. Kajelijeli, Case No. ICTR-98-44A-T, Judgment and Sentence,~ 968 (Dec. 1, 2003); 
Prosecutor v. Ndindabahizi, Case No. ICTR-2001-71-I, Judgment and Sentence, ~ 511 (July 15, 
2004); Prosecutor v. Kamuhanda, Case No. ICTR-95-54A-T, Judgment,~ 770 (Jan. 22, 2004). An 
eleventh defendant, Jean-Basco Barayagwiza, would have received a life sentence, but the Trial 
Chamber reduced his sentence to thirty-five years' imprisonment to remedy the prosecution's 
violation of his procedural rights. Nahimana Judgment, supra note 185, ~~ 1106-07. 
229. ICTR Statute, supra note 8, art. 26. 
230. International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda [ICTR], Fact Sheet No. 6: International Co-
operation with the Tribunal, http://65.18.216.88/ENGLISH/factsheets/6.htm (last visited Jan. 31, 
2006). 
231. See Rwandan War Crimes Court Postpones Ministers' Trial Until February, AGENCE 
FRANCE-PRESS, Oct. 30, 2004 ("Kambanda and five other convicts are currently jailed in Mali. 
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France, Italy, and Sweden-signed accords in which they agreed to 
imprison ICTR convicts, and France ratified its accord in May 2004.232 
Just how much influence ICTR prosecutors can have over the location-
of-detention decision is unclear, since it is a determination typically 
made by the President of the Tribunal; for a few years now, however, 
prosecutors have at least been willing to pursue discussions on the 
issue.233 Ruggiu's plea bargain, in fact, was said to have included an 
unofficial prosecutorial promise to transfer Ruggiu to Italy, where some 
of his family resides.234 
The most obvious benefit to an ICTR defendant of detention in a 
European prison relates to the more comfortable conditions in which 
the defendant will be held.235 That the families of many high-level 
ICTR defendants have relocated to European countries makes a 
European imprisonment all the more attractive. Perhaps most 
importantly, defendants imprisoned in Europe are typically eligible for 
release after they have served one-half to two-thirds of their 
sentences, 236 a benefit not guaranteed to those imprisoned in Mali. 
Thus, ICTR defendants sent to European prisons may not only serve 
their sentences in greater comfort, but may serve significantly shorter 
sentences than defendants who are sentenced to the same term of 
imprisonment but who serve their terms in Mali. 
As important as the location-of-detention question may be to an 
ICTR defendant, the location-of-trial question is even more important. 
To comply with the Security Council's instruction that the ICTR 
complete its work by 2010, the Tribunal has committed to transferring 
some of its cases to national courts in Rwanda.237 Prosecutors compiled 
Three other people who have been given sentences without further appeal are still being held in 
ICTR cells, waiting for a country to take them in."). 
232. France Ratifies Rwanda Accord, AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE, June 11, 2004. 
233. Telephone Interview with TH (Nov. 24, 2004); Telephone Interview with MK (Dec. 1, 
2004); Interview with EM, in The Hague, Neth. (Nov. 8, 2004). 
234. Telephone Interview with TH (Nov. 24, 2004); Telephone Interview with PK (Nov. 29, 
2004); Interview with EM, in The Hague, Neth. (Nov. 8, 2004). 
235. Although ICTR convicts detained in Mali are housed in special facilities prepared with UN 
financial aid, these facilities cannot compare with the roomier, better-equipped prisons of Europe. 
236. See, e.g., RichardS. Frase, Comparative Criminal Justice as a Guide to American Law 
Reform: How Do the French Do It, How Can We Find Out, and Why Should We Care?, 78 CAL. L. 
REV. 539, 649 n.569 (1990) (reporting that French sentences are reduced by one-half for good 
behavior); Mary Margaret Penrose, Lest We Fail: The Importance of Enforcement in International 
Criminal Law, 15 AM. U. INT'L L. REV. 321, 382 n.225 (reporting that an ICTY defendant 
imprisoned in Norway is eligible for parole after serving half of his sentence if he is a first time 
offender); see also Ivana Nizich, International Tribunals and their Ability to Provide Adequate 
Justice: Lessons from the Yugoslav Tribunal, 7 ILSA J. INT'L & COMP. L. 353, 367-68 (2001) 
(describing Western European parole laws as "infinitely more lenient" than those in other parts 
of the world). 
237. See supra text accompanying note 72. 
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a tentative list of cases for transfer, but they did not make this list 
public238 for fear of the defendants' reaction.239 The prospect of a 
Rwandan prosecution terrifies some defendants, who believe that they 
will suffer physical abuse or even death if they return to Rwanda. That 
fear motivated ICTR defendants to conduct a high-profile protest in 
September 2004, when forty-four of the ICTR's fifty-six detainees 
boycotted their trials and threatened to launch hunger strikes.240 Given 
the depth of the defendants' disquiet, the ability to transfer a case to 
Rwanda provides prosecutors with a potent bargaining chip. Indeed, 
although the prosecution had expected Rutaganira to plead guilty soon 
after his voluntary surrender in 2002, it was not until the prosecution 
made clear that it intended to transfer his case to Rwanda that 
Rutaganira decided to enter his guilty plea.241 
The above discussion indicates that ICTR prosecutors should be 
in a strong position to procure guilty pleas. Prosecutors are willing and 
able to offer substantial sentencing concessions to defendants who plead 
guilty, and these concessions should be all the more valuable since the 
sentences imposed after trials have been so severe. Prosecutors 
additionally have the ability to bargain with defendants over the 
location of their detention and even over the criminal justice system in 
which their case will be heard, issues that will have life-altering impact 
in many cases. Thus, given the prosecution's strong desire for guilty 
pleas and the compelling issues available for negotiation, one would 
have expected a substantial proportion of ICTR defendants to have pled 
guilty. Mter Ruggiu, however, four-and-one-half years elapsed before 
another ICTR defendant pled guilty, and a number of ICTR defense 
counsel assert that few, if any, additional guilty pleas should be 
expected. 242 As the following discussion will reveal, that prediction 
stems from the fact that the key inducement offered to convince 
domestic defendants to plead guilty-a sentence reduction-has little 
persuasive value for ICTR defendants. Rather, these defendants place 
greater weight on a variety of primarily ideological factors that serve to 
discourage them from pleading guilty. 
238. Telephone Interview with TH (Nov. 24, 2004); Telephone Interview with RQ (Dec. 1, 
2004). 
239. Telephone Interview with TH (Nov. 24, 2004). 
240. Modestus Kessy, Genocide Suspects Call Off Protest, THE SUNDAY OBSERVER (U.K.), 
Sept. 26, 2004. 
241. Thierry Cruvellier, Councillor Rutaganira Strikes a Good Deal, INT'L JUST. TRIB. (Paris, 
Fr.), Dec. 20, 2004. 
242. Telephone Interview with MI (Dec. 2, 2004); Telephone Interview with PK (Nov. 23, 
2004); Telephone Interview with RQ (Dec. 1, 2004). 
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Indeed, most ICTR defendants have refused to plead guilty 
because they truly do not believe that they are guilty of the crimes for 
which they have been charged.243 It is widely accepted in the 
international legal community that the Rwandan massacres constituted 
a genocide, and every ICTR defendant convicted thus far has been 
convicted of some form of genocide.244 The great majority of ICTR 
defendants, however, steadfastly deny that genocide occurred in 
Rwanda, maintaining instead that the 1994 violence took place in the 
context of the long-running war between the Rwandan government and 
the RPF. ICTR defendants do not dispute that events spiraled out of 
control and that unfortunate and unnecessary violence was targeted 
against Tutsi civilians. But they maintain that this violence 
constituted the excesses of a legitimate and spontaneous national 
defense effort, not a genocidal plan to eliminate the Tutsi. 245 They also 
stress that crimes were committed by both sides of the conflict.246 The 
ICTR has not prosecuted any members of the RPF, however, a fact 
which has exacerbated the defendants' belief that they are victims of 
victors' justice-that is, that they are being prosecuted only because 
their side lost the war-and that the Tribunal functions merely as a 
tool of the current Tutsi-led Rwandan government. Although most 
ICTR defendants are thus convinced that they cannot receive a fair 
trial,247 they see value in drawing out the proceedings and broadcasting 
their political views through those proceedings. 
243. Telephone Interview with TH (Nov. 24, 2004); Telephone Interview with MI (Dec. 2, 
2004); Telephone Interview with MK (Dec. 1, 2004); Telephone Interview with PK (Nov. 23, 
2004); Telephone Interview with RQ (Dec. 1, 2004); see also MELVERN, supra note 153, at 3 ("The 
Arusha prisoners remain convinced of the rectitude of their actions."). 
244. Prosecutor v. Gacumbitsi, Case No. ICTR-2001-64-T, Judgment, ~ 334 (June 17, 2004); 
Prosecutor v. Ntagerura et al., Case No. ICTR-99-46-T, Judgment and Sentence,~ 806 (Feb. 25, 
2004); Prosecutor v. Kamuhanda, Case No. ICTR-95-54A-T, Judgment, ~ 750 (Jan. 22, 2004); 
Nahimana Judgment, supra note 185, ~~ 1092-1094; Prosecutor v. Kajelijeli, Case No. ICTR-98-
44A-T, Judgment and Sentence, ~ 942 (Dec. 1, 2003); Prosecutor v. Niyitegeka, Case No. ICTR-
96-14-T, Judgment and Sentence,~ 480 (May 16, 2003); Prosecutor v. Semanza, Case No. ICTR-
97·20-T, Judgment and Sentence, ~ 553 (May 15, 2003); Prosecutor v. Elizaphan & Gerard 
Ntakirutimana, Case Nos. ICTR-96-10 & ICTR-96-17-T, Judgment and Sentence, ~~ 877-78 
(Feb. 21, 2003); Prosecutor v. Ndindabahizi, Case No. ICTR-2001-71-I, Judgment and Sentence, 
~ 495 (July 15, 2001); Ruggiu Judgment, supra note 188, at Verdict; Prosecutor v. Musema, Case 
No. ICTR-96-13, Judgment and Sentence, Verdict (Jan. 27, 2000); Prosecutor v. Rutaganda, Case 
No. ICTR-96-3, Judgment and Sentence, Verdict (Dec. 6, 1999); Kayishema & Ruzindana 
Judgment, supra note 183, at Verdict ~ 2; Serushago Sentence, supra note 174, at Verdict; 
Kambanda Judgment, supra note 154, at Verdict; Akayesu Judgment, supra note 166, at Verdict. 
245. Telephone Interview with PK (Nov. 29, 2004). 
246. Id.; Telephone Interview with MI (Dec. 2, 2004). Commentators estimate that, in 
putting an end to the killing spree, the Tutsi-led RPF killed tens of thousands of Hutu. Filip 
Reyntjens, Rwanda, Ten Years On: From Genocide to Dictatorship, 103 AFR. AFF. 177, 194 
(2004). 
247. Telephone Interview with WM (Oct. 19, 2005). 
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The prosecution's recent attempts to secure guilty pleas have 
highlighted the ways in which the defendants' characterization of the 
violence and their role in that violence can shape and sometimes derail 
efforts to obtain guilty pleas. In at least one case, for instance, 
prosecutors and defense counsel were able to agree on a sentence 
recommendation-and a generous one at that, by all accounts-but 
were nonetheless unable to conclude a plea agreement because the 
defendant refused to plead guilty to charges of genocide.248 That the 
desire to avoid the label of genocidaire would be so compelling as to 
preclude an agreement, even when the prosecution agreed to the 
sentencing recommendation sought by the defendant, mystified the 
prosecutors with whom I spoke.249 Yet, the defendant's position is fully 
in keeping with the historical view of the conflict to which ICTR 
defendants subscribe. While an ICTR defendant may be able to justify 
to himself a guilty plea to crimes against humanity, since it is 
undisputed that massive violence did occur in 1994, he cannot admit to 
taking part in a genocide because doing so would be fundamentally at 
odds with the defendant community's long-held characterization of the 
violence. That the only guilty plea to be tendered in recent years-that 
of Rutaganira-required the prosecutor not just to withdraw the 
genocide count but to request Rutaganira's acquittal on that count only 
supports this view. 
The legal characterization of crimes is typically of little 
significance to criminal defendants, whether domestic or international, 
unless that characterization bears directly on the defendant's expected 
sentence. That is, most criminal defendants do not particularly care 
whether they are convicted of this crime or that crime except in so far 
as the conviction affects the sentence. The high-ranking status of 
virtually all ICTR defendants helps to explain the atypical emphasis 
that these defendants place on characterization issues. While the ICTY 
has tried both high-level architects of the atrocities and low-level, 
hands-on killers, and the Special Panels have prosecuted only low-level, 
uneducated offenders, the vast majority of ICTR defendants held 
prominent positions in Rwandan public life. Because most ICTR 
defendants had been senior politicians, military leaders, or influential 
business people, they possess far greater concern than would lower-
ranking defendants about the legal and factual characterization of the 
conflict. In particular, they ardently seek to promote a narrative that 
defends and enhances their historical legacy. One defense counsel 
248. Telephone Interview with TH (Nov. 24, 2004); Telephone Interview with MI (Dec. 2, 
2004); Telephone Interview with RQ (Dec. 1, 2004) . 
249. Telephone Interview with TH (Nov. 24, 2004). 
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reported, for instance, that his client's primary goal during his trial was 
to impeach prosecution witnesses whom he believed to be lying and to 
present the testimony of witnesses who could reveal to the world what 
he believed was the true nature of the events of 1994. The prospect of 
spending the rest of his life behind bars was, his counsel believes, of less 
concern to this defendant than was his opportunity to create through 
his trial a historical record that might, even many years from now, 
vindicate his view of the conflict. 25° For these reasons, it should come 
as no surprise that three of the four ICTR defendants who pled guilty 
held low-level positions251 and consequently had no legacy in need of 
protecting. 
The defendants' commitment to their characterization of the 
violence, in addition, has been reinforced during the several years that 
most ICTR defendants have been imprisoned. Before and during trial, 
ICTR defendants are detained in the United Nations Detention Facility 
("UNDF') in Arusha, Tanzania. By all accounts, the defendants have 
formed a closely-knit, hierarchically-ordered community that 
communicates regularly, engages in joint decisionmaking,252 and 
mirrors in many ways the characteristics of the Rwandan 
administrative state. In such a community, defendants do not have the 
benefit of hearing views contrary to their own; thus, their own beliefs 
become even more entrenched.253 Further, those most responsible for 
the 1994 violence are said to wield the greatest power within the 
detainee community.254 Rwandan society is said by many to be 
characterized by an "unconditional obedience to authority,"255 so that 
the leaders of the detainee community have considerable ability to 
suppress views that are inconsistent with prevailing understandings. 
Defendants are additionally deterred from pleading guilty because 
admitting genocide undermines the legal position of their fellow 
detainees. Group loyalty, then, discourages defendants from taking this 
step, and so does fear. The families of many ICTR defendants live in 
250. Telephone Interview with RQ (Dec. 1, 2004). 
251. Rutaganira, in addition, likely also had less formal education than most of the 
remaining ICTR defendants. Many of the latter are hi- or tri-lingual, while Rutaganira speaks 
only Kinyarwanda. Prosecutor v. Rutaganira, Case No. ICTR-95-1C-I, Minutes of Proceedings at 
~ l.a. (Mar. 7, 2002). 
252. Ruggiu Transcript, supra note 188, at 48-49. 
253. Telephone Interview with TH (Nov. 24, 2004); Telephone Interview with Ml (Dec. 2, 
2004). 
254. Telephone Interview with MI (Dec. 2, 2004); Telephone Interview with MK (Dec. 1, 
2004); MELVERN, supra note 153, at 3. 
255. PRUNIER, supra note 145, at 141. But see Lars Waldorf, Mass Justice for Mass Atrocity, 
Rethinking Local Justice as Transitional Justice, 79 TEMPLE L. REV. (forthcoming 2006) (calling 
the authoritarian thesis into question, by for instance, pointing to "instances of disobedience and 
resistance to state authority under a succession of regimes"). 
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Hutu communities in various nations, and some defendants 
legitimately fear that their families will suffer retaliation if they plead 
guilty.256 
While a fundamental dispute about the nature of the 1994 
events stands as the primary factor deterring ICTR defendants from 
pleading guilty, there exist other, perhaps less influential, reasons for 
the dearth of guilty pleas. First among these relates to ICTR defense 
counsel and the advice they give to their clients. Speculation exists, for 
instance, that some defense counsel, particularly those from developing 
nations, may be less inclined to encourage their clients to plead guilty 
even when the clients would benefit from doing so, because counsel 
themselves have financial incentives to proceed to trial. 257 While many 
Western counsel earn less at the ICTR than they would in their home 
countries, counsel from developing nations typically earn considerably 
more at the ICTR than they would at home. A conflict-of-interest can 
arise, therefore, between counsel, who have a financial interest in 
prolonging their ICTR representation, and their clients, who may 
benefit from pleading guilty. Other ICTR defense counsel strongly 
identify with their clients' political views and with their understanding 
of the events of 1994. These counsel are as convinced of their clients' 
innocence as the clients themselves and typically discourage guilty 
pleas, considering them unprincipled capitulations. 
For some ICTR defendants, health and life expectancy 
considerations also serve to diminish the influence of sentencing 
discounts. A number of ICTR defendants are reportedly infected with 
HIV.258 These defendants may conclude that their life expectancies are 
already so reduced that the prosecution's sentencing concessions will 
ultimately have no practical effect on the amount of time that they 
spend incarcerated. That is, these defendants might reason that, if 
convicted, they will die behind bars no matter what sentence they 
receive, so they might as well try for an acquittal. Guilty pleas may be 
undesirable in addition because they hasten the defendants' conviction 
and their subsequent transfer from the UNDF to the prison in which 
they will ultimately serve their sentences. The UNDF is a comfortable 
detention facility by African standards and one that provides its 
detainees with appropriate medical treatment. By contrast, the 
Magistral of the Direction National de ['Administration Penitentiaire 
256. Telephone Interview with WM (Oct. 19, 2005). 
257. Telephone Interview with MI (Dec. 2, 2004); Telephone Interview with MK (Dec. 1, 
2004). 
258. Telephone Interview with TH (Nov. 24, 2004); Telephone Interview with MK (Dec. 1, 
2004); Interview with BM, in The Hague, Neth. (Nov. 8, 2004); Telephone Interview with RQ 
(Dec. 1, 2004). 
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et de ['Education Surueillee in Mali reported that while ICTR convicts 
serving their sentences in Mali receive some medication for 
"transmissible diseases," the amounts available are insufficient.259 
Thus, to the extent that an ICTR defendant considers that even after a 
guilty plea he will still serve a lengthy sentence, he may choose to 
maximize the portion of that sentence that he serves at the UNDF. A 
final factor deterring ICTR defendants from pleading guilty stems from 
the legacy of distrust generated by the Kambanda case. Whether 
accurate or not, the prevailing belief amongst ICTR defendants is that 
Kambanda was misled into pleading guilty. Consequently, some ICTR 
defendants have remained skeptical that the prosecution's promises are 
made in good faith. 260 
The foregoing discussion, then, places the earlier analysis of the 
ICTR's guilty pleas in a new light. The earlier discussion traced the 
evolution that has occurred in the ICTR's willingness to reward guilty 
pleas with sentencing discounts, and it observed that, on the surface, 
that evolution suggested that the ICTR should expect to receive a 
substantial number of gnilty pleas. Having now delineated the other 
factors that have proven more influential than sentence discounts to 
ICTR defendants, the guilty pleas tendered thus far appear to be best 
understood as the products of unique circumstances that are unlikely to 
be replicated. Kambanda, for instance, pled guilty expecting to receive 
an extremely short sentence. Kambanda's counsel argued for a 
maximum term of two years' imprisonment,261 and Kambanda 
apparently believed that he was likely to receive such a sentence. No 
ICTR defendant since Kambanda could be so mistaken. 
Serushago's and Ruggiu's guilty pleas likewise stemmed from 
unusual circumstances that are unlikely to be repeated at the ICTR. 
Serushago was a low-level offender whose case never would have come 
before the lCTR had Serushago himself not placed it there. Because he 
had no leadership role, Serushago could plead guilty without concern 
for the historical effect of his plea. 
259. Telephone Interview with Ahmadou Tourre (Sept. 13, 2005). Medication is generally 
scarce in Malian prisons. See E.V.O. DANKWA, AFRICAN COMM'N ON HUMAN & PEOPLE'S RIGHTS, 
SERIES IV, NO. 4, MALI PRISONS REVISITED: REPORT OF THE SPECIAL RAPPORTEUR ON PRISONS 
AND CONDITIONS OF DETENTION IN AFRICA 16-18 (1999). At least one women's prison in Bamako 
releases prisoners with HIV because they "simply don't have the means to provide care and 
treatment for them." Julia Nogushi, HIV Management in a Malian Women's Prison, BRUNAP 
NEWS (Brown Univ. AlDS Program, Providence, RI), Spring 2004, at 16. 
260. Telephone Interview with MI (Dec. 2, 2004); Telephone Interview with PK (Nov. 23, 
2004). In addition, high-level defendants might fear that the Trial Chamber's apparent practice 
of discounting sentences following guilty pleas might apply only to low-level offenders such as 
Serushago and Ruggiu. 
261. Prosecutor v. Kambanda, Case No. ICTR-97-23-l, Transcript at 33 (Sept. 3, 1998). 
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Ruggiu's guilty plea was likewise uncomplicated by many of the 
factors deterring the remaining ICTR defendants from pleading guilty. 
Although, as an initial matter, Ruggiu clung to the Hutu's 
characterization of the violence, as a Belgian who had emigrated to 
Rwanda only four months before the massacres began, Ruggiu did not 
experience the ethnic overtones of the conflict or the subsequent 
selective prosecutions in the way that other ICTR defendants do. In 
addition, even though Ruggiu hails from a civil-law country in which 
plea bargaining is not prevalent, 262 as a European, he was likely more 
receptive to the lure of a sentence discount than his community-minded 
Rwandan co-defendants. Ruggiu's guilty plea is difficult to interpret in 
part because Ruggiu himself is difficult to understand. A close friend 
testifying on his behalf described him as excessively rule-oriented and 
hard to get along with; even his lawyer described him as "not a 
particularly easy character in his person."263 Moreover, the prosecution 
has received little benefit from his testimony or the information he 
provided. Ruggiu admitted to lying to prosecutors in his early 
interviews, 264 and his testimony against his former co-defendants was 
so riddled with inconsistencies that the Trial Chamber rejected it "in its 
entirety."265 Ruggiu's guilty plea cannot, then, be seen to presage much 
of anything since it may have sprung from the same idealism and 
impulsiveness that apparently motivated Ruggiu's relocation to 
Rwanda in the first place. 
Before Rutaganira pled guilty in December 2004, a number of 
ICTR defense counsel whom I interviewed predicted that, as a result of 
the many factors canvassed above, the ICTR would not receive any 
further guilty pleas.266 Although Rutaganira's guilty plea renders that 
prediction technically inaccurate, the reasons underlying the prediction 
remain compelling. Because Rutaganira held a low-ranking position in 
the Rwandan political hierarchy, many of the factors that act to 
discourage more senior ICTR defendants from pleading guilty had less 
relevance for him. Further, the prosecution had the ability to offer 
Rutaganira benefits in addition to a lenient sentence recommendation. 
Because he was a low-level offender, Rutaganira was just the sort of 
262. See Christine Van den Wyngaert, Belgium, in CRIMINAL PROCEDURE SYSTEMS IN THE 
EUROPEAN COMMUNITY 1, 42 (Christine Van den Wyngaert et al. eds., 1993) ("The Belgian 
system does not know the plea of guilty, and concomitantly, the concept of plea bargaining is 
unknown."). 
263. Ruggiu Transcript, supra note 188, at 49, 146-47. 
264. Nahimana Judgment, supra note 179, ~ 549; Convicted Ex-Radio, supra note 264. 
265. Nahimana Judgment, supra note 179, ~~ 548-49. 
266. Telephone Interview with MI (Dec. 2, 2004); Telephone interview with RQ (Dec. 1, 
2004). 
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defendant whose case was apt to be transferred to Rwanda. Thus, the 
prosecution had that bargaining chip at its disposal, and it was willing, 
in addition, to seek a favorable detention location for Rutaganira. Most 
importantly, Rutaganira's plea agreement required him to admit only 
that a massacre took place that he failed to prevent, and that is an 
admission that even the most intractable ICTR defendant could likely 
make. ICTR prosecutors cannot be satisfied by such minimal 
admissions in other cases, and it remains to be seen whether the desire 
to avoid a trial in Rwanda will provide sufficient motivation to persuade 
other defendants whose cases might be transferred to Rwanda to plead 
guilty. It certainly may. ICTR defendants are reportedly terrified of 
the physical violence they believe they will suffer in Rwanda, 267 and 
even if they escape such harm, if convicted, they can look forward only 
to an unpleasant detention in an over-crowded Rwandan prison that 
may not adequately provide for their medical needs.268 One defense 
counsel went so far as to describe a transfer to Rwanda as a death 
sentence.269 In addition, because a trial in a Rwandan court is not apt 
to provide defendants with as desirable a public platform to proclaim 
their version of the events of 1994 as an ICTR trial, the perceived value 
of trials will diminish. The question of whether it is ethically 
appropriate to bargain over issues of such potential significance as the 
transfer of cases to Rwandan courts is beyond the scope of this Article, 
but, ethical or not, such bargaining likely provides prosecutors with the 
best vehicle for convincing future ICTR defendants to plead guilty. 
V. CULTURAL FACTORS INFLUENCING PLEA BARGAINING AND THE 
PERCEPTION GAP BETWEEN DEFENDANTS AND THEIR COUNSEL: GUILTY 
PLEAS AT THE SPECIAL PANELS FOR SERIOUS CRIMES 
East Timor had been a Portuguese colony for more than 450 
years270 when, in 1974, Portugal began to consider dismantling its 
colonies. Before Portugal could take any action, however, Indonesia 
267. Telephone Interview with MI (Dec. 2, 2004); Telephone Interview with MK (Dec. 1, 
2004); Telephone Interview with PK (Nov. 23, 2004); Telephone Interview with RQ (Dec. 1, 
2004). Others believe that, because cases that the ICTR transfers to Rwanda will be carefully 
watched, lCTR defendants are relatively unlikely to suffer physical violence. Telephone 
Interview with WM (Oct. 19, 2005). 
268. For an indictment of ICTR prison conditions in the late 1990s, see Human Rights First, 
Prosecuting Genocide in Rwanda: A Human Rights First Report on the ICTR and National 
Trials, VIlLE. (July 1997); Drumbl, supra note 193, at 571-72. 
269. Telephone Interview with MI (Dec. 2, 2004). 
270. For a discussion of the Timorese colonial period, see James J. Fox, Tracing the Path, 
Recounting the Path: Historical Perspectives on Timor, in OUT OF THE AsHES: DESTRUCTION AND 
RECONSTRUCTION OF EAST TIMOR 1, 1 (James J. Fox & Dionisio Babo·Soares eds., 2003). 
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invaded East Timor in December 1975 and soon after formally 
annexed the territory, proclaiming East Timor to be Indonesia's 
twenty-seventh province.271 By 1999, Indonesia's continued military 
presence in East Timor had led to trenchant international criticism 
and a financial drain on Indonesia's fragile economy.272 As a 
consequence, then-Indonesian President B.J. Habibie committed to a 
UN-sponsored consultation process whereby a referendum would be 
held permitting the East Timorese to vote either to become 
independent or to remain within Indonesia, bearing a special 
autonomous status.273 The months leading up to the August 1999 
ballot saw considerable violence, sponsored by Indonesia and aimed at 
intimidating the East Timorese population into voting to remain 
within Indonesia. 274 When 78.5 percent of the East Timorese voted 
instead for independence,275 heavily armed groups conducted a 
"scorched earth" campaign. These groups ''burned and looted entire 
towns and villages, attacked and killed at random in the streets, and 
forcibly 'evacuated' or kidnapped people to the western half of the 
271. lnt'l Comm'n of Inquiry on East Timor, Report of the International Commission of 
Inquiry on East Timor to the Secretary-General,~ 5, delivered to the Secretary-General, U.N. Doc. 
N541726, S/2000/59 (Jan. 31, 2000) [hereinafter Commission of Inquiry on East Timor]; see also 
Phillip J . Curtin, Comment, Genocide in East Timor? Calling for an International Criminal 
Tribunal for East Timor in Light of Akayesu, 19 DICK. J. INT'L L. 181, 184-85 (2000) (discussing 
the colonial history and Indonesia's invasion of East Timor); Sylvia de Bertodano, Current 
Developments in Internationalized Courts, 1 J . INT'L CRIM. JUST. 226, 228-29 (2003) (providing a 
historical background on East Timor). 
272. The financial issues stemmed in part from the monetary crisis in South-East Asia, 
which rendered Indonesia particularly reliant on International Monetary Fund restructuring 
loans and particularly vulnerable to international criticism that might endanger the provision of 
those loans. See Grayson J. Lloyd, The Diplomacy on East Timor: Indonesia, the United Nations 
and the International Community, in OUT OF THE AsHES, supra note 270, at 79, 8 -85 (discussing 
the influence of international pressure and IMF loans on the Indonesian government's 
concessions regarding East Timorese autonomy). 
273. Suzannah Linton, Rising from the Ashes: The Creation of a Viable Criminal Justice 
System in East Timor, 25 MELBOURNE U. L. REV. 122, 128-29 (2001); see also Dionisio Babo-
Soares, Political Developments Leading to the Referendum, in OUT OF THE AsHES, supra note 271 , 
at 57, 64-66 (discussing the political and military events leading up to the referendum) . See 
generally Lloyd, supra note 272, at 84-92. 
274. See Commission of Inquiry on East Timor, supra note 271, ~~ 41-42, 124 (discussing 
the tactics used to intimidate East Timorese civilians); The Secretary-General, Situation of 
Human Rights in East Timor: Note by the Secretary-General, ~ 26, U.N. Doc N541660 (Dec. 10, 
1999) ("[P]ro-integration groups launched a campaign of intimidation and violence directed 
against persons and communities known for their pro-independence sympathies."). 
275. Suzannah Linton, Cambodia, East Timor and Sierra Leone: Experiments in 
International Justice, 12 CRIM. L. F. 185, 203 (2001). Voter turnout was extremely high: 98.6% of 
registered voters cast their ballots. Fausto Belo Ximenes, The Unique Contribution of the 
Community-Based Reconciliation Process in East Timor 7 (May 28, 2004) (unpublished paper, on 
file with author). 
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island, which was still part of Indonesia."276 Mter sending security 
forces to halt the violence, the Security Council adopted Resolution 
1272, establishing the United Nations Transitional Administration in 
East Timor and empowering it "to exercise all legislative and 
executive authority, including the administration of justice."277 
Pursuant to that authority, the Secretary-General for East Timor 
created Special Panels for Serious Crimes in the Dili District Court to 
prosecute genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity, and 
particularly serious domestic crimes.278 Although the success of the 
Special Panels was substantially impeded by Indonesia's refusal to 
surrender suspects,279 the Special Panels were able to prosecute 
276. Hansjorg Strohmeyer, Collapse and Reconstruction of a Judicial System: The United 
Nations Missions in Kosovo and East Timor, 95 AM. J. INT'L L. 46, 50 (2001); see also Suzannah 
Linton, Cambodia, East Timor and Sierra Leone: Experiments in International Justice, 12 CRIM. 
L. F. 186, 202-03 (2001); PRISCILLA B. HAYNER, UNSPEAKABLE TRUTHS: FACING THE CHALLENGE 
OF TRUTH COMMISSIONS 261 (2002). 
277. S.C. Res. 1272, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1272 (Oct. 25, 1999). 
278. UNTAET Reg. No. 2000/11, §§ 9-10, UNTAET/REG/2001/11 (Mar. 6, 2000); UNTAET 
Reg. No. 2000/15, § 1.3, UNTAET/REG/2000/15 (June 6, 2000). The domestic crimes over which 
the Dili District Court has jurisdiction are murder, sexual offenses, and torture. UNTAET Reg. 
No. 2000/11, supra, § 10.1. The Special Panels were internationally dominated: they were 
composed of two international judges and one East Timorese judge, and the Court of Appeal 
hearing cases involving serious crimes had a panel with two out of three international judges. 
UNTAET Reg. No. 2000/15, supra,§ 22. Since East Timor gained independence in May 2002, the 
Serious Crimes Unit, which was the prosecutorial arm of the Special Panels, worked under the 
legal authority of the Prosecutor-General in Timor-Leste, the name taken by East Timor on 
independence. JUDICIAL SYSTEM MONITORING PROGRAMME, THE LoLOTOE CASE: A SMALL STEP 
FORWARD, 3 (July 2004) (hereinafter THE LoLOTOE CASE: A SMALL STEP FORWARD] . 
279. By December 2004, the Special Panels had indicted 370 individuals. Press Release, 
Office of the Deputy Gen. Prosecutor for Serious Crimes Timor Leste, SCU Indicts Suai Church 
Massacre Commanders (Nov. 30, 2004). At least 281 of those individuals were residing in 
Indonesia, JUDICIAL SYSTEM MONITORING PROGRAMME, THE FUTURE OF THE SERIOUS CRIMES 
UNIT: JSMP ISSUE REPORT 10 (Jan. 2004), and that country refused to surrender them. See id.; 
AMNESTY INT'L & JUDICIAL SYSTEM MONITORING PROGRAMME, JUSTICE FOR TIMOR·LESTE: THE 
WAY FORWARD§ 4.1 at 23 (Apr. 2004) (hereinafter JUSTICE FOR TIMOR-LESTE] ("The Indonesian 
government has publicly stated that it will not cooperate with the Timor-Leste government in 
bringing to trial persons against whom indictments have been presented to the Special Panels."); 
AsiA PACIFIC CENTRE FOR MILITARY LAW & JUDICIAL SYSTEM MONITORING PROGRAMME, REPORT 
OF PROCEEDINGS: SYMPOSIUM ON JUSTICE FOR INTERNATIONAL CRIMES COMMITTED ON THE 
TERRITORY OF EAST TIMOR§ 3.1 at 5 (Jan. 2003) (''Thus far, there has been no cooperation from 
Indonesia with requests for the detention and transfer ofindictees within Indonesia."). 
In an effort to stave off calls for an international criminal tribunal for East Timor on the 
order of the ICTY and lCTR, the Government of Indonesia agreed to undertake domestic 
prosecutions of Indonesians accused of international crimes relating to Timorese independence. 
These trials have recently concluded and have been condemned as shams. Indonesia selected 
only five incidents out of 670 for prosecution, and the prosecutions themselves were plagued by 
corruption, incompetence, and an effort to shield perpetrators from responsibility. See JUSTICE 
FOR TIMOR-LESTE, supra, §§ 5-9 (providing a history of the Indonesian trials); William J . Furney, 
East Timor Atrocities: Submit to International Tribunal, THE STRAITS TIMES (Singapore), Aug. 
15, 2003 (reporting that "almost every major international human rights group slamm[ed] the 
trials of 18 former officials as an unabashed 'whitewash."); Eugene Bingham, Getting Away with 
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eighty-seven defendants, convicting eighty-four of them. In May 2005, 
the UN stopped funding the Panels and they consequently closed. 280 
Details of Special Panels prosecutions are extremely difficult to 
obtain.281 Some judgments are not available in English, and some 
that are available in English are limited to three or four page 
"Dispositions of the Decision," which do little more than state the 
defendants' crimes and the sentences imposed for those crimes.282 
Special Panels cases are therefore challenging to research,283 but 
prosecutors and defense counsel indicate that at least 50 percent of 
Special Panels defendants elected to plead guilty. 284 The proportion of 
Murder, NEW ZEALAND HERALD, Aug. 30, 2003 (reporting on the corruption and non-cooperation 
of the Indonesian government during the trials); David Cohen, Seeking Justice on the Cheap: Is 
the East Timor Tribunal Really a Model for the Future?, AsiA PACIFIC ISSUES (East-West Center, 
Honolulu, HI), Aug. 2002, at 4 (discussing Indonesia's "show trials"). Twelve of the eighteen 
defendants were acquitted outright, and four of the six who were convicted were sentenced to 
terms of three years' imprisonment for crimes against humanity. All of the defendants remained 
free while their cases were on appeal, JUSTICE FOR TIMOR-LESTE, supra, § 9.9 at 48, and in 2004, 
Indonesia's appeals court overturned four of the six convictions which concerned Indonesian 
defendants and halved the sentences of the remaining two defendants, hoth of whom are ethnic 
Timorese. Andrew Burrell, Just Two Punished for Timor Atrocities, AUSTRALIAN FIN. REVIEW, 
Aug. 7, 2004; Jakarta Rejects Timor Convictions, BBC NEWS, Aug. 6, 2004. Following 
dissatisfaction with these prosecutions, UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan established a 
Commission of Experts to examine and report on the prosecutions. Annan Names Experts to 
Probe Impunity in Independence Violence in Timor-Leste, U.N. NEWS SERV., Feb. 18, 2005. The 
Commission's report recommends requiring Indonesia to review the prosecutions and to re-open 
them if appropriate. It also recommends giving Indonesia six months to provide a 
comprehensive report to the UN Secretary-General concerning its investigations of its own 
prosecutions and the indictments issued by the Serious Crimes Unit. The Secretary-General, 
Annex 1: Summary of the Report to the Secretary-General of the Commission of Experts to Review 
the Prosecution of Serious Violations of Human Rights in Timor-Leste (then East Timor) in 1999, 
'if'if 25, 27-28, delivered to the Security Council, U.N. Doc. S/2005/455 (May 26, 2005). If 
Indonesia fails to undertake this investigation, the Commission recommended that the UN 
Security Council establish an ad-hoc criminal tribunal for Timor-Leste. Id. 'if 29. 
280. Judicial System Monitoring Programme, Special Panels for Serious Crimes, available at 
http://www.jsmp.minihuh.org/Court%201\~onitoring/spsc.htm; Human Rights Watch, Human 
Rights Overview: East Timor, available at http://hrw.org/englishldocs/2005/0ll13/eastti9825.htm. 
281. The best source for information on the Special Panels is the website of the Judicial 
System Monitoring Programme (JSMP), http://www.jsmp.minihub.org. 
282. E.g., Prosecutor v. Mendes Correia, Dili District Court, Special Panels for Serious 
Crimes, Dispositions, Case No. 19/2001 (Mar. 3, 2004); Prosecutor v. Sarmento, Dili District 
Court, Special Panels for Serious Crimes, Case No. 18/2001, Disposition, (July 16, 2003); 
Prosecutor v. Mendow;:a, Dili District Court, Special Panels for Serious Crimes, Case No. 
18a/2001, Disposition of the Decision (Oct. 13, 2003). 
283. In January 2005, the President of the Court of Appeal issued instructions that all 
information in case files, including final decisions, would no longer be publicly available. Press 
Release, Judicial System Monitoring Programme, Public Access Barred to Decisions from 
District Courts (Jan. 25, 2005) (on file with author). Decisions such as these certainly do not 
enhance the already limited transparency of the Panels. 
284. Telephone interview with Nicholas Koumjian, Deputy Prosecutor for Serious Crimes, 
Special Panels for Serious Crimes (July 29, 2004); Telephone interview with Alan Gutman, Def. 
Counsel, Special Panels for Serious Crimes (July 30, 2004). 
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defendants who pled guilty is thus much higher at the Special Panels 
than it is at the ICTY or the ICTR, and that high proportion does bear 
a significant relationship to the sentencing discounts bestowed on 
Special Panels defendants who entered guilty pleas. The relationship, 
however, is a complex one. Special Panels defendants themselves 
were little tempted by the prospect of sentence discounts. Instead, 
they were motivated to plead guilty by a coalition of cultural and 
socio-economic factors that not only play little role in the guilty-plea 
decisions of Western defendants but may be difficult for Westerners 
even to comprehend. Indeed, for a variety of reasons that will soon be 
canvassed, many Special Panels defendants would have pled guilty 
even if they had not obtained any sentencing benefits in exchange. 
Special Panels defendants are represented by counsel, however, and in 
the last years of the Panels' existence, counsel insisted that their 
clients receive appropriate discounts before they would enter guilty 
pleas.285 Thus, sentencing discounts came to be required if East 
Timorese defendants were to tender guilty pleas, but it was not 
typically the East Timorese defendants who required them. The next 
Section will examine why the prospect of sentence discounts did not 
substantially influence the guilty-plea decisions of Special Panels 
defendants, and the following Section will explore the way in which 
the presence of defense counsel served to transform sentence discounts 
from an incidental benefit to the primary goal of defendants' guilty 
pleas. 
A. Sentencing Discounts Through the Eyes of Special Panels 
Defendants 
In the early days of the Special Panels, no plea negotiations 
took place.286 The prosecution saw no pressing need to resolve its 
cases summarily, and defense counsel at that time were so few, so 
under-resourced, and so unfamiliar with guilty pleas that they were 
not truly capable of engaging in plea negotiations. 287 In addition, 
285. In the Lolotoe case, for instance, when defendant Jose Cardoso spontaneously attempted 
to apologize to the court, defense counsel immediately stopped Cardoso from speaking and asked 
to confer with him. After that conference, Cardoso asserted that he no longer wished to say 
anything. Judicial System Monitoring Programme, The Lolotoe Case, Trial Notes (Apr. 10, 2002) 
(unpublished document, on file with author). 
286. Telephone interview with Essa Faal, former Chief of Prosecutions, Special Panels for 
Serious Crimes (July 30, 2004); Telephone interview with Stuart Alford, former prosecutor, 
Special Panels for Serious Crimes (Feb. 17, 2005); Telephone interview with Brenda Sue 
Thornton, former prosecutor, Special Panels for Serious Crimes, (Sept. 12, 2005). 
287. Telephone interview with Brenda Sue Thornton, former prosecutor, Special Panels for 
Serious Crimes (Sept. 12, 2005). 
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neither the prosecution nor the defense knew what range of sentences 
the Special Panels would be inclined to impose, so bargaining over 
sentencing recommendations seemed a particularly uncertain 
endeavor.288 However, despite the fact that early Special Panels 
defendants received no promise of a sentence discount, virtually all of 
them admitted to participating in the crimes for which they were 
charged, and many formally attempted to plead guilty. 289 The 
prospect of a sentence reduction was obviously not the factor 
motivating these early Special Panels defendants to plead guilty. 
Rather, the primary explanation for the defendants' propensity to 
spontaneously confess their crimes rests on the East Timorese belief 
system and, more particularly, on the Timorese understanding of 
crime and the proper response to crime. 
Special Panels defendants subscribe to a world-view that is 
very different from that of Westerners, and one that is much less 
likely to value the sentencing concessions that prove so important to 
ICTY defendants and defendants in Western criminal justice 
systems. 290 The majority of East Timorese survive by means of 
subsistence farming and believe that, to ensure appropriate weather 
288. Telephone interview with Stuart Alford, former prosecutor, Special Panels for Serious 
Crimes (Feb. 17, 2005). 
289. See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Fernandes, Dili District Court, Special Panels for Serious 
Crimes, Case No. 02 C.G. 2000, 4 (Mar. 1, 2000) (''The Defence admitted that Julio Fernandes 
stabbed twice Americo, that the victim was tied, beaten and suffering and that the crowd was 
shouting 'kill him, kill him."'); Prosecutor v. Soares Carmona, Dili District Court, Special Panels 
for Serious Crimes, Case No. 03 C.G. 2000, Judgment, 3 (Mar. 8-Apr. 25, 2001) (''Most of the 
factual allegations made by the Public Prosecutor are undisputed because Carlos Soares 
Carmona himself acknowledged them."); Prosecutor v. Bere, Dili District Court, Special Panels 
for Serious Crimes, Case No. 10/2000, Judgment, 5 (May 15, 2001) (''Most of the factual 
allegations made by the Public Prosecutor are undisputed because Manuel Gono:;alves Leto Bere 
himself acknowledged them."); Prosecutor v. Soares, Dili District Court, Special Panels for 
Serious Crimes, Case No. 12/2000, 4 (May 31, 2001) (''The accused admits that he shot the 
victim ... ''); Prosecutor v. Leki, Dili District Court, Special Panels for Serious Crimes, Case No. 
05/2000, Judgment, 2 (June 11, 2001) (''The defendant did not plead guilty. He stated at the 
time he was forced to kill only one of the alleged victims, and consequently was not guilty."); 
Prosecutor v. Valente, Dili District Court, Special Panels for Serious Crimes, Case No. 3/2001, 2 
(June 19, 2001) (reporting that the defendant "recognizes that he killed Benedito Marques 
Cabral, but [says] that he was ordered."). 
290. Belief systems vary from region to region in East Timor. See David Mearns, Looking 
Both Ways: Models for Justice in East Timor, AUSTRALIAN LEGAL RESOURCES INTERNATIONAL 
PUBLICATION, at 32 (Nov. 2002) (stating that underlying principles of justice and social 
interaction exist "despite [the villagers1 relative autonomy and apparent differences in detail.") 
(on file with author); Tanja Hohe & Rod Nixon, Reconciling Justice: 'Traditional' Law and State 
Judiciary in East Timor, paper prepared for the United States Institute of Peace and delivered 
at the workshop on the Working of Non-State Justice Systems, held at the Overseas 
Development Institute, Brighton U.K., at 12-13 (Mar. 6-7, 2003) (on file with author); Fox, supra 
note 270, at 1. I have space to present only a bare-bones summary of selected beliefs that are 
common to most regions and that are relevant to my discussion. 
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conditions, soil fertility, and the like, they must maintain excellent 
relations with their ancestors.291 Maintaining these relations requires 
East Timorese to perform certain rituals, adhere to certain taboos, and 
maintain hierarchical social relationships. It is only through these 
practices, the East Timorese believe, that they will appease their 
ancestors and prevent misfortune. 292 Indeed, as one scholar put it, the 
East Timorese "would be afraid not to follow their customs, as it could 
prove very dangerous to them and their families not to do so. The idea 
that mystical sanctions are likely to be imposed by the ancestors or 
the spirits remains a very strong force."293 
The need to appease powerful ancestral spirits also informs the 
East Timorese understanding of crime and its appropriate 
punishment. 294 The East Timorese view crimes and other 
transgressions of the social order as disruptions of the cosmic flow of 
values. Because crime creates an imbalance of values, the appropriate 
response to crime must aim to restore that balance, which will in turn 
reinforce the socio-cosmic order.295 Such a restoration requires 
reconciliation between affected individuals and their communities, 
and to achieve that reconciliation, offenders are typically required to 
acknowledge their wrongdoing publicly, to apologize, and to obtain the 
victim's forgiveness. 296 A successful reconciliation signifies that the 
conflict has been resolved and that both sides are again engaged in a 
peaceful relationship; if reconciliation fails to occur, by contrast, East 
Timorese believe that the social order remains imbalanced and the 
community's well-being subject to threat. 
The desirability-indeed, the compelling need-in the East 
Timorese belief system for reconciliation motivated most Special 
Panels defendants to confess their wrongdoing regardless of whether 
sentencing concessions were promised them in return for their 
291. Hohe & Nixon, supra note 290, at 11. 
292. Id. 
293. Mearns, supra note 290, at 44-45; see also Dionisio Babo-Soares, Nahe Biti: The 
Philosophy and Process of Grassroots Reconciliation (and Justice) in East Timor, 5 AsiA PACIFIC 
J. ANTHROPOLOGY 15, 22 (2004) ("Failure to observe appropriate rituals/exchanges leads to an 
imbalance, which might result in negative consequences to those living in the secular world."). 
294. Indeed, "[a]ll socio-cultural aspects of 'traditional' society are interdependent. Any one 
aspect, such as law, kinship or the belief system cannot be extracted from the entire socio-cosmic 
system without taking it out of context." Hohe & Nixon, supra note 290, at 12. 
295. Id. at 18. 
296. UNITED NATIONS DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME, THE COMMUNITY RECONCILIATION 
PROCESS OF THE COMMISSION FOR RECEPTION, TRUTH AND RECONCILIATION 26--27 (April 2004) 
(on file with author) [hereinafter UNDP REPORT ON THE COMMUNITY RECONCILIATION PROCESS); 
see also Babo-Soares, supra note 293, at 15-16 (observing that the East Timorese conception of 
reconciliation "forms part of a grand process that aims to link the past and the future" and is an 
evolving process which seeks ultimately to achieve a stable social order within society). 
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confessions. Special Panels defendants wanted to return to their 
original communities after suffering whatever punishment the Special 
Panels chose to mete out, but they knew that they would not be 
welcomed back unless they had reconciled with their victims. To 
accomplish this, the defendants needed to suffer the punishment 
prescribed by the Special Panels. Although the following discussion 
will reveal that Special Panels defendants have little understanding of 
the contours of the crimes with which they were charged, they do 
possess a basic understanding that their actions were wrong, and that 
their wrongdoing must give rise to punishment. 297 Confessing their 
crimes serves to acknowledge their wrongdoing and constitutes the 
first step in the reconciliation process. 
Sentencing discounts provided only a weak inducement to 
Special Panels defendants in addition because East Timorese view 
incarceration as an alien form of punishment and do not seek to avoid 
it with quite the same urgency as Western defendants. Because crime 
is conceived as creating an imbalance of values, traditional East 
Timorese justice mechanisms do not seek primarily to punish the 
offender, but aim rather to restore values and to re-establish the socio-
cosmic order.298 To that end, traditional East Timorese justice 
requires first and foremost that the offender compensate the victim 
and the victim's family, whose honor has been damaged, as a means of 
re-establishing balance. 299 In cases of theft, for instance, the offender 
is required to compensate the victim for the stolen goods and to pay 
additional compensation. If a house is destroyed, the perpetrator 
must compensate the victims for everything that was in the house or, 
if he is unable to do so, the victims are entitled to the perpetrator's 
belongings.3oo Even a murder may result in compensation being paid 
by the murderer to the victim's family.301 Because compensation and 
reconciliation constitute the central features in the East Timorese 
297. Telephone interview with Sylvia de Bertodano, former Defense Counsel, Special Panels 
for Serious Crimes (Dec. 2, 2004). Indeed, one defense counsel asserted that Special Panels 
defendants often talk of "killing" in an imprecise way. If a defendant, for instance, draws the 
blood of a victim who then falls to the ground, he might feel that he has "killed" that victim even 
though subsequent questioning reveals that the victim later got up and was killed by other 
militia members. Email interview with Sebastian Appenah, Defense Researcher/Lawyer, Special 
Panels Defence Lawyers Unit (Dec. 6, 2004). 
298. Hohe & Nixon, supra note 290, at 18. 
299. Mearns, supra note 290, at 43; see also id. at 54 ("[T]he variety of local practices in the 
area of justice and dispute resolution are all built upon a fundamental principle of reciprocity 
and fair compensation."); UNDP REPORT ON THE COMMUNITY RECONCILIATION PROCESS, supra 
note 296, at 11, 28 ("[J]ustice in East Timor [is] not always about punishment, but also 
compensation, contrition and other forms of reciprocity."). 
300. Hohe & Nixon, supra note 290, at 21. 
301. Id. at 20. 
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conception of justice, detention is rarely imposed on offenders. Indeed, 
in the eyes of many East Timorese, detention constitutes precious 
little punishment since prisoners are fed and housed in jail, and in 
some cases can avoid their compensation obligation.ao2 I do not mean 
to suggest that Special Panels defendants find incarceration 
appealing, but in light of the difficulties inherent in eking out a 
sustainable existence in East Timor, Special Panels defendants do not 
appear to view incarceration with quite the same distaste as do 
criminal defendants from more prosperous nations. Consequently, a 
promise to reduce the sentence of incarceration is not apt to be valued 
as highly by Special Panels defendants. 
Finally, sentencing discounts did little to influence the guilty-
plea decisions of Special Panels defendants because these defendants 
had only a limited ability to understand the nature of the guilty-plea 
process or even the larger prosecution surrounding it. The Special 
Panels were not able to obtain custody over high-level offenders,303 so 
virtually all of the defendants brought before the Panels were 
illiterate farmers, 304 many of whom were coerced into participating in 
the atrocities. In addition to lacking general education, these 
defendants lacked specific understanding of the nature of criminal 
processes. During the twenty-four years that Indonesia occupied East 
Timor, the East Timorese were completely excluded from judicial 
processes. Consequently, East Timorese have had "no experience of a 
functional criminal justice system with necessary checks and 
302. Id. at 64; see also Chandra Lekha Sriram, Globalising Justice: From Universal 
Jurisdiction to Mixed Tribunals, 22 NETH. Q. HUM. RTS. 7, 25 (2004) ("Concerns have been raised 
among village leaders that when a perpetrator has been caught and locked up, this will do 
nothing to alleviate the economic and social suffering of the victim(s) and the village and hence 
an additional punishment is expected upon return."). During the Indonesian period, serious 
criminal matters were supposed to be handled by state courts, but these were not regarded as 
legitimate bodies to resolve disputes: "These courts remained inaccessible and alien, as they did 
not involve traditional leaders or the conflicting parties, they were not cost effective or time 
efficient, and the [sic] did not result in 'appropriate' sanctions or incorporate the important notion 
of compensation." UNDP REPORT ON THE COMMUNITY RECONCILIATION PROCESS, supra note 296, 
at 25 (emphasis added). 
303. See supra text note 279 and accompanying text. 
304. See, e.g., Prosecutor v. da Costa, Dili District Court, Special Panels for Serious Crimes, 
Case No. 7/2000, 16 (Oct. 11, 2001) (describing the defendant as "[A]n ignorant person who is 
illiterate."); Prosecutor v. Marques, Dili District Court, Special Panels for Serious Crimes, Case 
No. 09/2000, 'II 168 (Dec. 11, 2001) (defendant Gonsalo Dos Santos describing himself as 
illiterate); Prosecutor v. Bere, Dili District Court, Special Panels for Serious Crimes, Case No. 
10/2000, 2 (May 15, 2001) (reporting on a defense motion that described the defendant as in 
illiterate civilian); Press Release, Judicial System Monitoring Programme, Court Sentences 
Liquica Militia Member to 20 Years Jail (Sept. 10, 2002) (''The judges emphasized that [the 
defendant] was illiterate .... "); Suzannah Linton & Caitlin Reiger, The Evolving Jurisprudence 
and Practice of East Timor's Special Panels for Serious Crimes on Admissions of Guilt, Duress 
and Superior Orders, 4 Y.B. INT'L HUMANITARIAN L. 167, 182 (2001). 
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balances,"305 and, according to one defense counsel, they have little 
conception even of rights.306 Further, many Special Panels defendants 
speak only Tetum, a simple language that does not have words for 
some of the distinctions relevant to explaining certain crimes,307 while 
other defendants speak even less sophisticated tribal languages.3os 
Throughout its life, the Special Panels suffered from an inadequate 
staff of interpreters and translators. But even with a sufficient 
number of highly qualified interpreters, many Special Panels 
defendants would have been unable to grasp certain concepts 
necessary for understanding the crimes for which they were charged 
because their languages did not permit the explication of those 
concepts. Unlike ICTR defendants, then, who may be prepared to 
plead guilty to crimes against humanity but balk at assuming the 
label "genocidaire," most Special Panels defendants were unable even 
to comprehend the distinction.309 Indeed, as the following exchange 
from the Umbertus Ena case demonstrates, even a Panel's relatively 
straightforward efforts to ascertain whether a defendant understands 
the nature of the charges against him can fail. 
JUDGE: Can you understand the nature of the accusation against you? Did you read 
indictments or someone read it for you? 
DEFENDANT: I'm saying like this, I will speak about, I said that I'm only a small man 
and there is people who would like to kill myself, and I defend myself so I could leave. 
JUDGE: You will have time to make declaration, but now the tribunal would like to ask 
you whether you have read the indictments and that if you understand the nature of the 
indictments. Last time we read for you about the right that you have to access your 
legal defense and that you have opportunity to discuss about the accusation against you 
with your defense. Did you read the indictments submitted by the prosecutor against 
you? 
305. UNDP REPORT ON THE COMMUNITY RECONCILIATION PROCESS, supra note 296, at 28; see 
also Telephone interview with Mohamed Othman, Former Prosecutor General of East Timor 
(Aug. 4, 2004). 
306. Telephone interview with Alan Gutman, Defense Counsel, Special Panels for Serious 
Crimes (July 30, 2004). 
307. For instance, in the Lolotoe case, defense counsel was not able to receive from a witness 
a comprehensible answer to the question "Do you know the difference between soldier and 
militia" because the word "difference" reportedly does not exist in Tetum. Judicial System 
Monitoring Programme, The Lolotoe Case, Trial Notes (Apr. 11, 2002) (on file with author). 
308. See Press Release, Judicial System Monitoring Programme, Court Sentences Liquica 
Militia Member to 20 Years Jail (Sept. 10, 2002) (''The judges emphasized that [the defendant] 
was illiterate and did not speak Indonesian or Tetum, East Timor's national language, only 
speaking his local dialect."); JUDICIAL SYSTEM MONITORING PROGRAMME, SPECIAL PANELS FOR 
SERIOUS CASES- WEEKLY REPORT (Jan. 27-31, 2003) (In the Jose Cardoso case, "[T]he court was 
delayed until 1012 hours because of difficulties in finding a Bunak language interpreter, the only 
local dialect spoken by the witness."). 
309. Telephone interview with Alan Gutman, Defense Counsel, Special Panels for Serious 
Crimes (July 30, 2004). 
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DEFENDANT: Can I speak? 
JUDGE: Yes please. 
DEFENDANT: Would you wasn't me to speak loudly or to answer your question? 
DEFENSE COUNSEL: Your honor, my client does not understand. If you can give me 
time 5 minutes to speak to him about what is happening now. I have spoken to him last 
time, but it seems that he still not understand. 
JUDGE: The court gives five minutes for the defense to talk to his client about this, but 
first let's try again. 
JUDGE: Umbertus Ena, do you know why you are here? 
DEFENDANT: Because of what happened in 1999. 
DEFENSE COUNSEL: I'm worrying that he may mitigated himself and I worry because 
be is very unsophisticated man. 
JUDGE: This court gives five minutes to both defense counsels to talk to their clients. 
This court is postponed to 5 minutes. 
AFTER 5 MINUTES BREAK 
JUDGE: After the consult with the defense counsel, I think that I can ask the question, 
Umbertus Ena, can you please stand up? Do you understand the accusation against 
you? 
DEFENDANT: I know. 
JUDGE: Do you know the nature of the accusation? 
DEFENDANT: I know. 3!0 
Guilty-plea colloquies proved even more worrisome as they 
suggested that many Special Panels defendants pled guilty without 
any real awareness of what they were doing or of the consequences of 
their pleas. When Special Panels judges asked Benjamin Sarmento if 
he wanted to plead guilty, for instance, he seemed to indicate that he 
did, but he repeatedly asserted that he had been ordered to commit 
the crimes, making such statements as: "People send us to kill. That's 
why we did it. That is like we accept our guilty," and "This charge, I 
accept, because they told me to do it. That's why I accept. But the 
problem is that for me to think about doing it, I wouldn't have done it. 
That is because I was told to do it."311 Despite the obvious ambiguities 
310. Prosecutor v. Ena, Dili District Court, Special Panels for Serious Crimes, Case No. 
05/2002, Transcript at 2 (Feb. 14, 2003). 
311. Public Prosecutor v. Sarmento, Dili District Court, Special Panel for Serious Crimes, 
Court Record at 10 (June 30, 2003) (on file with author). 
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in Sarmento's admissions, the Panel accepted his guilty plea, making 
no attempt to apprise him of the consequences of his action. A few 
minutes later, Sarmento's co-defendant, Romeiro Tilman, also 
attempted to plead guilty, and his responses were even more 
equivocal. Tilman apparently held the victim down while someone 
else killed him. When asked if he was prepared to plead guilty, 
Tilman responded: 
I agree. This is not because of what I wanted, but because those in charge forced me. I 
did it. It is not that I used a knife, or a machete to kill. I didn't. The commander of 
militia forced me. I was scared of death. My colleague did it. And I have been in jail for 
over 3 years. This wrong is not mine. The person who did this is not here. And I, have 
come to accept my wrong .... I feel that I am wrong because I held with my hands. 312 
Because Tilman claimed to have been forced to commit the crime, the 
court adjourned to allow him to consult with his lawyer. Returning 
from his consultation, Tilman said simply: "I am guilty."313 
The Special Panels defendants' already-limited ability to make 
informed decisions about the guilty-plea process was further impeded 
by an insufficient staff of translators, a problem mentioned above and 
one that was especially acute at the Special Panels' outset. Trials had 
to be postponed for lack of interpreters, 314 and in many cases, defense 
counsel were not provided their own interpreters, so they had to seek 
help from prosecution interpreters or court interpreters in order to 
consult with their clients. 315 Even in the Special Panels' later days, 
312. Id. at 15. 
313. Id. at 16. 
314. See Suzanne Katzenstein, Note, Hybrid Tribunals: Searching for Justice in East Timor, 
16 HARV. HUM. RTS. J . 245, 252 (2003); JUDICIAL SYSTEM MONITORING PROGRAMME, SPECIAL 
PANELS FOR SERIOUS CASES- WEEKLY REPORT (Jan. 27-31, 2003) (reporting that the trial was 
postponed because of the difficulty of finding a language interpreter and that a prosecution 
witness was never called to testify because translation was unavailable) . Further, some 
judgments have been issued in only one of the Panels' official languages, even though judges on 
that very Panel were unable to read the judgment. See de Carvalho v. Prosecutor General, Court 
of Appeal of East Timor, Criminal Appeal No. 25 of 2001, Judgment of Fredrick Egonda·Ntende, 
~ 1 (Oct. 29, 2001) (Because the Court of Appeal judgment "is in Portuguese, a language I do not 
understand, and there are no translation services, ... I have therefore decided to briefly explain 
my reasons for the decision made today."); Fernandes v. Prosecutor General, Court of Appeal of 
East Timor, Criminal Appeal No. 7 of 2001, Judgment of Fredrick Egonda·Ntende, ~ 36, (June 
29, 2001) ("The majority of this court, if I understand there [sic] position correctly, (that position 
is set out in Portuguese, a language I do not understand and for which no translation is 
provided ... . )"; JUSTICE FOR TIMOR·LESTE, supra note 279, § 3.10 ("[D]ecisions, two thirds of 
which are delivered in Portuguese, are not translated into English, Bahasa Indonesia or Tetum 
with the result that some trial judges, defense lawyers and suspects cannot understand them."); 
see also de Bertodano, supra note 271, at 233 (reporting that a judgment "was given in 
Portuguese and, despite an obligation on the Court to provide translations, it has not heen made 
available in English"). 
315. Judicial System Monitoring Programme, Lolotoe Trial Observation Weekly Summary 
for 21-25 October (2002) (unpublished document, on file with author). 
HeinOnline -- 59 Vand. L. Rev.  136 2006
136 VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 59:1:69 
interpreters were required to work for extensive periods of time 
without breaks,316 and they consequently often failed to translate 
crucial exchanges between counsel and judges into languages that the 
defendants could understand. 317 Thus, even if a Special Panels 
defendant was one of the rare sort who understood the nature of the 
guilty-plea process and wished to condition his plea on the promise of 
a sentence reduction, the defendant may well have had no ability to 
communicate such a desire. 
In sum, Special Panels defendants are culturally disposed to 
confess their crimes without concern for any sentencing benefits they 
might receive. In the East Timorese world view, offenders must 
reconcile with their victims if balance is to be restored following a 
crime, and the offender's admission of wrongdoing constitutes a vital 
first step in that process of reconciliation. For that reason, during the 
Panels' first few years, virtually every defendant immediately 
admitted his wrongdoing upon apprehension. That these defendants 
might receive a sentence discount in exchange for their admissions 
was of little or no consequence to them. They confessed instead for the 
reasons just canvassed, and their lack of education, their limited 
language skills, and the dearth of interpreters at the Special Panels 
prevented these defendants from evaluating the benefits that their 
confessions might have gained for them if they had been inclined to 
seek them. 
It is typically the role of defense counsel to seek such benefits 
for their clients, but while early Special Panels defendants were 
formally represented by defense counsel, that representation was 
insufficient by any measure. Many early defense counsel were East 
Timorese who had little or no training in criminal defense, let alone in 
plea bargaining. In addition, the Special Panels conducted their work 
on a meager $6.3 million annual budget, and, at the outset, virtually 
none of those funds were allocated to defense costs. 318 As a result, in 
the early cases defense attorneys had no ability to undertake 
316. One interpreter, who was translating into Bahasa Indonesia, Tetum, and Portuguese 
asked to have the afternoon off, maintaining that he was exhausted. Because the Panel had no 
other interpreters, he was not allowed to leave. Judicial System Monitoring Programme, The 
Lolotoe Case, Trial Notes (Oct. 31, 2002) (unpublished document, on file with author). Another 
translator repeatedly complained about working conditions, id., and was later disqualified after 
he made a number of loud outbursts during court sessions. Judicial System Monitoring 
Programme, The Lolotoe Case, Trial Notes (Nov. 13, 2002) (unpublished document, on file with 
author). 
317. THE LOLOTOE CASE: A SMALL STEP FORWARD, supra note 278, § 3.4. 
318. $6 million of the $6.3 million was allocated to the prosecution. Virtually all of the 
remaining $300,000 constituted the salaries of the international judges. Cohen, supra note 279, 
at 5. As Cohen relates, "No one in either the Public Defenders' office or UNTAET could tell me 
whether or not the Public Defenders had a budget or, if so, what it was." !d. 
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investigations, and indeed, not a single defense witness was called to 
testify in the first fourteen trials, not even in a massive case charging 
ten defendants with crimes against humanity.319 The Special Panels 
prosecutors with whom I spoke indicated that early defendants had so 
little assistance that the prosecutors themselves sometimes felt 
compelled to step into the role of defense counsel to caution 
defendants about making incriminating statements.320 
Sentencing discounts thus had no influence over the guilty-plea 
decisions of early Special Panels defendants. As noted above, virtually 
all of the early Special Panels defendants immediately admitted their 
wrongdoing upon apprehension despite the fact that no benefits were 
offered them, and some tried formally to plead guilty. In a number of 
cases, the Special Panels declined to accept these guilty pleas because 
the defendants' admissions did not precisely match the charges 
contained in the indictment, or because the defendants maintained 
that they had been forced-or at least ordered-to commit the acts, so 
questions remained about their mens rea. 321 Although these 
319. ld.; de Bertodano, supra note 271, at 232; see JUDICIAL SYSTEM MONITORING 
PROGRAMME, GENERAL PROSECUTOR V. MARQUES (THE LOS PALOS CASE): A JSMP TRIAL REPORT 
§ 2.3.2.2 (Mar. 2002) ("No witnesses or physical evidence were presented by the defence."); id. § 
3.2.2.1 ("The defence raised other reasons for not calling witnesses for the trial, of which one was 
lack of resources. They frequently stated that they lacked both cars and the time to travel to the 
districts to speak to potential witnesses, to provide transport to court and to pay for the witness 
expenses such as food and lodging while being in Dili."). See also Prosecutor v. Gonc;alves Bere, 
Dili District Court, Special Panel for Serious Crimes, Case No. 10/2000, Judgment at 4 (May 15, 
2001) ("The Defence did not present any witnesses or evidence."); Prosecutor v. DosSantos Laku, 
Dili District Court, Special Panels for Serious Crimes, Case No. 8/2001, Judgment, ~ 3 (July 25, 
2001) (same); Prosecutor v. Soares Carmona, Dili District Court, Special Panel for Serious 
Crimes, Case No. 03 C.G. 2000, Judgment at 2 (Apr. 19, 2001); Prosecutor v. Leki, Dili District 
Court, Special Panel for Serious Crimes, Case No. 05/2001, Judgment, ~ 14 (Sept. 14, 2002) ("The 
Legal Counsel of the accused did not bring any witnesses nor [sic] he presented any evidence."). 
320. Telephone interview with Brenda Sue Thornton, former prosecutor Special Panels for 
Serious Crimes (Sept. 12, 2005). Cohen also reports that the "prosecution has not sought to take 
advantage of [defense] inadequacies, but has repeatedly tried to help novice defense counsel by 
coaching them about how to make motions or objections." Cohen, supra note 279, at 5. 
321. See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Valente, Dili District Court, Special Panels for Serious Crimes, 
Case No. 03/2001, 2 (June 19, 2001) [hereinafter Valente] (observing that although the defendant 
tried to enter a guilty plea, the "Special Panel deemed that there was no confession of guilt in 
this case because 'the statement of the accused does not correspond with the facts alleged in the 
indictment and that there is no clear consultation with the legal representative."'); JUDICIAL 
SYSTEM MONITORING PROGRAMME, "LOS PALOS" CASE TRIAL NOTES 4--6 (Sept. 9, 2001) (on file 
with author). Linton & Reiger, supra note 304, at 188 ("The post-Fernandes practice suggests 
that that [sic] the Special Panels now shy away from taking decisions at the pre-trial stage and 
prefer to proceed to trial whenever the issue of coercion is raised."). In the Gaspar Leki case, for 
instance, the defendant pled guilty to murder because he shot and killed a man who had been 
hiding in the bushes. The Panel initially accepted the guilty plea, and only as a result of further 
questioning did it learn that, although the defendant had been ordered to shoot anything that 
moved, he believed that he was shooting a wild pig in the bush. Since the element of deliberate 
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defendants did not receive any sentencing concessions from the 
prosecution, the Panels themselves ostensibly considered the 
defendants' guilty pleas to be mitigating factors in sentencing. A 
cursory examination of the sentences imposed on the first handful of 
defendants to be tried individually, as well as the sentences imposed 
on the ten defendants who were tried together in the Special Panels' 
first multi-defendant case indicates, however, that early defendants 
received little, if anything, for their guilty pleas. 
Joao Fernandes was the first Special Panels defendant to plead 
guilty, and his sentencing Panel asserted that it gave him credit for 
his guilty plea by treating it as a mitigating factor in sentencing.322 
The Panel also considered the superior orders pursuant to which 
Fernandes committed the crime a mitigating factor, and it sentenced 
him to twelve years' imprisonment for the one murder he 
committed. 323 Following the Fernandes decision, the Panel conducted 
trials in a number of cases featuring similar facts. In particular, 
Carlos Soares, Manuel Bere, Agustinho da Costa, and Augusto 
Tavares were each convicted of one murder following a trial, and each 
had the benefit of superior orders as a mitigating factor. These cases, 
thus, resembled Fernandes in every respect except for Fernandes's 
guilty plea. Soares, Bere, da Costa, and Tavares received sentences of 
imprisonment of fifteen-and-one-half years, fourteen years, fifteen 
years, and sixteen years, respectively. Because these sentences are on 
average approximately 20 percent longer than Fernandes's sentence, 
it might appear that Fernandes received a 20 percent discount as a 
consequence of his guilty plea. However, another defendant, Jose 
Valente, was convicted of one murder following a trial, and without 
the benefit of either superior orders or a guilty plea, received a 
sentence of twelve-and-one-half years' imprisonment,324 only six 
intent to commit murder was called into question, the Panel reversed its decision to accept the 
guilty plea and proceeded to trial. Id. at 17-18. 
322. Prosecutor v. Fernandes, Dili District Court, Special Panel for Serious Crimes, Case No. 
01/00 C. G. 2000, Judgment, 'II 20(b) (Jan. 25, 2001). 
323. Id. 'II 20 and Verdict. Fernandes was charged only with murder because financial 
constraints forced prosecutors to charge early Special Panels defendants with domestic crimes 
under the less demanding Indonesian criminal code, rather than with international crimes. See 
Linton, supra note 276, at 215; Suzannah Linton, Correspondents' Reports, in Y.B. INT'L 
HUMANITARIAN L. 471, 481 (2000) (noting that the decision to charge domestic crimes was a 
"pragmatic" one given the "inadequate resources and the immensity of the task of proving 
international crimes" and further noting that because suspects could not be detained indefinitely 
pending investigation of international crimes, "[t]he only other acceptable option would have 
been to release the suspects."). 
324. Valente, supra note 321, at 11-12. Valente did admit "some facts before the Court and 
freely cooperated with the Public Prosecutor about his involvement in becoming a member of 
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months longer than the sentence imposed on Fernandes. Further, 
Joseph Leki was convicted of committing four murders-three more 
than Fernandes-and with superior orders as a mitigating factor, Leki 
received a sentence of thirteen years' imprisonment, 325 just one year 
longer than Fernandes's sentence. Thus, after comparing these 
sentences, it is not clear whether Fernandes received any discount for 
his guilty plea. 
The Special Panels conducted its first multi-defendant trial in 
the Los Palos case, and the sentences imposed on the ten Los Palos 
defendants similarly fail to reveal the quantum of discount, if any, 
that the Special Panels bestowed on defendants pleading guilty. Nine 
of the Los Palos defendants were members of the Team Alfa militia, 
while the tenth, Joni Marques, was one of Team Alfa's commanders. 
The Los Palos indictment charged Joni Marques with seven counts, 
and in his opening statement, Marques attempted to plead guilty to 
three of the counts,326 though he had not negotiated with the 
prosecution for any sentencing concessions in exchange for his guilty 
pleas. 327 The Panel declined to accept two of the attempted guilty 
pleas, because Marques's admissions did not precisely match the 
charges,328 but it did accept the third, which related to the murders of 
nine clergy members and journalists. 329 In its sentencing, the Panel 
stated that it considered as a mitigating factor Marques's guilty 
plea, 330 but the Panel's judgment gives little indication of what benefit, 
if any, Marques received for that guilty plea. 
The Panel determined that Marques was "in charge" of the 
operation to kill the clergy and journalists. While the Panel 
Team Ratih/Panah." Id. at 11. But the same could be said of most of the defendants discussed 
thus far. 
325. Prosecutor v. Leki, Dili District Court, Special Panels for Serious Crimes, Case No. 
05/2000, Judgment, 11-12 (June 11, 2001). 
326. JUDICIAL SYSTEM MONITORING PROGRAMME, "LOS PALOS" CASE TRIAL NOTES 4 (Sept. 9, 
2001) (on file with author). Marques also admitted to participating in the crimes described in the 
remaining counts, but, with respect to those crimes, he challenged various aspects of the 
prosecution's case. Id.; Prosecutor v. Marques, Dili District Court, Special Panels for Serious 
Crimes, Case No. 09/2000, ~~ 43-63 (Dec. 11, 2001) [hereinafter Marques]. 
327. Telephone interview with Stuart Alford, former prosecutor, Special Panels for Serious 
Crimes (Feb. 17, 2005). 
328. JUDICIAL SYSTEM MONITORING PROGRAMME, "LOS PALOS" CASE TRIAL NOTES 6 (Sept. 9, 
2001) (on file with author). 
329. Marques, supra note 326, ~ 70. Marques's admissions even with respect to that count 
did not precisely match the prosecution's allegations because Marques denied that he was the 
commander of Team Alfa. ld. ~ 67. The Panel apparently considered the charges and the 
admissions a close·enough fit, however, and it made its own finding that, despite his 
protestations to the contrary, Marques was in fact a commander. ld. ~ 921. 
330. Id. ~ 1069. The Panels also considered as a mitigating factor the inculpatory statements 
that Marques made that did not rise to the level of a guilty plea. ld. ~ 1055. 
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acknowledged that the plan itself was drafted by Indonesian officers, 
it considered the fact that Marques supervised the plan's 
implementation to be an aggravating factor. 331 The Panel sentenced 
Marques to nineteen years' imprisonment for this count,332 which is 
the same sentence that the Panel imposed on two of Marques's co-
defendants, neither of whom had a leadership role in the operation.333 
The mitigating effect of Marques's guilty plea, then, seems to have 
been to negate the aggravating effect of his supervisory role in the 
killing operation; however, it is not clear what the aggravating effect 
would have been since a comparison of the sentences that the Panel 
imposed on Marques and his co-defendants on the other counts is not 
very illuminating. Marques, for instance, was convicted on another 
count of ordering a murder, while co-defendant Joao da Costa was 
convicted of physically assisting in that murder. The Panel considered 
as an aggravating factor Marques's supervisory role, and he received a 
nineteen year sentence, while da Costa, who was not considered a 
supervisor, received a seventeen year sentence.334 The comparison is 
not particularly useful, however, because the two defendants were 
involved in the murder in very different ways and because the Panel 
also considered da Costa "one of the leaders in arresting the victim," 
so da Costa's sentence, like Marques's, may also have been enhanced 
to some degree as a result of his leadership role in the arrest. 
A possibly more useful comparison can be made from the 
sentences that the Los Palos Panel imposed on a count involving the 
expulsion of civilians and the destruction of villages. The Panel 
determined that although there was insufficient evidence to prove that 
Marques had burned any houses himself, Marques was present when 
expulsions and house-burnings took place, and his presence was that 
of a commander.335 The Panel considered his supervisory position as 
an aggravating factor and sentenced him to seven years' 
imprisonment. The Panel went on to find that co-defendant Paolo da 
Costa himself burned houses and expelled villagers, but it found that 
he did so pursuant to the superior orders of Joni Marques. In 
sentencing Paolo da Costa, then, the Panel not only did not find any 
aggravating factors with respect to a leadership role, but considered as 
a mitigating factor the superior orders under which Paolo da Costa 
331. Id. ~ 1068. 
332. Id. ~ 1071. 
333. Id. ~~ 1077, 1084. The Panel imposed 18 year sentences on three other co·defendants. 
Id. ~~ 1091, 1098, 1113. It imposed a 17 year sentence on a final co·defendant. Id. ~ 1106. 
334. Id. ~~ 1012-23. 
335. Id. ~ 796. 
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committed the crime. 336 Yet, the Panel sentenced da Costa to six 
years' imprisonment,337 a term only one year shorter than the term it 
imposed on Marques. Again, the facts underlying the two convictions 
are by no means identical, but the sentences do suggest that 
Marques's supervisory role did not earn him a significant sentence 
increase. To the extent, then, that Marques's guilty plea for the 
killing of the clergy and journalists merely negated the sentence 
increase that the Panel imposed for his supervisory role, one can 
surmise that Marques's guilty plea benefited him little. 
B. Enhancing the Influence of Sentencing Discounts: The Role of 
Defense Counsel 
Although most Special Panels defendants would have pled 
guilty without the lure of sentencing concessions, those concessions 
ended up playing an influential role in determining how many 
defendants, and which ones, pled guilty during the last few years of 
the Special Panels' existence. Later Special Panels defendants 
themselves remained as uninfluenced by sentencing discounts as their 
earlier counterparts, but because funding increased for defense 
counsel as time went on, later defense counsel were more numerous 
and better able to make efforts to advance their clients' interests. In 
later Special Panels' cases, then, defense counsel routinely insisted 
that their clients receive sentence discounts if they were to plead 
guilty. As a result of this insistence, plea negotiations became 
commonplace during the later years of . the Special Panels, and 
prosecutors were forced to offer defendants sentencing concessions if 
they wanted to procure guilty pleas. 
Not every defense counsel engaged in bargaining. Indeed, 
some routinely advised their clients not to plead guilty despite the 
potential for a sentence reduction. Some defense counsel hailing from 
civil-law countries, for instance, were relatively unfamiliar with plea 
bargaining and were opposed in principle to the practice. Other 
defense counsel, like many ICTR defense counsel, declined to bargain 
with the prosecution because they believed their clients to be innocent 
and could not in good faith encourage them to plead guilty to crimes 
they did not commit. Defense counsel frequently described Special 
Panels' investigations as one-sided and based on insufficient 
336. ld. ~ 1035. 
337. ld. ~ 1037. 
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evidence. 338 One defense counsel went so far as to opine that 85 to 90 
percent of the Special Panels' convictions would be acquittals in any 
other jurisdiction.339 That belief notwithstanding, the fact remained 
that the Special Panels convicted eighty-four out of eighty-seven 
defendants.340 Although those dismal statistics motivated some 
defense counsel to strongly encourage their clients to plead guilty so 
long as the prosecution offered reasonable concessions, others felt 
uncomfortable participating in a process that, in their minds, 
perpetuated an injustice. The fact that most Special Panels 
defendants had no ability to understand the nature of the crimes-
against-humanity charges to which they would have been pleading 
guilty raised additional concerns for some defense counsel. 341 
When bargaining did take place, it centered on the sentence 
that the prosecution would ask the Panel to impose. Although 
prosecutors initially had little need to offer incentives to expedite 
proceedings, by the spring of 2003, the UN had made plans to end its 
mission in East Timor in May 2004. The lifespan of the mission was 
extended for an additional year, 342 but by August 2003, the 
prosecutorial arm of the Special Panels had already begun 
downsizing.343 The realization that the Special Panels would close its 
doors in a short time without having completed its work344 motivated 
prosecutors to make substantial efforts to obtain guilty pleas. 
Prosecutors began promising to recommend specific sentences to the 
Special Panels in exchange for defendants' guilty pleas, and the 
338. See Telephone interview with Alan Gutman, Defense Counsel, Special Panels for 
Serious Crimes (July 30, 2004); Email interview with Sehastian Appenah, Defense 
Researcher/Lawyer, Special Panels Defence Lawyers Unit (Dec. 6, 2004). 
339. Telephone interview with Alan Gutman, Defense Counsel, Special Panels for Serious 
Crimes (July 30, 2004). 
340. Information Release, Serious Crimes Unit, Special Panels Acquits Aparacio Guterres 
(Feb. 16, 2005). The Special Panels acquitted four defendants, but one acquittal was reversed on 
appeal. See Information Release, Serious Crimes Unit, Special Panels Trial Ends with an East 
Timorese TNl Soldier Being Acquitted of Crimes Against Humanity (Dec. 8, 2003) (reporting on 
the acquittal of Paulino de Jesus); Judicial System Monitoring Programme, Court of Appeal 
Overturns Decision of Acquittal of the SPSC, in JUSTICE UPDATE 11/2004 (Nov. 4-9, 2004) 
(reporting on the appellate reversal of the acquittal). 
341. Telephone interview with Sylvia de Bertodano, former Defense Counsel, Special Panels 
for Serious Crimes (Dec. 2, 2004). 
342. S.C. Res. 1573, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1573 (Nov. 16, 2004). 
343. JUDICIAL SYSTEM MONITORING PROGRAMME, THE FUTURE OF THE SERIOUS CRIMES UNIT: 
JSMP ISSUE REPORT 5-8 (Jan. 2004); see also Amnesty International, Indonesia and Timor Leste: 
International Responsibility for Justice, AI INDEX: ASA 03/01/2003 (Apr. 14, 2003). 
344. Sec JUSTICE FOR TIMOR-LESTE, supra note 279, § 1 (asserting that the Special Panel's 
"chances of completing its task ... are extremely remote."); Sylvia de Bertodano, Have Some 
Faith in Iraqi Justice, THE TIMES (London), Jan. 20, 2004, at 7 ("It is highly unlikely that all 
trials, let alone all appeals, will be completed before the funds run out."). 
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Special Panels apparently never imposed a sentence longer than that 
recommended by the prosecution.345 Indeed, as I will briefly describe 
below, one Special Panel tried to construct a sentencing framework 
that would encourage defendants to plead guilty, but its efforts may 
have been for naught. 
In the Agustinho Atolan case, a Special Panel set forth a 
specific and generous sentencing discount to bestow on defendants 
who pled guilty. Agustinho Atolan pled guilty to one count of murder 
as a crime against humanity, and the defense and prosecution agreed 
to recommend a seven year prison sentence. Mter surveying 
analogous past cases, the Panel concluded that the Special Panels' 
practice had been to sentence defendants convicted of one murder 
following a trial to a term of imprisonment of between twelve and 
sixteen years.346 The Panel went on to praise defendants who, ''being 
regretful, [choose] a procedural option which spares time and 
resources of the Court," and it asserted that if such defendants were to 
receive an appropriate "advantage" in exchange for their guilty plea, 
then their sentences should be halved. To support the need for a 
substantial discount, the Panel observed: "A less drastic approach 
proved to be useless: after the first decision of the Special Panel, in the 
Joao Fernandes case, where the Court took a less lenient decision, 
more than one year elapsed before a second guilty plea was 
submitted."347 Consequently, after concluding that it would have 
sentenced Atolan to a term of fourteen years' imprisonment had the 
case proceeded to trial, the Panel sentenced him to a term of seven 
years' imprisonment, 348 the exact sentence recommended by the 
prosecution. 
Six months later another Panel adhered to the framework 
articulated in Atolan in the Martins & Gon~alves case. There, 
Anastacio Martins pled guilty and was convicted of murder as a crime 
against humanity for the killing of three people, while his co-
defendant, Domingos Gon<;alves, proceeded to trial and was also 
convicted of murder as a crime against humanity for the killing of 
three people and of deportation as a crime against humanity. Cutting 
and pasting several paragraphs from the Atolan judgment, the Panel 
345. Telephone interview with Essa Faal, former Chief of Prosecutions, Special Panels for 
Serious Crimes, (Nov. 16, 2004). 
346. Prosecutor v. Atolan, Dili District Court, Special Panels for Serious Crimes, Case No. 
3/2003, Judgment, 6 (June 9, 2003). Without further explanation, the Panel asserted that the 
sentences imposed on three defendants that had fallen outside this range were justified by 
"specific reasons." Id. at 7. 
347. Id. 
348. Id. at 8. 
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held that a guilty plea should normally result in a 50 percent 
reduction in sentence.349 The Panel then determined that had Martins 
proceeded to trial, a single brutal murder of the sort he committed 
would have warranted a sentence of sixteen years' imprisonment, and 
that his three murders would have resulted in a twenty-three year 
sentence. Discounting the sentence by half, then, on the basis of his 
guilty plea, the Panel sentenced Martins to eleven-and-one-half years' 
imprisonment, which was within the eight-to-twelve year range 
recommended by the prosecution.350 Gonc;alves did not plead guilty, so 
he was in line to receive a twenty-three year sentence for the three 
murders he committed and an additional year of imprisonment for the 
deportation count. Although Gonc;alves did not receive any discount 
for a guilty plea, the Panel did consider, in mitigation, his low rank 
and the substantial current difficulties that he and his family faced. 351 
In light of these mitigating factors, the Panel sentenced Gonc;alves to 
fifteen years' imprisonment.352 
Despite the potential benefits of a clear rule, the sentencing 
framework articulated in Atolan and Martins & Gon<;alues has not 
been followed. Indeed, a Special Panel composed of two of the same 
three judges who decided Atolan subsequently imposed a number of 
lenient sentences following trials that undercut efforts to procure 
guilty pleas. One month after the Martins & Gon<;alues decision, for 
instance, this Panel convicted Damiao da Costa Nunes of two counts of 
murder as crimes against humanity, and one count of persecution as a 
crime against humanity. Pursuant to the framework set forth in 
Atolan and Martins & Gon<;alues, da Costa Nunes should have 
received a sentence of more than fourteen years' and less than twenty-
three years' imprisonment. Instead, the Panel made no mention of the 
Atolan and Martins & Gon<;alues sentencing framework, and despite 
concluding that there existed no mitigating factors, 353 it sentenced him 
349. Prosecutor v. Martins, Dili District Court, Special Panels for Serious Crimes, Case No. 
1112001, Judgment, 17 (Nov. 13, 2003). 
350. Id. at 18. 
351. Id. The Panel noted for instance, that Gon~alves is unemployed, that he "has lost a leg, 
cut by his own wife, his wife is mad; his children are young and his mother is very old." Id. 
352. Id. at 19. 
353. Prosecutor v. da Costa Nunes, Dili District Court, Special Panels for Serious Crimes, 
Case No. 1/2003, Judgment,~~ 65-76 (Dec. 10, 2003). 
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to a mere ten-and-one-half years' imprisonment.354 That Panel's 
sentencing in subsequent cases was similar. ass 
The fact that the guilty-plea rate at the Special Panels was as 
high as 50 percent, despite the Special Panels' somewhat arbitrary 
sentencing practices, acts as additional confirmation that sentencing 
discounts did not motivate the guilty-plea decisions of Special Panels 
defendants. That is, the uncertainty inherent in the Special Panels' 
sentencing would have deterred a substantial proportion of defendants 
from pleading guilty if the defendants' primary goal had been to 
receive a sentence reduction. ICTY defendants stopped pleading 
guilty, for instance, as soon as Trial Chambers started imposing 
sentences longer than those recommended by the prosecution. Since 
other factors were more influential to the guilty-plea decisions of 
Special Panels defendants, the Panels' arbitrary sentencing practices 
had a much more limited deterrent effect. ass 
In sum, sentence concessions appeared on the surface to play 
much the same role at the Special Panels that they do at the ICTY or 
in national criminal justice systems since Special Panels defendants 
who were offered reasonable discounts in exchange for their guilty 
pleas were much more likely to enter guilty pleas than defendants 
who were not. Below the surface, however, the picture is very 
different; at the ICTY and in national criminal justice systems, it is 
the defendant's ardent desire to reduce his incarceration time that 
inspires his counsel to insist on concessions from the prosecutor. 
354. Id. at 20. Judge Blunk, the judge who had not participated in Atolan dissented to the 
sentence, asserting that it failed to meet the goals of deterrence, retribution, reconciliation, and 
reprobation. Id. at 22 (Blunk, J., dissenting). 
355. For instance, a Panel composed of the same members convicted Umbertus Ena after a 
trial of murder and inhumane acts as crimes against humanity for the killing of two 
independence supporters and an assault on a third. OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY GENERAL 
PROSECUTOR FOR SERIOUS CRIMES TIMOR LESTE, SERIOUS CRIMES UNIT UPDATE 9 (Apr. 30, 
2004). Again, pursuant to the sentencing framework articulated in Atolan and Martins & 
Gon~alves, Ena should have received a sentence of more than fourteen years' imprisonment and 
less than twenty-three years' imprisonment, but the Panel sentenced him to an eleven-year term. 
The Panel also convicted Marcelino Soares after a trial of one count of murder as a crime against 
humanity, one count of torture as a crime against humanity, and one count of persecution as a 
crime against humanity for killing one independence supporter and severely beating two others. 
After determining that not only did the defendant fail to express regret but that he "appeared 
pleased with himself, when the victims of his torture testified to his savage cruelty, and showed 
the severe wounds inflicted by him," the Panel sentenced him to eleven years' imprisonment. 
Prosecutor v. Soares, Dili District Court, Special Panels for Serious Crimes, Case No. 11/2003, 
Judgment, Disposition, 12-14 (Dec. 11, 2003). 
356. However, the Panels' arbitrary sentencing did act to deter some defense counsel who 
were already slightly uneasy about plea bargaining from advising their clients to plead guilty. 
One counsel who expressed discomfort with plea bargaining, for instance, opined that, given the 
Special Panels' seemingly random sentencing practices, one could never be certain that a 
defendant would actually gain anything from pleading guilty. 
HeinOnline -- 59 Vand. L. Rev.  146 2006
146 VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 59:1:69 
Although Special Panels defendants may likewise desire to reduce 
their terms of imprisonment, that desire is not the key factor 
prompting them to plead guilty. Instead, a variety of cultural and 
socio-economic factors coalesce to motivate Special Panels defendants 
to confess even if they do not receive any sentencing benefit for doing 
so. The influence of sentence discounts at the Special Panels, then, 
held sway not primarily over Special Panels defendants but rather 
over their counsel. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Plea bargaining can be practiced in any number of ways, and 
different forms of plea bargaining are more prevalent in some 
jurisdictions than in others. Charge bargaining is most prevalent in 
American jurisdictions where prosecutors exercise broad discretion 
over charging decisions that largely define the limits of criminal 
punishment. Sentence bargaining will be practiced alternatively or 
additionally in American jurisdictions where judges virtually always 
sentence in accordance with prosecutorial recommendations. 
Bargaining between prosecution and defense tends to be less overt in 
England and Australia. Although charge bargaining does occur,357 
implicit bargaining-the least obvious form of plea bargaining-is 
probably most prevalent in those countries. 358 Both charge bargaining 
and sentence bargaining, wherever practiced, can concern not only the 
defendant's guilty plea but other issues as well. In exchange for 
charging or sentencing concessions, the prosecution might require the 
defendant to provide information about the cnmes of other 
357. See generally SANDERS & YOUNG, supra note 2, at 441-68 (describing charge bargaining 
in England); Richard Read, Plea Negotiation and the Role of the Prosecution in Victoria, 6 J. Jun. 
ADMIN. 25 (1996) (discussing charge bargaining in some jurisdictions of Australia). 
358. On implicit bargaining in Australia, see Willis, supra note 2. On implicit bargaining in 
the United Kingdom, see SANDERS & YOUNG, supra note 2, at 398; R. v. March [2002] EWCA 
(Crim) 551, 2002 Crim.App. R(S) 98 (Eng.); Du Plooy v. H.M. Advocate, High Court of Justiciary, 
[2003] S.L.T. 1237, 2003 WL 22257793 (Scot.). As Penny Darbyshire writes: 
Plea bargaining in England and Wales cannot be directly likened to negotiating in the 
United States, because we lack certain elements common in US legal systems: our 
prosecutors do not make sentence recommendations; most of our offences do not carry 
minimum sentences; our judges are not supposed to indicate the sentences they are 
minded to impose. In England, then, we tend to speak of plea bargaining as the 
exchange of a guilty plea for a reduced charge or some hope of a reduced sentence. 
The last can be induced without involvement of the prosecutor, or any explicit 
bargain. This is called 'implicit bargaining.' 
Darbyshire, supra note 2, at 897. 
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defendants, for instance, or to waive his right to appeaP59 or his right 
to receive exculpatory evidence collected by the prosecution.360 
Although plea bargaining can take many forms and result in 
many different sorts of agreements, the force driving all of them is the 
defendant's desire for a sentence reduction. Although a small 
percentage of defendants charged with domestic crimes will plead 
guilty without concern for sentencing concessions because the 
evidence against them is so compelling,361 domestic defendants in the 
main agree to self-convict because they expect to receive shorter 
sentences. Indeed, the fact that sentence discounts motivate domestic 
defendants to plead guilty virtually goes without saying in the plea-
bargaining literature. It is simply understood that defendants 
prosecuted in Western criminal justice systems seek to minimize their 
incarceration time. While reducing the length of their sentence may 
not be their sole concern, it is so significant a concern that an offer of a 
sentence reduction will be a persuasive inducement in virtually every 
case. That inducement will prove all the more compelling to 
defendants who are in fact guilty of the crimes for which they have 
been charged and who are confronted with substantial evidence of that 
guilt. But reports indicate that even some innocent defendants 
likewise plead guilty to avoid the risk of a longer sentence imposed 
upon conviction after a trial. 362 
359. Most plea agreements at the ICTY and the Special Panels, for instance, require 
defendants to waive their right to appeal their sentence if they are sentenced within the range 
agreed upon in the plea agreement. See, e.g., Momir Nikolic Plea Agreement, supra note 73,, 14; 
Obrenovic Plea Agreement, supra note 73, , 14; Telephone interview with Essa Faal, Chief of 
Prosecutions, Special Panels for Serious Crimes (July 30, 2004). 
360. See, e.g., Erica G. Franklin, Note, Waiving Prosecutorial Disclosure in the Guilty Plea 
Process: A Debate on the Merits of "Discovery" Waivers, 51 STAN. L. REV. 567 (1999) (discussing 
the practice of waiving discovery rights in plea bargain contracts); Shane M. Cahill, Note, United 
States v. Ruiz: Are Plea Agreements Conditioned on Brady Waivers Unconstitutional?, 32 
GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 1 (2002) (examining the constitutionality of plea agreements 
conditioned on the defendant's willingness to waive his right to receive impeachment evidence). 
Proposed amendments to the United States Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure would put an 
end to bargaining over the defendant's right to receive exculpatory evidence because they would 
require federal prosecutors to disclose all exculpatory evidence fourteen days before a guilty plea 
is entered. Robert W. Tarun et al., Proposed Codification of Disclosure of Favorable Information 
Under Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure 11 and 16, 41 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 93,95 (2004). 
361. Albert W. Alschuler, The Changing Plea Bargaining Debate, 69 CAL. L. REV. 652, 657 
(1981) (observing that some defendants plead guilty because they "sense no chance of victory at 
trial"); Weninger, supra note 3, at 293. 
362. MICHAEL ZANDER & PAUL HENDERSON, THE ROYAL COMMISSION ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE, 
CROWN COURT STUDY 139 (1993); John Baldwin & Michael McConville, Plea Bargaining and 
Plea Negotiation in England, 13 LAW & Soc'Y REV. 287, 298 (1979) (reporting that "innocent 
persons are frequently placed at risk and that, on occasion, the weaker and less knowledgeable 
are wrongly persuaded to plead guilty."). 
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The relatively straightforward relationship between sentencing 
discounts and guilty pleas just described does not exist in the context 
of international crimes. Although some international defendants rely 
on sentence-based calculations when deciding whether or not to plead 
guilty, for a substantial proportion of international defendants 
currently in the dock, sentence inducements have only limited 
persuasive value. The reasons for their lack of influence vary with the 
circumstances. High-level ICTR defendants, for instance, are so 
convinced of their innocence, so ideologically committed to their 
characterization of the Rwandan conflict, and so concerned about their 
place in the history books that virtually no sentence inducement will 
persuade them to plead guilty to genocide. Low-level Special Panels 
defendants, by contrast, are so ignorant about their legal rights and so 
culturally disposed to admitting wrongdoing and seeking 
reconciliation that, absent the constraining hand of counsel, no 
sentence inducement is needed to persuade them to plead guilty. 
Prosecutors who seek to procure guilty pleas from current or future 
defendants brought before the Special Court for Sierra Leone, the 
Extraordinary Chambers in Cambodia, or the International Criminal 
Court will no doubt be confronted with a different array of factors that 
will impact the influence of sentencing discounts over those 
defendants. 
This discussion elides the question of whether prosecutors 
should be seeking guilty pleas for international crimes. There is no 
question that plea bargaining constitutes one of the most disreputable 
features of the American criminal justice system.363 American charge 
bargaining frequently distorts the historical record of proceedings, 364 
363. See Combs, supra note 36, at 4-5 n.13 (collecting critical sources). Plea bargaining is 
none too popular in other countries either. See Kathy Mack & Sharyn Roach Anleu, Sentence 
Discount for a Guilty Plea: Time for a New Look, 1 FLINDERS J. L. REFORM 123, 124 (1997) ("It is 
our conclusion that the sentence discount for a guilty plea as it currently operates in Australia is 
wrong in principle and in practice and should not be supported."); Kathy Mack & Sharyn Roach 
Anleu, Choice, Consent and Autonomy in a Guilty Plea System, 17 L. CONTEXT 75, 75-76 (1999) 
(suggesting reform of the Australian plea-bargaining system to take account of defendants' 
diverse social identities); Willis, supra note 2, at 72 (recounting various criticisms of Australian 
plea bargaining); Murder Sentence Changes Unveiled, BBC NEWS, Sept. 20, 2004 (criticizing 
British plan to reduce a defendant's sentence by up to a third, following a guilty plea); Lincoln 
Archer, "We Feel We've Been Robbed,"BBC NEWS, Sept. 20, 2004 (same). 
364. Some prosecutors systematically over-charge defendants so as to be able to withdraw 
charges during the bargaining process. See Albert W. Alschuler, The Prosecutor's Role in Plea 
Bargaining, 36 U. CHI. L. REV. 50, 89 (1968) (describing prosecutors who "charge robbery when 
they should charge larceny from the person, [who] charge grand theft when they should charge 
petty theft, [who] charge assault with intent to commit murder when they should charge some 
form of battery ... ") [hereinafter Alschuler, The Prosecutor's Role in Plea Bargaining]; 
Ruttenberg, supra note 38, at 325-26 (The prosecutor "may charge the defendant in the original 
indictment with a crime or crimes that he knows he cannot prove, and then, 'bargain' down to 
HeinOnline -- 59 Vand. L. Rev.  149 2006
2006] GUILTY PLEAS FOR INTERNATIONAL CRI1WES 149 
and any sort of plea bargaining can encourage prosecutors and defense 
attorneys to misrepresent facts and to bring frivolous motions to 
obtain a better plea.365 Moreover, as a result of the way in which most 
appointed counsel are compensated in the United States, plea 
bargaining gives rise to conflicts of interest whereby defense counsel 
have strong incentives to pressure their clients to plead guilty, 
regardless of whether it is in their best interests to do so.366 Many of 
the charges for which he has the necessary proof."); Frase, supra note 236, at 621 (noting that 
American prosecutors ''have an incentive to exaggerate initial charges so as to leave more room 
for later plea bargaining concessions"); see also Robert E. Scott & William J. Stuntz, Plea 
Bargaining as Contract, 101 YALE L.J. 1909, 1963-66 (1992) (observing that mandatory 
minimum sentencing schemes provide useful bargaining positions for the prosecutor, who may 
then obtain a guilty plea for a lesser crime that, in fact, more accurately represents the 
defendant's conduct). Other prosecutors issue accurate indictments but withdraw charges in a 
way that understates the actual criminal responsibility. John H. Langbein, Torture and Plea 
Bargaining, 46 U. CHI. L. REV. 3, 16 (1978) ("In the plea bargaining that takes the form of charge 
bargaining (as opposed to sentence bargaining), the culprit is convicted not for what he did, but 
for something less opprobrious."); Alschuler, Trial Judge's Role, supra note 11, at 1141 
(observing that charge bargaining frequently mislabels the conduct that it punishes so that 
"[g]uns are 'swallowed' as armed robberies become unarmed robberies; burglaries committed at 
night are transformed through prosecutorial wizardry to burglaries during the day; and 
defendants solemnly affirm that they have driven the wrong way on one-way streets in towns 
without one-way streets"). 
365. Prosecutors might, for instance, conceal fatal defects in the case, such as that a critical 
witness has died, will not testify, or cannot be found. See Alschuler, The Prosecutor's Role in Plea 
Bargaining, supra note 364, at 65--67; see also William F. McDonald et al., Prosecutorial Bluffing 
and the Case Against Plea-Bargaining, in PLEA BARGAINING 1, 9 (William F. McDonald & James 
A. Cramer eds., 1980); Fred C. Zacharias, Justice in Plea Bargaining, 39 WM. & MARY L. REV. 
1121, 1149 (1998). Defense attorneys, for their part, frequently demand jury trials when they 
have no interest in trying the case before a jury. Alschuler, The Prosecutor's Role in Plea 
Bargaining, supra note 364, at 56. They also often file numerous pre-trial motions in an effort to 
enhance their own bargaining positions. Id. at 80; see Kenneth Kipnis, Criminal Justice and the 
Negotiated Plea, 86 ETHICS 93, 94 (1976) ("A skilled defense attorney can do much to force the 
prosecutor to expend resources in bringing a case to trial."). 
366. The conflicts of interest arise because American defense counsel are compensated in 
ways that motivate them to dispose of virtually all of their cases through guilty pleas. Retained 
defense attorneys typically obtain a flat fee, paid up-front, for their representation. David Lynch, 
The Impropriety of Plea Agreements: A Tale of Two Counties, 19 LAw. & Soc. INQUIRY 115, 123 & 
n.9 (1994). That fee is always sufficient, and frequently generous, for the work involved in 
securing a guilty plea. Albert W. Alschuler, The Defense Attorney's Role in Plea Bargaining, 84 
YALE L.J. 1179, 1182-84 (1975). But it is often woefully inadequate as compensation for taking a 
case to trial. See Schulhofer, supra note 1, at 1988; Stephen J. Schulhofer, A Wake-Up Call from 
the Plea Bargaining Trenches, 19 LAw. & Soc. INQUIRY 135, 138 (1994); Stephen J. Schulhofer, 
Criminal Justice Discretion as a Regulatory System, 17 J. LEGAL STUD. 43, 53-54 (1988) (noting 
that because retained lawyers are typically paid a flat fee up front, when they take a case to 
trial, their "additional hours of effort typically have to be provided free of charge"); Alschuler, 
The Defense Attorney's Role, supra at 1181-1206 (describing the retained defense attorneys' 
incentive to convince their clients to plead guilty); Gordon van Kessel, Adversary Excesses in the 
American Criminal Trial, 67 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 403, 502 (1992) (noting that retained 
attorneys "make more money disposing of cases by plea bargain than by trial" and that some 
"lawyers complain of 'losing money by going to trial"'); Chad Baruch, Through The Looking 
Glass: A Brief Comment on the Short Life and Unhappy Demise of the Singleton Rule, 27 N. KY. 
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these abuses also have the potential to wreak havoc in the 
international context, and the hue and cry that greeted the sentences 
imposed in certain ICTY guilty-plea cases367 suggest a similar level of 
public dissatisfaction with plea bargaining in that realm. 
The desirability of plea bargaining in the international realm is 
not a topic that can be addressed here. 36B Whatever its desirability, 
what can be observed is that in a national criminal justice system, 
defendants who are not motivated by sentence discounts would spell 
the end of efforts to secure guilty pleas because sentence discounts are 
the only real inducement that national prosecutors have to offer. 
International prosecutors, however, have at their disposal additional 
incentives. For some international defendants, the location of 
detention can matter more than the length of detention. Likewise, 
where there is more than one criminal justice system available to 
prosecute the defendant, the question of which one takes the honors 
can be of key significance. Bargaining over these issues may be more 
easily conducted outside the public glare, thereby benefiting 
prosecutors accustomed to public rebuke for their lenient sentence 
L. REV. 841, 850 (2000) (noting that court appointed defense attorneys and those paid a flat fee 
who proceed to trial "take!] the risk of earning as little as one or two dollars per hour."); Jerome 
H. Skolnick, Social Control in the Adversary System, 11 J . CONFLICT RES. 52, 61 (1967) (noting 
the economic advantage that can accrue to the private attorney who pleads her client guilty). 
Lawyers who are appointed to represent indigent defendants have similarly compelling 
incentives to convince their clients to plead guilty. Appointed counsel are typically paid either a 
flat fee or an hourly rate with a ceiling. Whichever form the compensation takes, the amounts 
are embarrassingly low. Nancy J. Moore, The Ethical Duties of Insurance Defense Lawyers: Are 
Special Solutions Required?, 4 CONN. INS. L.J. 259, 290 (1997-1998) ("[IJn criminal defense work, 
flat fees are common for lawyers representing indigent defendants, and the rates are 
outrageously low, especially in death penalty cases."). Appointed defense attorneys in New York 
County, New York, for instance, are paid "$40 per hour for in-court work and $25 per hour for 
out-of-court work, with caps of $1,200 for felony cases and $800 for misdemeanor cases." Terry 
Brooks & Shubhangi Deoras, Local Bars Fight to Hike Counsel Rates, 17 CRIM. JUST. 42, 42 
(2002). Because the compensation caps are almost always the same regardless of whether the 
defendant pleads guilty or goes to trial, appointed defense counsel have enormous incentives to 
dispose of as many cases as possible by guilty plea. Schulhofer, Plea Bargaining as Disaster, 
supra note 1, at 1989; Bruce W. Neckers, Michigan 's System of Compensation for Criminal 
Defense of the Indigent is Inadequate, 81 MICH. BAR J . 8 (Jan. 2002) (''Those serving indigent 
defendants in counties with flat rates, or 'fee schedules,' are faced with a disturbing disincentive 
to serve their clients well because in most cases the lawyer receives a maximum amount for the 
type of service rendered despite the time it takes to render the service.'). 
367. See supra note 137. 
368. I will briefly note, however, that international criminal prosecutions labor under 
pressures unknown to domestic criminal courts. The Special Panels closed its doors in May 2005, 
leaving many defendants unprosecuted. Attempts to secure guilty pleas in this context, then, 
must be evaluated by entirely different criteria. See NANCY AMOURY COMBS, GUILTY PLEAS IN 
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW: CONSTRUCTING A RESTORATIVE JUSTICE APPROACH FOR 
BRIDGING JUSTICE AND TRUTH (forthcoming 2006) (arguing, among other things, that plea 
bargaining is justified in the context of international crimes as a means of enhancing the 
penological goals that international criminal prosecutions are intended to serve). 
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recommendations in guilty-plea cases but creating an additional worry 
for those already uneasy about plea bargaining. Whether the offer of 
such inducements will or should be the next frontier in international 
plea bargaining cannot yet be known. What is currently clear, 
however, is that international prosecutors who wish to procure guilty 
pleas must be more flexible and more creative in their efforts if they 
are to counterbalance the many factors that can deter international 
defendants from pleading guilty. 
